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 Warren E. Buffett letters

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AuteurMessage
mihou
Rang: Administrateur
mihou


Nombre de messages : 8092
Localisation : Washington D.C.
Date d'inscription : 28/05/2005

Warren E. Buffett letters - Page 2 Empty
05072006
MessageWarren E. Buffett letters

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

Chairman's Letter


To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 1996 was $6.2 billion, or 36.1%. Per-
share book value, however, grew by less, 31.8%, because the number of
Berkshire shares increased: We issued stock in acquiring FlightSafety
International and also sold new Class B shares.* Over the last 32 years
(that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has
grown from $19 to $19,011, or at a rate of 23.8% compounded annually.

* Each Class B share has an economic interest equal to 1/30th of
that possessed by a Class A share, which is the new designation for
the only stock that Berkshire had outstanding before May 1996.
Throughout this report, we state all per-share figures in terms of
"Class A equivalents," which are the sum of the Class A shares
outstanding and 1/30th of the Class B shares outstanding.

For technical reasons, we have restated our 1995 financial
statements, a matter that requires me to present one of my less-than-
thrilling explanations of accounting arcana. I'll make it brief.

The restatement was required because GEICO became a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Berkshire on January 2, 1996, whereas it was previously
classified as an investment. From an economic viewpoint - taking into
account major tax efficiencies and other benefits we gained - the value
of the 51% of GEICO we owned at year-end 1995 increased significantly
when we acquired the remaining 49% of the company two days later.
Accounting rules applicable to this type of "step acquisition," however,
required us to write down the value of our 51% at the time we moved to
100%. That writedown - which also, of course, reduced book value -
amounted to $478.4 million. As a result, we now carry our original 51%
of GEICO at a value that is both lower than its market value at the time
we purchased the remaining 49% of the company and lower than the value at
which we carry that 49% itself.

There is an offset, however, to the reduction in book value I have
just described: Twice during 1996 we issued Berkshire shares at a
premium to book value, first in May when we sold the B shares for cash
and again in December when we used both A and B shares as part-payment
for FlightSafety. In total, the three non-operational items affecting
book value contributed less than one percentage point to our 31.8% per-
share gain last year.

I dwell on this rise in per-share book value because it roughly
indicates our economic progress during the year. But, as Charlie Munger,
Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and I have repeatedly told you, what counts at
Berkshire is intrinsic value, not book value. The last time you got that
message from us was in the Owner's Manual, sent to you in June after we
issued the Class B shares. In that manual, we not only defined certain
key terms - such as intrinsic value - but also set forth our economic
principles.

For many years, we have listed these principles in the front of our
annual report, but in this report, on pages 58 to 67, we reproduce the
entire Owner's Manual. In this letter, we will occasionally refer to the
manual so that we can avoid repeating certain definitions and
explanations. For example, if you wish to brush up on "intrinsic value,"
see pages 64 and 65.

Last year, for the first time, we supplied you with a table that
Charlie and I believe will help anyone trying to estimate Berkshire's
intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table, which follows, we
trace two key indices of value. The first column lists our per-share
ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents) and the second
column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's operating businesses
before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments but after all interest
and corporate overhead expenses. The operating-earnings column excludes
all dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from the
investments presented in the first column. In effect, the two columns
show what Berkshire would have reported had it been broken into two parts.


Pre-tax Earnings Per Share
Investments Excluding All Income from
Year Per Share Investments
---- ----------- -------------------------
1965................................$ 4 $ 4.08
1975................................ 159 (6.48)
1985................................ 2,443 18.86
1995................................ 22,088 258.20
1996................................ 28,500 421.39

Annual Growth Rate, 1965-95......... 33.4% 14.7%
One-Year Growth Rate, 1995-96 ...... 29.0% 63.2%


As the table tells you, our investments per share increased in 1996
by 29.0% and our non-investment earnings grew by 63.2%. Our goal is to
keep the numbers in both columns moving ahead at a reasonable (or, better
yet, unreasonable) pace.

Our expectations, however, are tempered by two realities. First,
our past rates of growth cannot be matched nor even approached:
Berkshire's equity capital is now large - in fact, fewer than ten
businesses in America have capital larger - and an abundance of funds
tends to dampen returns. Second, whatever our rate of progress, it will
not be smooth: Year-to-year moves in the first column of the table above
will be influenced in a major way by fluctuations in securities markets;
the figures in the second column will be affected by wide swings in the
profitability of our catastrophe-reinsurance business.

In the table, the donations made pursuant to our shareholder-
designated contributions program are charged against the second column,
though we view them as a shareholder benefit rather than as an expense.
All other corporate expenses are also charged against the second column.
These costs may be lower than those of any other large American
corporation: Our after-tax headquarters expense amounts to less than two
basis points (1/50th of 1%) measured against net worth. Even so, Charlie
used to think this expense percentage outrageously high, blaming it on my
use of Berkshire's corporate jet, The Indefensible. But Charlie has
recently experienced a "counter-revelation": With our purchase of
FlightSafety, whose major activity is the training of corporate pilots,
he now rhapsodizes at the mere mention of jets.

Seriously, costs matter. For example, equity mutual funds incur
corporate expenses - largely payments to the funds' managers - that
average about 100 basis points, a levy likely to cut the returns their
investors earn by 10% or more over time. Charlie and I make no promises
about Berkshire's results. We do promise you, however, that virtually
all of the gains Berkshire makes will end up with shareholders. We are
here to make money with you, not off you.


The Relationship of Intrinsic Value to Market Price

In last year's letter, with Berkshire shares selling at $36,000, I
told you: (1) Berkshire's gain in market value in recent years had
outstripped its gain in intrinsic value, even though the latter gain had
been highly satisfactory; (2) that kind of overperformance could not
continue indefinitely; (3) Charlie and I did not at that moment consider
Berkshire to be undervalued.

Since I set down those cautions, Berkshire's intrinsic value has
increased very significantly - aided in a major way by a stunning
performance at GEICO that I will tell you more about later - while the
market price of our shares has changed little. This, of course, means
that in 1996 Berkshire's stock underperformed the business.
Consequently, today's price/value relationship is both much different
from what it was a year ago and, as Charlie and I see it, more
appropriate.

Over time, the aggregate gains made by Berkshire shareholders must
of necessity match the business gains of the company. When the stock
temporarily overperforms or underperforms the business, a limited number
of shareholders - either sellers or buyers - receive outsized benefits at
the expense of those they trade with. Generally, the sophisticated have
an edge over the innocents in this game.

Though our primary goal is to maximize the amount that our
shareholders, in total, reap from their ownership of Berkshire, we wish
also to minimize the benefits going to some shareholders at the expense
of others. These are goals we would have were we managing a family
partnership, and we believe they make equal sense for the manager of a
public company. In a partnership, fairness requires that partnership
interests be valued equitably when partners enter or exit; in a public
company, fairness prevails when market price and intrinsic value are in
sync. Obviously, they won't always meet that ideal, but a manager - by
his policies and communications - can do much to foster equity.

Of course, the longer a shareholder holds his shares, the more
bearing Berkshire's business results will have on his financial
experience - and the less it will matter what premium or discount to
intrinsic value prevails when he buys and sells his stock. That's one
reason we hope to attract owners with long-term horizons. Overall, I
think we have succeeded in that pursuit. Berkshire probably ranks number
one among large American corporations in the percentage of its shares
held by owners with a long-term view.


Acquisitions of 1996

We made two acquisitions in 1996, both possessing exactly the
qualities we seek - excellent business economics and an outstanding
manager.

The first acquisition was Kansas Bankers Surety (KBS), an insurance
company whose name describes its specialty. The company, which does
business in 22 states, has an extraordinary underwriting record, achieved
through the efforts of Don Towle, an extraordinary manager. Don has
developed first-hand relationships with hundreds of bankers and knows
every detail of his operation. He thinks of himself as running a company
that is "his," an attitude we treasure at Berkshire. Because of its
relatively small size, we placed KBS with Wesco, our 80%-owned
subsidiary, which has wanted to expand its insurance operations.

You might be interested in the carefully-crafted and sophisticated
acquisition strategy that allowed Berkshire to nab this deal. Early in
1996 I was invited to the 40th birthday party of my nephew's wife, Jane
Rogers. My taste for social events being low, I immediately, and in my
standard, gracious way, began to invent reasons for skipping the event.
The party planners then countered brilliantly by offering me a seat next
to a man I always enjoy, Jane's dad, Roy Dinsdale - so I went.

The party took place on January 26. Though the music was loud - Why
must bands play as if they will be paid by the decibel? - I just managed
to hear Roy say he'd come from a directors meeting at Kansas Bankers
Surety, a company I'd always admired. I shouted back that he should let
me know if it ever became available for purchase.

On February 12, I got the following letter from Roy: "Dear Warren:
Enclosed is the annual financial information on Kansas Bankers Surety.
This is the company that we talked about at Janie's party. If I can be
of any further help, please let me know." On February 13, I told Roy we
would pay $75 million for the company - and before long we had a deal.
I'm now scheming to get invited to Jane's next party.

Our other acquisition in 1996 - FlightSafety International, the
world's leader in the training of pilots - was far larger, at about $1.5
billion, but had an equally serendipitous origin. The heroes of this
story are first, Richard Sercer, a Tucson aviation consultant, and
second, his wife, Alma Murphy, an ophthalmology graduate of Harvard
Medical School, who in 1990 wore down her husband's reluctance and got
him to buy Berkshire stock. Since then, the two have attended all our
Annual Meetings, but I didn't get to know them personally.

Fortunately, Richard had also been a long-time shareholder of
FlightSafety, and it occurred to him last year that the two companies
would make a good fit. He knew our acquisition criteria, and he thought
that Al Ueltschi, FlightSafety's 79-year-old CEO, might want to make a
deal that would both give him a home for his company and a security in
payment that he would feel comfortable owning throughout his lifetime.
So in July, Richard wrote Bob Denham, CEO of Salomon Inc, suggesting that
he explore the possibility of a merger.

Bob took it from there, and on September 18, Al and I met in New
York. I had long been familiar with FlightSafety's business, and in
about 60 seconds I knew that Al was exactly our kind of manager. A month
later, we had a contract. Because Charlie and I wished to minimize the
issuance of Berkshire shares, the transaction we structured gave
FlightSafety shareholders a choice of cash or stock but carried terms
that encouraged those who were tax-indifferent to take cash. This nudge
led to about 51% of FlightSafety's shares being exchanged for cash, 41%
for Berkshire A and 8% for Berkshire B.

Al has had a lifelong love affair with aviation and actually piloted
Charles Lindbergh. After a barnstorming career in the 1930s, he began
working for Juan Trippe, Pan Am's legendary chief. In 1951, while still
at Pan Am, Al founded FlightSafety, subsequently building it into a
simulator manufacturer and a worldwide trainer of pilots (single-engine,
helicopter, jet and marine). The company operates in 41 locations,
outfitted with 175 simulators of planes ranging from the very small, such
as Cessna 210s, to Boeing 747s. Simulators are not cheap - they can cost
as much as $19 million - so this business, unlike many of our
operations, is capital intensive. About half of the company's revenues
are derived from the training of corporate pilots, with most of the
balance coming from airlines and the military.

Al may be 79, but he looks and acts about 55. He will run
operations just as he has in the past: We never fool with success. I
have told him that though we don't believe in splitting Berkshire stock,
we will split his age 2-for-1 when he hits 100.

An observer might conclude from our hiring practices that Charlie
and I were traumatized early in life by an EEOC bulletin on age
discrimination. The real explanation, however, is self-interest: It's
difficult to teach a new dog old tricks. The many Berkshire managers who
are past 70 hit home runs today at the same pace that long ago gave them
reputations as young slugging sensations. Therefore, to get a job with
us, just employ the tactic of the 76-year-old who persuaded a dazzling
beauty of 25 to marry him. "How did you ever get her to accept?" asked
his envious contemporaries. The comeback: "I told her I was 86."

* * * * * * * * * * * *

And now we pause for our usual commercial: If you own a large
business with good economic characteristics and wish to become associated
with an exceptional collection of businesses having similar
characteristics, Berkshire may well be the home you seek. Our
requirements are set forth on page 21. If your company meets them - and
if I fail to make the next birthday party you attend - give me a call.


Insurance Operations - Overview

Our insurance business was terrific in 1996. In both primary
insurance, where GEICO is our main unit, and in our "super-cat"
reinsurance business, results were outstanding.

As we've explained in past reports, what counts in our insurance
business is, first, the amount of "float" we generate and, second, its
cost to us. These are matters that are important for you to understand
because float is a major component of Berkshire's intrinsic value that is
not reflected in book value.
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Warren E. Buffett letters :: Commentaires

mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 0:50 par mihou
Corporate Performance

During 1983 our book value increased from $737.43 per share
to $975.83 per share, or by 32%. We never take the one-year
figure very seriously. After all, why should the time required
for a planet to circle the sun synchronize precisely with the
time required for business actions to pay off? Instead, we
recommend not less than a five-year test as a rough yardstick of
economic performance. Red lights should start flashing if the
five-year average annual gain falls much below the return on
equity earned over the period by American industry in aggregate.
(Watch out for our explanation if that occurs as Goethe observed,
“When ideas fail, words come in very handy.”)

During the 19-year tenure of present management, book value
has grown from $19.46 per share to $975.83, or 22.6% compounded
annually. Considering our present size, nothing close to this
rate of return can be sustained. Those who believe otherwise
should pursue a career in sales, but avoid one in mathematics.

We report our progress in terms of book value because in our
case (though not, by any means, in all cases) it is a
conservative but reasonably adequate proxy for growth in
intrinsic business value - the measurement that really counts.
Book value’s virtue as a score-keeping measure is that it is easy
to calculate and doesn’t involve the subjective (but important)
judgments employed in calculation of intrinsic business value.
It is important to understand, however, that the two terms - book
value and intrinsic business value - have very different
meanings.

Book value is an accounting concept, recording the
accumulated financial input from both contributed capital and
retained earnings. Intrinsic business value is an economic
concept, estimating future cash output discounted to present
value. Book value tells you what has been put in; intrinsic
business value estimates what can be taken out.

An analogy will suggest the difference. Assume you spend
identical amounts putting each of two children through college.
The book value (measured by financial input) of each child’s
education would be the same. But the present value of the future
payoff (the intrinsic business value) might vary enormously -
from zero to many times the cost of the education. So, also, do
businesses having equal financial input end up with wide
variations in value.

At Berkshire, at the beginning of fiscal 1965 when the
present management took over, the $19.46 per share book value
considerably overstated intrinsic business value. All of that
book value consisted of textile assets that could not earn, on
average, anything close to an appropriate rate of return. In the
terms of our analogy, the investment in textile assets resembled
investment in a largely-wasted education.

Now, however, our intrinsic business value considerably
exceeds book value. There are two major reasons:

(1) Standard accounting principles require that common
stocks held by our insurance subsidiaries be stated on
our books at market value, but that other stocks we own
be carried at the lower of aggregate cost or market.
At the end of 1983, the market value of this latter
group exceeded carrying value by $70 million pre-tax,
or about $50 million after tax. This excess belongs in
our intrinsic business value, but is not included in
the calculation of book value;

(2) More important, we own several businesses that possess
economic Goodwill (which is properly includable in
intrinsic business value) far larger than the
accounting Goodwill that is carried on our balance
sheet and reflected in book value.

Goodwill, both economic and accounting, is an arcane subject
and requires more explanation than is appropriate here. The
appendix that follows this letter - “Goodwill and its
Amortization: The Rules and The Realities” - explains why
economic and accounting Goodwill can, and usually do, differ
enormously.

You can live a full and rewarding life without ever thinking
about Goodwill and its amortization. But students of investment
and management should understand the nuances of the subject. My
own thinking has changed drastically from 35 years ago when I was
taught to favor tangible assets and to shun businesses whose
value depended largely upon economic Goodwill. This bias caused
me to make many important business mistakes of omission, although
relatively few of commission.

Keynes identified my problem: “The difficulty lies not in
the new ideas but in escaping from the old ones.” My escape was
long delayed, in part because most of what I had been taught by
the same teacher had been (and continues to be) so
extraordinarily valuable. Ultimately, business experience,
direct and vicarious, produced my present strong preference for
businesses that possess large amounts of enduring Goodwill and
that utilize a minimum of tangible assets.

I recommend the Appendix to those who are comfortable with
accounting terminology and who have an interest in understanding
the business aspects of Goodwill. Whether or not you wish to
tackle the Appendix, you should be aware that Charlie and I
believe that Berkshire possesses very significant economic
Goodwill value above that reflected in our book value.

Sources of Reported Earnings

The table below shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported
earnings. In 1982, Berkshire owned about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps
whereas, in 1983, our ownership was 60% throughout the first six
months and 100% thereafter. In turn, Berkshire’s net interest in
Wesco was 48% during 1982 and the first six months of 1983, and
80% for the balance of 1983. Because of these changed ownership
percentages, the first two columns of the table provide the best
measure of underlying business performance.

All of the significant gains and losses attributable to
unusual sales of assets by any of the business entities are
aggregated with securities transactions on the line near the
bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings.
(We regard any annual figure for realized capital gains or losses
as meaningless, but we regard the aggregate realized and
unrealized capital gains over a period of years as very
important.) Furthermore, amortization of Goodwill is not charged
against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the
Appendix, is set forth as a separate item.

Net Earnings
Earnings Before Income Taxes After Tax
-------------------------------------- ------------------
Total Berkshire Share Berkshire Share
------------------ ------------------ ------------------
1983 1982 1983 1982 1983 1982
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
(000s omitted)
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ............ $(33,872) $(21,558) $(33,872) $(21,558) $(18,400) $(11,345)
Net Investment Income ... 43,810 41,620 43,810 41,620 39,114 35,270
Berkshire-Waumbec Textiles (100) (1,545) (100) (1,545) (63) (862)
Associated Retail Stores .. 697 914 697 914 355 446
Nebraska Furniture Mart(1) 3,812 -- 3,049 -- 1,521 --
See’s Candies ............. 27,411 23,884 24,526 14,235 12,212 6,914
Buffalo Evening News ...... 19,352 (1,215) 16,547 (724) 8,832 (226)
Blue Chip Stamps(2) ....... (1,422) 4,182 (1,876) 2,492 (353) 2,472
Wesco Financial - Parent .. 7,493 6,156 4,844 2,937 3,448 2,210
Mutual Savings and Loan ... (798) (6) (467) (2) 1,917 1,524
Precision Steel ........... 3,241 1,035 2,102 493 1,136 265
Interest on Debt .......... (15,104) (14,996) (13,844) (12,977) (7,346) (6,951)
Special GEICO Distribution 21,000 -- 21,000 -- 19,551 --
Shareholder-Designated
Contributions .......... (3,066) (891) (3,066) (891) (1,656) (481)
Amortization of Goodwill .. (532) 151 (563) 90 (563) 90
Other ..................... 10,121 3,371 9,623 2,658 8,490 2,171
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings .......... 82,043 41,102 72,410 27,742 68,195 31,497
Sales of securities and
unusual sales of assets .. 67,260 36,651 65,089 21,875 45,298 14,877
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Total Earnings .............. $149,303 $ 77,753 $137,499 $ 49,617 $113,493 $ 46,374
======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ========

(1) October through December
(2) 1982 and 1983 are not comparable; major assets were
transferred in the merger.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 0:51 par mihou
For a discussion of the businesses owned by Wesco, please
read Charlie Munger’s report on pages 46-51. Charlie replaced
Louie Vincenti as Chairman of Wesco late in 1983 when health
forced Louie’s retirement at age 77. In some instances, “health”
is a euphemism, but in Louie’s case nothing but health would
cause us to consider his retirement. Louie is a marvelous man
and has been a marvelous manager.

The special GEICO distribution reported in the table arose
when that company made a tender offer for a portion of its stock,
buying both from us and other shareholders. At GEICO’s request,
we tendered a quantity of shares that kept our ownership
percentage the same after the transaction as before. The
proportional nature of our sale permitted us to treat the
proceeds as a dividend. Unlike individuals, corporations net
considerably more when earnings are derived from dividends rather
than from capital gains, since the effective Federal income tax
rate on dividends is 6.9% versus 28% on capital gains.

Even with this special item added in, our total dividends
from GEICO in 1983 were considerably less than our share of
GEICO’s earnings. Thus it is perfectly appropriate, from both an
accounting and economic standpoint, to include the redemption
proceeds in our reported earnings. It is because the item is
large and unusual that we call your attention to it.

The table showing you our sources of earnings includes
dividends from those non-controlled companies whose marketable
equity securities we own. But the table does not include
earnings those companies have retained that are applicable to our
ownership. In aggregate and over time we expect those
undistributed earnings to be reflected in market prices and to
increase our intrinsic business value on a dollar-for-dollar
basis, just as if those earnings had been under our control and
reported as part of our profits. That does not mean we expect
all of our holdings to behave uniformly; some will disappoint us,
others will deliver pleasant surprises. To date our experience
has been better than we originally anticipated, In aggregate, we
have received far more than a dollar of market value gain for
every dollar of earnings retained.

The following table shows our 1983 yearend net holdings in
marketable equities. All numbers represent 100% of Berkshire’s
holdings, and 80% of Wesco’s holdings. The portion attributable
to minority shareholders of Wesco has been excluded.

No. of Shares Cost Market
------------- ---------- ----------
(000s omitted)
690,975 Affiliated Publications, Inc. .... $ 3,516 $ 26,603
4,451,544 General Foods Corporation(a) ..... 163,786 228,698
6,850,000 GEICO Corporation ................ 47,138 398,156
2,379,200 Handy & Harman ................... 27,318 42,231
636,310 Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. 4,056 33,088
197,200 Media General .................... 3,191 11,191
250,400 Ogilvy & Mather International .... 2,580 12,833
5,618,661 R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc.(a) 268,918 314,334
901,788 Time, Inc. ....................... 27,732 56,860
1,868,600 The Washington Post Company ...... 10,628 136,875
---------- ----------
$558,863 $1,287,869
All Other Common Stockholdings ... 7,485 18,044
---------- ----------
Total Common Stocks .............. $566,348 $1,305,913
========== ==========

(a) WESCO owns shares in these companies.

Based upon present holdings and present dividend rates -
excluding any special items such as the GEICO proportional
redemption last year - we would expect reported dividends from
this group to be approximately $39 million in 1984. We can also
make a very rough guess about the earnings this group will retain
that will be attributable to our ownership: these may total about
$65 million for the year. These retained earnings could well
have no immediate effect on market prices of the securities.
Over time, however, we feel they will have real meaning.

In addition to the figures already supplied, information
regarding the businesses we control appears in Management’s
Discussion on pages 40-44. The most significant of these are
Buffalo Evening News, See’s, and the Insurance Group, to which we
will give some special attention here.

Buffalo Evening News

First, a clarification: our corporate name is Buffalo
Evening News, Inc. but the name of the newspaper, since we began
a morning edition a little over a year ago, is Buffalo News.

In 1983 the News somewhat exceeded its targeted profit
margin of 10% after tax. Two factors were responsible: (1) a
state income tax cost that was subnormal because of a large loss
carry-forward, now fully utilized, and (2) a large drop in the
per-ton cost of newsprint (an unanticipated fluke that will be
reversed in 1984).

Although our profit margins in 1983 were about average for
newspapers such as the News, the paper’s performance,
nevertheless, was a significant achievement considering the
economic and retailing environment in Buffalo.

Buffalo has a concentration of heavy industry, a segment of
the economy that was hit particularly hard by the recent
recession and that has lagged the recovery. As Buffalo consumers
have suffered, so also have the paper’s retailing customers.
Their numbers have shrunk over the past few years and many of
those surviving have cut their linage.

Within this environment the News has one exceptional
strength: its acceptance by the public, a matter measured by the
paper’s “penetration ratio” - the percentage of households within
the community purchasing the paper each day. Our ratio is
superb: for the six months ended September 30, 1983 the News
stood number one in weekday penetration among the 100 largest
papers in the United States (the ranking is based on “city zone”
numbers compiled by the Audit Bureau of Circulations).

In interpreting the standings, it is important to note that
many large cities have two papers, and that in such cases the
penetration of either paper is necessarily lower than if there
were a single paper, as in Buffalo. Nevertheless, the list of
the 100 largest papers includes many that have a city to
themselves. Among these, the News is at the top nationally, far
ahead of many of the country’s best-known dailies.

Among Sunday editions of these same large dailies, the News
ranks number three in penetration - ten to twenty percentage
points ahead of many well-known papers. It was not always this
way in Buffalo. Below we show Sunday circulation in Buffalo in
the years prior to 1977 compared with the present period. In
that earlier period the Sunday paper was the Courier-Express (the
News was not then publishing a Sunday paper). Now, of course, it
is the News.

Average Sunday Circulation
--------------------------
Year Circulation
---- -----------
1970 314,000
1971 306,000
1972 302,000
1973 290,000
1974 278,000
1975 269,000
1976 270,000

1984 (Current) 376,000

We believe a paper’s penetration ratio to be the best
measure of the strength of its franchise. Papers with unusually
high penetration in the geographical area that is of prime
interest to major local retailers, and with relatively little
circulation elsewhere, are exceptionally efficient buys for those
retailers. Low-penetration papers have a far less compelling
message to present to advertisers.

In our opinion, three factors largely account for the
unusual acceptance of the News in the community. Among these,
points 2 and 3 also may explain the popularity of the Sunday News
compared to that of the Sunday Courier-Express when it was the
sole Sunday paper:

(1) The first point has nothing to do with merits of the
News. Both emigration and immigration are relatively
low in Buffalo. A stable population is more interested
and involved in the activities of its community than is
a shifting population - and, as a result, is more
interested in the content of the local daily paper.
Increase the movement in and out of a city and
penetration ratios will fall.

(2) The News has a reputation for editorial quality and
integrity that was honed by our longtime editor, the
legendary Alfred Kirchhofer, and that has been preserved
and extended by Murray Light. This reputation was
enormously important to our success in establishing a
Sunday paper against entrenched competition. And without
a Sunday edition, the News would not have survived in the
long run.

(3) The News lives up to its name - it delivers a very
unusual amount of news. During 1983, our “news hole”
(editorial material - not ads) amounted to 50% of the
newspaper’s content (excluding preprinted inserts).
Among papers that dominate their markets and that are of
comparable or larger size, we know of only one whose news
hole percentage exceeds that of the News. Comprehensive
figures are not available, but a sampling indicates an
average percentage in the high 30s. In other words, page
for page, our mix gives readers over 25% more news than
the typical paper. This news-rich mixture is by intent.
Some publishers, pushing for higher profit margins, have
cut their news holes during the past decade. We have
maintained ours and will continue to do so. Properly
written and edited, a full serving of news makes our
paper more valuable to the reader and contributes to our
unusual penetration ratio.

Despite the strength of the News’ franchise, gains in ROP
linage (advertising printed within the newspaper pages as
contrasted to preprinted inserts) are going to be very difficult
to achieve. We had an enormous gain in preprints during 1983:
lines rose from 9.3 million to 16.4 million, revenues from $3.6
million to $8.1 million. These gains are consistent with
national trends, but exaggerated in our case by business we
picked up when the Courier-Express closed.

On balance, the shift from ROP to preprints has negative
economic implications for us. Profitability on preprints is less
and the business is more subject to competition from alternative
means of delivery. Furthermore, a reduction in ROP linage means
less absolute space devoted to news (since the news hole
percentage remains constant), thereby reducing the utility of the
paper to the reader.

Stan Lipsey became Publisher of the Buffalo News at midyear
upon the retirement of Henry Urban. Henry never flinched during
the dark days of litigation and losses following our introduction
of the Sunday paper - an introduction whose wisdom was questioned
by many in the newspaper business, including some within our own
building. Henry is admired by the Buffalo business community,
he’s admired by all who worked for him, and he is admired by
Charlie and me. Stan worked with Henry for several years, and
has worked for Berkshire Hathaway since 1969. He has been
personally involved in all nuts-and-bolts aspects of the
newspaper business from editorial to circulation. We couldn’t do
better.

See’s Candy Shops

The financial results at See’s continue to be exceptional.
The business possesses a valuable and solid consumer franchise
and a manager equally valuable and solid.

In recent years See’s has encountered two important
problems, at least one of which is well on its way toward
solution. That problem concerns costs, except those for raw
materials. We have enjoyed a break on raw material costs in
recent years though so, of course, have our competitors. One of
these days we will get a nasty surprise in the opposite
direction. In effect, raw material costs are largely beyond our
control since we will, as a matter of course, buy the finest
ingredients that we can, regardless of changes in their price
levels. We regard product quality as sacred.

But other kinds of costs are more controllable, and it is in
this area that we have had problems. On a per-pound basis, our
costs (not including those for raw materials) have increased in
the last few years at a rate significantly greater than the
increase in the general price level. It is vital to our
competitive position and profit potential that we reverse this
trend.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 0:52 par mihou
In recent months much better control over costs has been
attained and we feel certain that our rate of growth in these
costs in 1984 will be below the rate of inflation. This
confidence arises out of our long experience with the managerial
talents of Chuck Huggins. We put Chuck in charge the day we took
over, and his record has been simply extraordinary, as shown by
the following table:

52-53 Week Year Operating Number of Number of
Ended About Sales Profits Pounds of Stores Open
December 31 Revenues After Taxes Candy Sold at Year End
------------------- ------------ ----------- ---------- -----------
1983 (53 weeks) ... $133,531,000 $13,699,000 24,651,000 207
1982 .............. 123,662,000 11,875,000 24,216,000 202
1981 .............. 112,578,000 10,779,000 24,052,000 199
1980 .............. 97,715,000 7,547,000 24,065,000 191
1979 .............. 87,314,000 6,330,000 23,985,000 188
1978 .............. 73,653,000 6,178,000 22,407,000 182
1977 .............. 62,886,000 6,154,000 20,921,000 179
1976 (53 weeks) ... 56,333,000 5,569,000 20,553,000 173
1975 .............. 50,492,000 5,132,000 19,134,000 172
1974 .............. 41,248,000 3,021,000 17,883,000 170
1973 .............. 35,050,000 1,940,000 17,813,000 169
1972 .............. 31,337,000 2,083,000 16,954,000 167

The other problem we face, as the table suggests, is our
recent inability to achieve meaningful gains in pounds sold. The
industry has the same problem. But for many years we
outperformed the industry in this respect and now we are not.

The poundage volume in our retail stores has been virtually
unchanged each year for the past four, despite small increases
every year in the number of shops (and in distribution expense as
well). Of course, dollar volume has increased because we have
raised prices significantly. But we regard the most important
measure of retail trends to be units sold per store rather than
dollar volume. On a same-store basis (counting only shops open
throughout both years) with all figures adjusted to a 52-week
year, poundage was down .8 of 1% during 1983. This small decline
was our best same-store performance since 1979; the cumulative
decline since then has been about 8%. Quantity-order volume,
about 25% of our total, has plateaued in recent years following
very large poundage gains throughout the 1970s.

We are not sure to what extent this flat volume - both in
the retail shop area and the quantity order area - is due to our
pricing policies and to what extent it is due to static industry
volume, the recession, and the extraordinary share of market we
already enjoy in our primary marketing area. Our price increase
for 1984 is much more modest than has been the case in the past
few years, and we hope that next year we can report better volume
figures to you. But we have no basis to forecast these.

Despite the volume problem, See’s strengths are many and
important. In our primary marketing area, the West, our candy is
preferred by an enormous margin to that of any competitor. In
fact, we believe most lovers of chocolate prefer it to candy
costing two or three times as much. (In candy, as in stocks,
price and value can differ; price is what you give, value is what
you get.) The quality of customer service in our shops - operated
throughout the country by us and not by franchisees is every bit
as good as the product. Cheerful, helpful personnel are as much
a trademark of See’s as is the logo on the box. That’s no small
achievement in a business that requires us to hire about 2000
seasonal workers. We know of no comparably-sized organization
that betters the quality of customer service delivered by Chuck
Huggins and his associates.

Because we have raised prices so modestly in 1984, we expect
See’s profits this year to be about the same as in 1983.

Insurance - Controlled Operations

We both operate insurance companies and have a large
economic interest in an insurance business we don’t operate,
GEICO. The results for all can be summed up easily: in
aggregate, the companies we operate and whose underwriting
results reflect the consequences of decisions that were my
responsibility a few years ago, had absolutely terrible results.
Fortunately, GEICO, whose policies I do not influence, simply
shot the lights out. The inference you draw from this summary is
the correct one. I made some serious mistakes a few years ago
that came home to roost.

The industry had its worst underwriting year in a long time,
as indicated by the table below:

Yearly Change Combined Ratio
in Premiums after Policy-
Written (%) holder Dividends
------------- ----------------
1972 .................... 10.2 96.2
1973 .................... 8.0 99.2
1974 .................... 6.2 105.4
1975 .................... 11.0 107.9
1976 .................... 21.9 102.4
1977 .................... 19.8 97.2
1978 .................... 12.8 97.5
1979 .................... 10.3 100.6
1980 .................... 6.0 103.1
1981 .................... 3.9 106.0
1982 (Revised) .......... 4.4 109.7
1983 (Estimated) ........ 4.6 111.0

Source: Best’s Aggregates and Averages.
Best’s data reflect the experience of practically the entire
industry, including stock, mutual, and reciprocal companies. The
combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred
plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums; a ratio below
100 indicates an underwriting profit and one above 100 indicates
a loss.

For the reasons outlined in last year’s report, we expect
the poor industry experience of 1983 to be more or less typical
for a good many years to come. (As Yogi Berra put it: “It will be
deja vu all over again.”) That doesn’t mean we think the figures
won’t bounce around a bit; they are certain to. But we believe
it highly unlikely that the combined ratio during the balance of
the decade will average significantly below the 1981-1983 level.
Based on our expectations regarding inflation - and we are as
pessimistic as ever on that front - industry premium volume must
grow about 10% annually merely to stabilize loss ratios at
present levels.

Our own combined ratio in 1983 was 121. Since Mike Goldberg
recently took over most of the responsibility for the insurance
operation, it would be nice for me if our shortcomings could be
placed at his doorstep rather than mine. But unfortunately, as
we have often pointed out, the insurance business has a long
lead-time. Though business policies may be changed and personnel
improved, a significant period must pass before the effects are
seen. (This characteristic of the business enabled us to make a
great deal of money in GEICO; we could picture what was likely to
happen well before it actually occurred.) So the roots of the
1983 results are operating and personnel decisions made two or
more years back when I had direct managerial responsibility for
the insurance group.

Despite our poor results overall, several of our managers
did truly outstanding jobs. Roland Miller guided the auto and
general liability business of National Indemnity Company and
National Fire and Marine Insurance Company to improved results,
while those of competitors deteriorated. In addition, Tom Rowley
at Continental Divide Insurance - our fledgling Colorado
homestate company - seems certain to be a winner. Mike found him
a little over a year ago, and he was an important acquisition.

We have become active recently - and hope to become much
more active - in reinsurance transactions where the buyer’s
overriding concern should be the seller’s long-term
creditworthiness. In such transactions our premier financial
strength should make us the number one choice of both claimants
and insurers who must rely on the reinsurer’s promises for a
great many years to come.

A major source of such business is structured settlements -
a procedure for settling losses under which claimants receive
periodic payments (almost always monthly, for life) rather than a
single lump sum settlement. This form of settlement has
important tax advantages for the claimant and also prevents his
squandering a large lump-sum payment. Frequently, some inflation
protection is built into the settlement. Usually the claimant
has been seriously injured, and thus the periodic payments must
be unquestionably secure for decades to come. We believe we
offer unparalleled security. No other insurer we know of - even
those with much larger gross assets - has our financial strength.

We also think our financial strength should recommend us to
companies wishing to transfer loss reserves. In such
transactions, other insurance companies pay us lump sums to
assume all (or a specified portion of) future loss payments
applicable to large blocks of expired business. Here also, the
company transferring such claims needs to be certain of the
transferee’s financial strength for many years to come. Again,
most of our competitors soliciting such business appear to us to
have a financial condition that is materially inferior to ours.

Potentially, structured settlements and the assumption of
loss reserves could become very significant to us. Because of
their potential size and because these operations generate large
amounts of investment income compared to premium volume, we will
show underwriting results from those businesses on a separate
line in our insurance segment data. We also will exclude their
effect in reporting our combined ratio to you. We “front end” no
profit on structured settlement or loss reserve transactions, and
all attributable overhead is expensed currently. Both businesses
are run by Don Wurster at National Indemnity Company.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 0:53 par mihou
Insurance - GEICO

Geico’s performance during 1983 was as good as our own
insurance performance was poor. Compared to the industry’s
combined ratio of 111, GEICO wrote at 96 after a large voluntary
accrual for policyholder dividends. A few years ago I would not
have thought GEICO could so greatly outperform the industry. Its
superiority reflects the combination of a truly exceptional
business idea and an exceptional management.

Jack Byrne and Bill Snyder have maintained extraordinary
discipline in the underwriting area (including, crucially,
provision for full and proper loss reserves), and their efforts
are now being further rewarded by significant gains in new
business. Equally important, Lou Simpson is the class of the
field among insurance investment managers. The three of them are
some team.

We have approximately a one-third interest in GEICO. That
gives us a $270 million share in the company’s premium volume, an
amount some 80% larger than our own volume. Thus, the major
portion of our total insurance business comes from the best
insurance book in the country. This fact does not moderate by an
iota the need for us to improve our own operation.

Stock Splits and Stock Activity

We often are asked why Berkshire does not split its stock.
The assumption behind this question usually appears to be that a
split would be a pro-shareholder action. We disagree. Let me
tell you why.

One of our goals is to have Berkshire Hathaway stock sell at
a price rationally related to its intrinsic business value. (But
note “rationally related”, not “identical”: if well-regarded
companies are generally selling in the market at large discounts
from value, Berkshire might well be priced similarly.) The key to
a rational stock price is rational shareholders, both current and
prospective.

If the holders of a company’s stock and/or the prospective
buyers attracted to it are prone to make irrational or emotion-
based decisions, some pretty silly stock prices are going to
appear periodically. Manic-depressive personalities produce
manic-depressive valuations. Such aberrations may help us in
buying and selling the stocks of other companies. But we think
it is in both your interest and ours to minimize their occurrence
in the market for Berkshire.

To obtain only high quality shareholders is no cinch. Mrs.
Astor could select her 400, but anyone can buy any stock.
Entering members of a shareholder “club” cannot be screened for
intellectual capacity, emotional stability, moral sensitivity or
acceptable dress. Shareholder eugenics, therefore, might appear
to be a hopeless undertaking.

In large part, however, we feel that high quality ownership
can be attracted and maintained if we consistently communicate
our business and ownership philosophy - along with no other
conflicting messages - and then let self selection follow its
course. For example, self selection will draw a far different
crowd to a musical event advertised as an opera than one
advertised as a rock concert even though anyone can buy a ticket
to either.

Through our policies and communications - our
“advertisements” - we try to attract investors who will
understand our operations, attitudes and expectations. (And,
fully as important, we try to dissuade those who won’t.) We want
those who think of themselves as business owners and invest in
companies with the intention of staying a long time. And, we
want those who keep their eyes focused on business results, not
market prices.

Investors possessing those characteristics are in a small
minority, but we have an exceptional collection of them. I
believe well over 90% - probably over 95% - of our shares are
held by those who were shareholders of Berkshire or Blue Chip
five years ago. And I would guess that over 95% of our shares
are held by investors for whom the holding is at least double the
size of their next largest. Among companies with at least
several thousand public shareholders and more than $1 billion of
market value, we are almost certainly the leader in the degree to
which our shareholders think and act like owners. Upgrading a
shareholder group that possesses these characteristics is not
easy.

Were we to split the stock or take other actions focusing on
stock price rather than business value, we would attract an
entering class of buyers inferior to the exiting class of
sellers. At $1300, there are very few investors who can’t afford
a Berkshire share. Would a potential one-share purchaser be
better off if we split 100 for 1 so he could buy 100 shares?
Those who think so and who would buy the stock because of the
split or in anticipation of one would definitely downgrade the
quality of our present shareholder group. (Could we really
improve our shareholder group by trading some of our present
clear-thinking members for impressionable new ones who,
preferring paper to value, feel wealthier with nine $10 bills
than with one $100 bill?) People who buy for non-value reasons
are likely to sell for non-value reasons. Their presence in the
picture will accentuate erratic price swings unrelated to
underlying business developments.

We will try to avoid policies that attract buyers with a
short-term focus on our stock price and try to follow policies
that attract informed long-term investors focusing on business
values. just as you purchased your Berkshire shares in a market
populated by rational informed investors, you deserve a chance to
sell - should you ever want to - in the same kind of market. We
will work to keep it in existence.

One of the ironies of the stock market is the emphasis on
activity. Brokers, using terms such as “marketability” and
“liquidity”, sing the praises of companies with high share
turnover (those who cannot fill your pocket will confidently fill
your ear). But investors should understand that what is good for
the croupier is not good for the customer. A hyperactive stock
market is the pickpocket of enterprise.

For example, consider a typical company earning, say, 12% on
equity. Assume a very high turnover rate in its shares of 100%
per year. If a purchase and sale of the stock each extract
commissions of 1% (the rate may be much higher on low-priced
stocks) and if the stock trades at book value, the owners of our
hypothetical company will pay, in aggregate, 2% of the company’s
net worth annually for the privilege of transferring ownership.
This activity does nothing for the earnings of the business, and
means that 1/6 of them are lost to the owners through the
“frictional” cost of transfer. (And this calculation does not
count option trading, which would increase frictional costs still
further.)

All that makes for a rather expensive game of musical
chairs. Can you imagine the agonized cry that would arise if a
governmental unit were to impose a new 16 2/3% tax on earnings of
corporations or investors? By market activity, investors can
impose upon themselves the equivalent of such a tax.

Days when the market trades 100 million shares (and that
kind of volume, when over-the-counter trading is included, is
today abnormally low) are a curse for owners, not a blessing -
for they mean that owners are paying twice as much to change
chairs as they are on a 50-million-share day. If 100 million-
share days persist for a year and the average cost on each
purchase and sale is 15 cents a share, the chair-changing tax for
investors in aggregate would total about $7.5 billion - an amount
roughly equal to the combined 1982 profits of Exxon, General
Motors, Mobil and Texaco, the four largest companies in the
Fortune 500.
These companies had a combined net worth of $75 billion at
yearend 1982 and accounted for over 12% of both net worth and net
income of the entire Fortune 500 list. Under our assumption
investors, in aggregate, every year forfeit all earnings from
this staggering sum of capital merely to satisfy their penchant
for “financial flip-flopping”. In addition, investment
management fees of over $2 billion annually - sums paid for
chair-changing advice - require the forfeiture by investors of
all earnings of the five largest banking organizations (Citicorp,
Bank America, Chase Manhattan, Manufacturers Hanover and J. P.
Morgan). These expensive activities may decide who eats the pie,
but they don’t enlarge it.

(We are aware of the pie-expanding argument that says that
such activities improve the rationality of the capital allocation
process. We think that this argument is specious and that, on
balance, hyperactive equity markets subvert rational capital
allocation and act as pie shrinkers. Adam Smith felt that all
noncollusive acts in a free market were guided by an invisible
hand that led an economy to maximum progress; our view is that
casino-type markets and hair-trigger investment management act as
an invisible foot that trips up and slows down a forward-moving
economy.)

Contrast the hyperactive stock with Berkshire. The bid-and-
ask spread in our stock currently is about 30 points, or a little
over 2%. Depending on the size of the transaction, the
difference between proceeds received by the seller of Berkshire
and cost to the buyer may range downward from 4% (in trading
involving only a few shares) to perhaps 1 1/2% (in large trades
where negotiation can reduce both the market-maker’s spread and
the broker’s commission). Because most Berkshire shares are
traded in fairly large transactions, the spread on all trading
probably does not average more than 2%.

Meanwhile, true turnover in Berkshire stock (excluding
inter-dealer transactions, gifts and bequests) probably runs 3%
per year. Thus our owners, in aggregate, are paying perhaps
6/100 of 1% of Berkshire’s market value annually for transfer
privileges. By this very rough estimate, that’s $900,000 - not a
small cost, but far less than average. Splitting the stock would
increase that cost, downgrade the quality of our shareholder
population, and encourage a market price less consistently
related to intrinsic business value. We see no offsetting
advantages.

Miscellaneous

Last year in this section I ran a small ad to encourage
acquisition candidates. In our communications businesses we tell
our advertisers that repetition is a key to results (which it
is), so we will again repeat our acquisition criteria.

We prefer:
(1) large purchases (at least $5 million of after-tax
earnings),
(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future
projections are of little interest to us, nor are
“turn-around” situations),
(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while
employing little or no debt,
(4) management in place (we can’t supply it),
(5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we
won’t understand it),
(6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or
that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily,
about a transaction when price is unknown).

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise
complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily
within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer
to buy for cash, but will consider issuance of stock when we
receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. We
invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people
with whom we have done business in the past. For the right
business - and the right people - we can provide a good home.

* * * * *

About 96.4% of all eligible shares participated in our 1983
shareholder-designated contributions program. The total
contributions made pursuant to this program - disbursed in the
early days of 1984 but fully expensed in 1983 - were $3,066,501,
and 1353 charities were recipients. Although the response
measured by the percentage of shares participating was
extraordinarily good, the response measured by the percentage of
holders participating was not as good. The reason may well be
the large number of new shareholders acquired through the merger
and their lack of familiarity with the program. We urge new
shareholders to read the description of the program on pages 52-
53.

If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly
urge that you immediately make sure that your shares are
registered in the actual owner’s name, not in “street” or nominee
name. Shares not so registered on September 28, 1984 will not be
eligible for any 1984 program.

* * * * *

The Blue Chip/Berkshire merger went off without a hitch.
Less than one-tenth of 1% of the shares of each company voted
against the merger, and no requests for appraisal were made. In
1983, we gained some tax efficiency from the merger and we expect
to gain more in the future.

One interesting sidelight to the merger: Berkshire now has
1,146,909 shares outstanding compared to 1,137,778 shares at the
beginning of fiscal 1965, the year present management assumed
responsibility. For every 1% of the company you owned at that
time, you now would own .99%. Thus, all of today’s assets - the
News, See’s, Nebraska Furniture Mart, the Insurance Group, $1.3
billion in marketable stocks, etc. - have been added to the
original textile assets with virtually no net dilution to the
original owners.

We are delighted to have the former Blue Chip shareholders
join us. To aid in your understanding of Berkshire Hathaway, we
will be glad to send you the Compendium of Letters from the
Annual Reports of 1977-1981, and/or the 1982 Annual report.
Direct your request to the Company at 1440 Kiewit Plaza, Omaha,
Nebraska 68131.


Warren E. Buffett
March 14, 1984 Chairman of the Board
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 0:53 par mihou
Appendix

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.



Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities

This appendix deals only with economic and accounting Goodwill – not the goodwill of everyday usage. For example, a business may be well liked, even loved, by most of its customers but possess no economic goodwill. (AT&T, before the breakup, was generally well thought of, but possessed not a dime of economic Goodwill.) And, regrettably, a business may be disliked by its customers but possess substantial, and growing, economic Goodwill. So, just for the moment, forget emotions and focus only on economics and accounting.

When a business is purchased, accounting principles require that the purchase price first be assigned to the fair value of the identifiable assets that are acquired. Frequently the sum of the fair values put on the assets (after the deduction of liabilities) is less than the total purchase price of the business. In that case, the difference is assigned to an asset account entitled "excess of cost over equity in net assets acquired". To avoid constant repetition of this mouthful, we will substitute "Goodwill".

Accounting Goodwill arising from businesses purchased before November 1970 has a special standing. Except under rare circumstances, it can remain an asset on the balance sheet as long as the business bought is retained. That means no amortization charges to gradually extinguish that asset need be made against earnings.

The case is different, however, with purchases made from November 1970 on. When these create Goodwill, it must be amortized over not more than 40 years through charges – of equal amount in every year – to the earnings account. Since 40 years is the maximum period allowed, 40 years is what managements (including us) usually elect. This annual charge to earnings is not allowed as a tax deduction and, thus, has an effect on after-tax income that is roughly double that of most other expenses.

That’s how accounting Goodwill works. To see how it differs from economic reality, let’s look at an example close at hand. We’ll round some figures, and greatly oversimplify, to make the example easier to follow. We’ll also mention some implications for investors and managers.

Blue Chip Stamps bought See’s early in 1972 for $25 million, at which time See’s had about $8 million of net tangible assets. (Throughout this discussion, accounts receivable will be classified as tangible assets, a definition proper for business analysis.) This level of tangible assets was adequate to conduct the business without use of debt, except for short periods seasonally. See’s was earning about $2 million after tax at the time, and such earnings seemed conservatively representative of future earning power in constant 1972 dollars.

Thus our first lesson: businesses logically are worth far more than net tangible assets when they can be expected to produce earnings on such assets considerably in excess of market rates of return. The capitalized value of this excess return is economic Goodwill.

In 1972 (and now) relatively few businesses could be expected to consistently earn the 25% after tax on net tangible assets that was earned by See’s – doing it, furthermore, with conservative accounting and no financial leverage. It was not the fair market value of the inventories, receivables or fixed assets that produced the premium rates of return. Rather it was a combination of intangible assets, particularly a pervasive favorable reputation with consumers based upon countless pleasant experiences they have had with both product and personnel.

Such a reputation creates a consumer franchise that allows the value of the product to the purchaser, rather than its production cost, to be the major determinant of selling price. Consumer franchises are a prime source of economic Goodwill. Other sources include governmental franchises not subject to profit regulation, such as television stations, and an enduring position as the low cost producer in an industry.

Let’s return to the accounting in the See’s example. Blue Chip’s purchase of See’s at $17 million over net tangible assets required that a Goodwill account of this amount be established as an asset on Blue Chip’s books and that $425,000 be charged to income annually for 40 years to amortize that asset. By 1983, after 11 years of such charges, the $17 million had been reduced to about $12.5 million. Berkshire, meanwhile, owned 60% of Blue Chip and, therefore, also 60% of See’s. This ownership meant that Berkshire’s balance sheet reflected 60% of See’s Goodwill, or about $7.5 million.

In 1983 Berkshire acquired the rest of Blue Chip in a merger that required purchase accounting as contrasted to the "pooling" treatment allowed for some mergers. Under purchase accounting, the "fair value" of the shares we gave to (or "paid") Blue Chip holders had to be spread over the net assets acquired from Blue Chip. This "fair value" was measured, as it almost always is when public companies use their shares to make acquisitions, by the market value of the shares given up.

The assets "purchased" consisted of 40% of everything owned by Blue Chip (as noted, Berkshire already owned the other 60%). What Berkshire "paid" was more than the net identifiable assets we received by $51.7 million, and was assigned to two pieces of Goodwill: $28.4 million to See’s and $23.3 million to Buffalo Evening News.

After the merger, therefore, Berkshire was left with a Goodwill asset for See’s that had two components: the $7.5 million remaining from the 1971 purchase, and $28.4 million newly created by the 40% "purchased" in 1983. Our amortization charge now will be about $1.0 million for the next 28 years, and $.7 million for the following 12 years, 2002 through 2013.

In other words, different purchase dates and prices have given us vastly different asset values and amortization charges for two pieces of the same asset. (We repeat our usual disclaimer: we have no better accounting system to suggest. The problems to be dealt with are mind boggling and require arbitrary rules.)

But what are the economic realities? One reality is that the amortization charges that have been deducted as costs in the earnings statement each year since acquisition of See’s were not true economic costs. We know that because See’s last year earned $13 million after taxes on about $20 million of net tangible assets – a performance indicating the existence of economic Goodwill far larger than the total original cost of our accounting Goodwill. In other words, while accounting Goodwill regularly decreased from the moment of purchase, economic Goodwill increased in irregular but very substantial fashion.

Another reality is that annual amortization charges in the future will not correspond to economic costs. It is possible, of course, that See’s economic Goodwill will disappear. But it won’t shrink in even decrements or anything remotely resembling them. What is more likely is that the Goodwill will increase – in current, if not in constant, dollars – because of inflation.

That probability exists because true economic Goodwill tends to rise in nominal value proportionally with inflation. To illustrate how this works, let’s contrast a See’s kind of business with a more mundane business. When we purchased See’s in 1972, it will be recalled, it was earning about $2 million on $8 million of net tangible assets. Let us assume that our hypothetical mundane business then had $2 million of earnings also, but needed $18 million in net tangible assets for normal operations. Earning only 11% on required tangible assets, that mundane business would possess little or no economic Goodwill.

A business like that, therefore, might well have sold for the value of its net tangible assets, or for $18 million. In contrast, we paid $25 million for See’s, even though it had no more in earnings and less than half as much in "honest-to-God" assets. Could less really have been more, as our purchase price implied? The answer is "yes" – even if both businesses were expected to have flat unit volume – as long as you anticipated, as we did in 1972, a world of continuous inflation.

To understand why, imagine the effect that a doubling of the price level would subsequently have on the two businesses. Both would need to double their nominal earnings to $4 million to keep themselves even with inflation. This would seem to be no great trick: just sell the same number of units at double earlier prices and, assuming profit margins remain unchanged, profits also must double.

But, crucially, to bring that about, both businesses probably would have to double their nominal investment in net tangible assets, since that is the kind of economic requirement that inflation usually imposes on businesses, both good and bad. A doubling of dollar sales means correspondingly more dollars must be employed immediately in receivables and inventories. Dollars employed in fixed assets will respond more slowly to inflation, but probably just as surely. And all of this inflation-required investment will produce no improvement in rate of return. The motivation for this investment is the survival of the business, not the prosperity of the owner.

Remember, however, that See’s had net tangible assets of only $8 million. So it would only have had to commit an additional $8 million to finance the capital needs imposed by inflation. The mundane business, meanwhile, had a burden over twice as large – a need for $18 million of additional capital.

After the dust had settled, the mundane business, now earning $4 million annually, might still be worth the value of its tangible assets, or $36 million. That means its owners would have gained only a dollar of nominal value for every new dollar invested. (This is the same dollar-for-dollar result they would have achieved if they had added money to a savings account.)

See’s, however, also earning $4 million, might be worth $50 million if valued (as it logically would be) on the same basis as it was at the time of our purchase. So it would have gained $25 million in nominal value while the owners were putting up only $8 million in additional capital – over $3 of nominal value gained for each $1 invested.

Remember, even so, that the owners of the See’s kind of business were forced by inflation to ante up $8 million in additional capital just to stay even in real profits. Any unleveraged business that requires some net tangible assets to operate (and almost all do) is hurt by inflation. Businesses needing little in the way of tangible assets simply are hurt the least.

And that fact, of course, has been hard for many people to grasp. For years the traditional wisdom – long on tradition, short on wisdom – held that inflation protection was best provided by businesses laden with natural resources, plants and machinery, or other tangible assets ("In Goods We Trust"). It doesn’t work that way. Asset-heavy businesses generally earn low rates of return – rates that often barely provide enough capital to fund the inflationary needs of the existing business, with nothing left over for real growth, for distribution to owners, or for acquisition of new businesses.

In contrast, a disproportionate number of the great business fortunes built up during the inflationary years arose from ownership of operations that combined intangibles of lasting value with relatively minor requirements for tangible assets. In such cases earnings have bounded upward in nominal dollars, and these dollars have been largely available for the acquisition of additional businesses. This phenomenon has been particularly evident in the communications business. That business has required little in the way of tangible investment – yet its franchises have endured. During inflation, Goodwill is the gift that keeps giving.

But that statement applies, naturally, only to true economic Goodwill. Spurious accounting Goodwill – and there is plenty of it around – is another matter. When an overexcited management purchases a business at a silly price, the same accounting niceties described earlier are observed. Because it can’t go anywhere else, the silliness ends up in the Goodwill account. Considering the lack of managerial discipline that created the account, under such circumstances it might better be labeled "No-Will". Whatever the term, the 40-year ritual typically is observed and the adrenalin so capitalized remains on the books as an "asset" just as if the acquisition had been a sensible one.

* * * * *

If you cling to any belief that accounting treatment of Goodwill is the best measure of economic reality, I suggest one final item to ponder.

Assume a company with $20 per share of net worth, all tangible assets. Further assume the company has internally developed some magnificent consumer franchise, or that it was fortunate enough to obtain some important television stations by original FCC grant. Therefore, it earns a great deal on tangible assets, say $5 per share, or 25%.

With such economics, it might sell for $100 per share or more, and it might well also bring that price in a negotiated sale of the entire business.

Assume an investor buys the stock at $100 per share, paying in effect $80 per share for Goodwill (just as would a corporate purchaser buying the whole company). Should the investor impute a $2 per share amortization charge annually ($80 divided by 40 years) to calculate "true" earnings per share? And, if so, should the new "true" earnings of $3 per share cause him to rethink his purchase price?

* * * * *

We believe managers and investors alike should view intangible assets from two perspectives:

1. In analysis of operating results – that is, in evaluating the underlying economics of a business unit – amortization charges should be ignored. What a business can be expected to earn on unleveraged net tangible assets, excluding any charges against earnings for amortization of Goodwill, is the best guide to the economic attractiveness of the operation. It is also the best guide to the current value of the operation’s economic Goodwill.

1. In evaluating the wisdom of business acquisitions, amortization charges should be ignored also. They should be deducted neither from earnings nor from the cost of the business. This means forever viewing purchased Goodwill at its full cost, before any amortization. Furthermore, cost should be defined as including the full intrinsic business value – not just the recorded accounting value – of all consideration given, irrespective of market prices of the securities involved at the time of merger and irrespective of whether pooling treatment was allowed. For example, what we truly paid in the Blue Chip merger for 40% of the Goodwill of See’s and the News was considerably more than the $51.7 million entered on our books. This disparity exists because the market value of the Berkshire shares given up in the merger was less than their intrinsic business value, which is the value that defines the true cost to us.

Operations that appear to be winners based upon perspective (1) may pale when viewed from perspective (2). A good business is not always a good purchase – although it’s a good place to look for one.



We will try to acquire businesses that have excellent operating economics measured by (1) and that provide reasonable returns measured by (2). Accounting consequences will be totally ignored.

At yearend 1983, net Goodwill on our accounting books totaled $62 million, consisting of the $79 million you see stated on the asset side of our balance sheet, and $17 million of negative Goodwill that is offset against the carrying value of our interest in Mutual Savings and Loan.

We believe net economic Goodwill far exceeds the $62 million accounting number.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 0:55 par mihou
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 1984 was $152.6 million, or
$133 per share. This sounds pretty good but actually it’s
mediocre. Economic gains must be evaluated by comparison with
the capital that produces them. Our twenty-year compounded
annual gain in book value has been 22.1% (from $19.46 in 1964 to
$1108.77 in 1984), but our gain in 1984 was only 13.6%.

As we discussed last year, the gain in per-share intrinsic
business value is the economic measurement that really counts.
But calculations of intrinsic business value are subjective. In
our case, book value serves as a useful, although somewhat
understated, proxy. In my judgment, intrinsic business value and
book value increased during 1984 at about the same rate.

Using my academic voice, I have told you in the past of the
drag that a mushrooming capital base exerts upon rates of return.
Unfortunately, my academic voice is now giving way to a
reportorial voice. Our historical 22% rate is just that -
history. To earn even 15% annually over the next decade
(assuming we continue to follow our present dividend policy,
about which more will be said later in this letter) we would need
profits aggregating about $3.9 billion. Accomplishing this will
require a few big ideas - small ones just won’t do. Charlie
Munger, my partner in general management, and I do not have any
such ideas at present, but our experience has been that they pop
up occasionally. (How’s that for a strategic plan?)

Sources of Reported Earnings

The table on the following page shows the sources of
Berkshire’s reported earnings. Berkshire’s net ownership
interest in many of the constituent businesses changed at midyear
1983 when the Blue Chip merger took place. Because of these
changes, the first two columns of the table provide the best
measure of underlying business performance.

All of the significant gains and losses attributable to
unusual sales of assets by any of the business entities are
aggregated with securities transactions on the line near the
bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings.
(We regard any annual figure for realized capital gains or losses
as meaningless, but we regard the aggregate realized and
unrealized capital gains over a period of years as very
important.)

Furthermore, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against
the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix
to my letter in the 1983 annual report, is set forth as a
separate item.

(000s omitted)
----------------------------------------------------------
Net Earnings
Earnings Before Income Taxes After Tax
-------------------------------------- ------------------
Total Berkshire Share Berkshire Share
------------------ ------------------ ------------------
1984 1983 1984 1983 1984 1983
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ............ $(48,060) $(33,872) $(48,060) $(33,872) $(25,955) $(18,400)
Net Investment Income ... 68,903 43,810 68,903 43,810 62,059 39,114
Buffalo News .............. 27,328 19,352 27,328 16,547 13,317 8,832
Nebraska Furniture Mart(1) 14,511 3,812 11,609 3,049 5,917 1,521
See’s Candies ............. 26,644 27,411 26,644 24,526 13,380 12,212
Associated Retail Stores .. (1,072) 697 (1,072) 697 (579) 355
Blue Chip Stamps(2) (1,843) (1,422) (1,843) (1,876) (899) (353)
Mutual Savings and Loan ... 1,456 (798) 1,166 (467) 3,151 1,917
Precision Steel ........... 4,092 3,241 3,278 2,102 1,696 1,136
Textiles .................. 418 (100) 418 (100) 226 (63)
Wesco Financial ........... 9,777 7,493 7,831 4,844 4,828 3,448
Amortization of Goodwill .. (1,434) (532) (1,434) (563) (1,434) (563)
Interest on Debt .......... (14,734) (15,104) (14,097) (13,844) (7,452) (7,346)
Shareholder-Designated
Contributions .......... (3,179) (3,066) (3,179) (3,066) (1,716) (1,656)
Other ..................... 4,932 10,121 4,529 9,623 3,476 8,490
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings .......... 87,739 61,043 82,021 51,410 70,015 48,644
Special GEICO Distribution .. -- 19,575 -- 19,575 -- 18,224
Special Gen. Foods Distribution 8,111 -- 7,896 -- 7,294 --
Sales of securities and
unusual sales of assets .. 104,699 67,260 101,376 65,089 71,587 45,298
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Total Earnings - all entities $200,549 $147,878 $191,293 $136,074 $148,896 $112,166
======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ========

(1) 1983 figures are those for October through December.
(2) 1984 and 1983 are not comparable; major assets were
transferred in the mid-year 1983 merger of Blue Chip Stamps.

Sharp-eyed shareholders will notice that the amount of the
special GEICO distribution and its location in the table have
been changed from the presentation of last year. Though they
reclassify and reduce “accounting” earnings, the changes are
entirely of form, not of substance. The story behind the
changes, however, is interesting.

As reported last year: (1) in mid-1983 GEICO made a tender
offer to buy its own shares; (2) at the same time, we agreed by
written contract to sell GEICO an amount of its shares that would
be proportionately related to the aggregate number of shares
GEICO repurchased via the tender from all other shareholders; (3)
at completion of the tender, we delivered 350,000 shares to
GEICO, received $21 million cash, and were left owning exactly
the same percentage of GEICO that we owned before the tender; (4)
GEICO’s transaction with us amounted to a proportionate
redemption, an opinion rendered us, without qualification, by a
leading law firm; (5) the Tax Code logically regards such
proportionate redemptions as substantially equivalent to
dividends and, therefore, the $21 million we received was taxed
at only the 6.9% inter-corporate dividend rate; (6) importantly,
that $21 million was far less than the previously-undistributed
earnings that had inured to our ownership in GEICO and, thus,
from the standpoint of economic substance, was in our view
equivalent to a dividend.

Because it was material and unusual, we highlighted the
GEICO distribution last year to you, both in the applicable
quarterly report and in this section of the annual report.
Additionally, we emphasized the transaction to our auditors,
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. Both the Omaha office of Peat
Marwick and the reviewing Chicago partner, without objection,
concurred with our dividend presentation.

In 1984, we had a virtually identical transaction with
General Foods. The only difference was that General Foods
repurchased its stock over a period of time in the open market,
whereas GEICO had made a “one-shot” tender offer. In the General
Foods case we sold to the company, on each day that it
repurchased shares, a quantity of shares that left our ownership
percentage precisely unchanged. Again our transaction was
pursuant to a written contract executed before repurchases began.
And again the money we received was far less than the retained
earnings that had inured to our ownership interest since our
purchase. Overall we received $21,843,601 in cash from General
Foods, and our ownership remained at exactly 8.75%.

At this point the New York office of Peat Marwick came into
the picture. Late in 1984 it indicated that it disagreed with
the conclusions of the firm’s Omaha office and Chicago reviewing
partner. The New York view was that the GEICO and General Foods
transactions should be treated as sales of stock by Berkshire
rather than as the receipt of dividends. Under this accounting
approach, a portion of the cost of our investment in the stock of
each company would be charged against the redemption payment and
any gain would be shown as a capital gain, not as dividend
income. This is an accounting approach only, having no bearing
on taxes: Peat Marwick agrees that the transactions were
dividends for IRS purposes.

We disagree with the New York position from both the
viewpoint of economic substance and proper accounting. But, to
avoid a qualified auditor’s opinion, we have adopted herein Peat
Marwick’s 1984 view and restated 1983 accordingly. None of this,
however, has any effect on intrinsic business value: our
ownership interests in GEICO and General Foods, our cash, our
taxes, and the market value and tax basis of our holdings all
remain the same.

This year we have again entered into a contract with General
Foods whereby we will sell them shares concurrently with open
market purchases that they make. The arrangement provides that
our ownership interest will remain unchanged at all times. By
keeping it so, we will insure ourselves dividend treatment for
tax purposes. In our view also, the economic substance of this
transaction again is the creation of dividend income. However,
we will account for the redemptions as sales of stock rather than
dividend income unless accounting rules are adopted that speak
directly to this point. We will continue to prominently identify
any such special transactions in our reports to you.

While we enjoy a low tax charge on these proportionate
redemptions, and have participated in several of them, we view
such repurchases as at least equally favorable for shareholders
who do not sell. When companies with outstanding businesses and
comfortable financial positions find their shares selling far
below intrinsic value in the marketplace, no alternative action
can benefit shareholders as surely as repurchases.

(Our endorsement of repurchases is limited to those dictated
by price/value relationships and does not extend to the
“greenmail” repurchase - a practice we find odious and repugnant.
In these transactions, two parties achieve their personal ends by
exploitation of an innocent and unconsulted third party. The
players are: (1) the “shareholder” extortionist who, even before
the ink on his stock certificate dries, delivers his “your-
money-or-your-life” message to managers; (2) the corporate
insiders who quickly seek peace at any price - as long as the
price is paid by someone else; and (3) the shareholders whose
money is used by (2) to make (1) go away. As the dust settles,
the mugging, transient shareholder gives his speech on “free
enterprise”, the muggee management gives its speech on “the best
interests of the company”, and the innocent shareholder standing
by mutely funds the payoff.)

The companies in which we have our largest investments have
all engaged in significant stock repurhases at times when wide
discrepancies existed between price and value. As shareholders,
we find this encouraging and rewarding for two important reasons
- one that is obvious, and one that is subtle and not always
understood. The obvious point involves basic arithmetic: major
repurchases at prices well below per-share intrinsic business
value immediately increase, in a highly significant way, that
value. When companies purchase their own stock, they often find
it easy to get $2 of present value for $1. Corporate acquisition
programs almost never do as well and, in a discouragingly large
number of cases, fail to get anything close to $1 of value for
each $1 expended.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 0:56 par mihou
The other benefit of repurchases is less subject to precise
measurement but can be fully as important over time. By making
repurchases when a company’s market value is well below its
business value, management clearly demonstrates that it is given
to actions that enhance the wealth of shareholders, rather than
to actions that expand management’s domain but that do nothing
for (or even harm) shareholders. Seeing this, shareholders and
potential shareholders increase their estimates of future returns
from the business. This upward revision, in turn, produces
market prices more in line with intrinsic business value. These
prices are entirely rational. Investors should pay more for a
business that is lodged in the hands of a manager with
demonstrated pro-shareholder leanings than for one in the hands
of a self-interested manager marching to a different drummer. (To
make the point extreme, how much would you pay to be a minority
shareholder of a company controlled by Robert Wesco?)

The key word is “demonstrated”. A manager who consistently
turns his back on repurchases, when these clearly are in the
interests of owners, reveals more than he knows of his
motivations. No matter how often or how eloquently he mouths
some public relations-inspired phrase such as “maximizing
shareholder wealth” (this season’s favorite), the market
correctly discounts assets lodged with him. His heart is not
listening to his mouth - and, after a while, neither will the
market.

We have prospered in a very major way - as have other
shareholders - by the large share repurchases of GEICO,
Washington Post, and General Foods, our three largest holdings.
(Exxon, in which we have our fourth largest holding, has also
wisely and aggressively repurchased shares but, in this case, we
have only recently established our position.) In each of these
companies, shareholders have had their interests in outstanding
businesses materially enhanced by repurchases made at bargain
prices. We feel very comfortable owning interests in businesses
such as these that offer excellent economics combined with
shareholder-conscious managements.

The following table shows our 1984 yearend net holdings in
marketable equities. All numbers exclude the interests
attributable to minority shareholders of Wesco and Nebraska
Furniture Mart.


No. of Shares Cost Market
------------- ---------- ----------
(000s omitted)
690,975 Affiliated Publications, Inc. ....... $ 3,516 $ 32,908
740,400 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. 44,416 46,738
3,895,710 Exxon Corporation ................... 173,401 175,307
4,047,191 General Foods Corporation ........... 149,870 226,137
6,850,000 GEICO Corporation ................... 45,713 397,300
2,379,200 Handy & Harman ...................... 27,318 38,662
818,872 Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. 2,570 28,149
555,949 Northwest Industries 26,581 27,242
2,553,488 Time, Inc. .......................... 89,327 109,162
1,868,600 The Washington Post Company ......... 10,628 149,955
---------- ----------
$573,340 $1,231,560
All Other Common Stockholdings 11,634 37,326
---------- ----------
Total Common Stocks $584,974 $1,268,886
========== ==========

It’s been over ten years since it has been as difficult as
now to find equity investments that meet both our qualitative
standards and our quantitative standards of value versus price.
We try to avoid compromise of these standards, although we find
doing nothing the most difficult task of all. (One English
statesman attributed his country’s greatness in the nineteenth
century to a policy of “masterly inactivity”. This is a strategy
that is far easier for historians to commend than for
participants to follow.)

In addition to the figures supplied at the beginning of this
section, information regarding the businesses we own appears in
Management’s Discussion on pages 42-47. An amplified discussion
of Wesco’s businesses appears in Charlie Munger’s report on pages
50-59. You will find particularly interesting his comments about
conditions in the thrift industry. Our other major controlled
businesses are Nebraska Furniture Mart, See’s, Buffalo Evening
News, and the Insurance Group, to which we will give some special
attention here.

Nebraska Furniture Mart

Last year I introduced you to Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin) and her
family. I told you they were terrific, and I understated the
case. After another year of observing their remarkable talents
and character, I can honestly say that I never have seen a
managerial group that either functions or behaves better than the
Blumkin family.

Mrs. B, Chairman of the Board, is now 91, and recently was
quoted in the local newspaper as saying, “I come home to eat and
sleep, and that’s about it. I can’t wait until it gets daylight
so I can get back to the business”. Mrs. B is at the store seven
days a week, from opening to close, and probably makes more
decisions in a day than most CEOs do in a year (better ones,
too).

In May Mrs. B was granted an Honorary Doctorate in
Commercial Science by New York University. (She’s a “fast track”
student: not one day in her life was spent in a school room prior
to her receipt of the doctorate.) Previous recipients of honorary
degrees in business from NYU include Clifton Garvin, Jr., CEO of
Exxon Corp.; Walter Wriston, then CEO of Citicorp; Frank Cary,
then CEO of IBM; Tom Murphy, then CEO of General Motors; and,
most recently, Paul Volcker. (They are in good company.)

The Blumkin blood did not run thin. Louie, Mrs. B’s son,
and his three boys, Ron, Irv, and Steve, all contribute in full
measure to NFM’s amazing success. The younger generation has
attended the best business school of them all - that conducted by
Mrs. B and Louie - and their training is evident in their
performance.

Last year NFM’s net sales increased by $14.3 million,
bringing the total to $115 million, all from the one store in
Omaha. That is by far the largest volume produced by a single
home furnishings store in the United States. In fact, the gain
in sales last year was itself greater than the annual volume of
many good-sized successful stores. The business achieves this
success because it deserves this success. A few figures will
tell you why.

In its fiscal 1984 10-K, the largest independent specialty
retailer of home furnishings in the country, Levitz Furniture,
described its prices as “generally lower than the prices charged
by conventional furniture stores in its trading area”. Levitz,
in that year, operated at a gross margin of 44.4% (that is, on
average, customers paid it $100 for merchandise that had cost it
$55.60 to buy). The gross margin at NFM is not much more than
half of that. NFM’s low mark-ups are possible because of its
exceptional efficiency: operating expenses (payroll, occupancy,
advertising, etc.) are about 16.5% of sales versus 35.6% at
Levitz.
None of this is in criticism of Levitz, which has a well-
managed operation. But the NFM operation is simply extraordinary
(and, remember, it all comes from a $500 investment by Mrs. B in
1937). By unparalleled efficiency and astute volume purchasing,
NFM is able to earn excellent returns on capital while saving its
customers at least $30 million annually from what, on average, it
would cost them to buy the same merchandise at stores maintaining
typical mark-ups. Such savings enable NFM to constantly widen
its geographical reach and thus to enjoy growth well beyond the
natural growth of the Omaha market.

I have been asked by a number of people just what secrets
the Blumkins bring to their business. These are not very
esoteric. All members of the family: (1) apply themselves with
an enthusiasm and energy that would make Ben Franklin and Horatio
Alger look like dropouts; (2) define with extraordinary realism
their area of special competence and act decisively on all
matters within it; (3) ignore even the most enticing propositions
failing outside of that area of special competence; and, (4)
unfailingly behave in a high-grade manner with everyone they deal
with. (Mrs. B boils it down to “sell cheap and tell the truth”.)

Our evaluation of the integrity of Mrs. B and her family was
demonstrated when we purchased 90% of the business: NFM had never
had an audit and we did not request one; we did not take an
inventory nor verify the receivables; we did not check property
titles. We gave Mrs. B a check for $55 million and she gave us
her word. That made for an even exchange.

You and I are fortunate to be in partnership with the
Blumkin family.

See’s Candy Shops, Inc.

Below is our usual recap of See’s performance since the time
of purchase by Blue Chip Stamps:

52-53 Week Year Operating Number of Number of
Ended About Sales Profits Pounds of Stores Open
December 31 Revenues After Taxes Candy Sold at Year End
------------------- ------------ ----------- ---------- -----------
1984 .............. $135,946,000 $13,380,000 24,759,000 214
1983 (53 weeks) ... 133,531,000 13,699,000 24,651,000 207
1982 .............. 123,662,000 11,875,000 24,216,000 202
1981 .............. 112,578,000 10,779,000 24,052,000 199
1980 .............. 97,715,000 7,547,000 24,065,000 191
1979 .............. 87,314,000 6,330,000 23,985,000 188
1978 .............. 73,653,000 6,178,000 22,407,000 182
1977 .............. 62,886,000 6,154,000 20,921,000 179
1976 (53 weeks) ... 56,333,000 5,569,000 20,553,000 173
1975 .............. 50,492,000 5,132,000 19,134,000 172
1974 .............. 41,248,000 3,021,000 17,883,000 170
1973 .............. 35,050,000 1,940,000 17,813,000 169
1972 .............. 31,337,000 2,083,000 16,954,000 167

This performance has not been produced by a generally rising
tide. To the contrary, many well-known participants in the
boxed-chocolate industry either have lost money in this same
period or have been marginally profitable. To our knowledge,
only one good-sized competitor has achieved high profitability.
The success of See’s reflects the combination of an exceptional
product and an exceptional manager, Chuck Huggins.

During 1984 we increased prices considerably less than has
been our practice in recent years: per-pound realization was
$5.49, up only 1.4% from 1983. Fortunately, we made good
progress on cost control, an area that has caused us problems in
recent years. Per-pound costs - other than those for raw
materials, a segment of expense largely outside of our control -
increased by only 2.2% last year.

Our cost-control problem has been exacerbated by the problem
of modestly declining volume (measured by pounds, not dollars) on
a same-store basis. Total pounds sold through shops in recent
years has been maintained at a roughly constant level only by the
net addition of a few shops annually. This more-shops-to-get-
the-same-volume situation naturally puts heavy pressure on per-
pound selling costs.

In 1984, same-store volume declined 1.1%. Total shop volume,
however, grew 0.6% because of an increase in stores. (Both
percentages are adjusted to compensate for a 53-week fiscal year
in 1983.)

See’s business tends to get a bit more seasonal each year.
In the four weeks prior to Christmas, we do 40% of the year’s
volume and earn about 75% of the year’s profits. We also earn
significant sums in the Easter and Valentine’s Day periods, but
pretty much tread water the rest of the year. In recent years,
shop volume at Christmas has grown in relative importance, and so
have quantity orders and mail orders. The increased
concentration of business in the Christmas period produces a
multitude of managerial problems, all of which have been handled
by Chuck and his associates with exceptional skill and grace.

Their solutions have in no way involved compromises in
either quality of service or quality of product. Most of our
larger competitors could not say the same. Though faced with
somewhat less extreme peaks and valleys in demand than we, they
add preservatives or freeze the finished product in order to
smooth the production cycle and thereby lower unit costs. We
reject such techniques, opting, in effect, for production
headaches rather than product modification.

Our mall stores face a host of new food and snack vendors
that provide particularly strong competition at non-holiday
periods. We need new products to fight back and during 1984 we
introduced six candy bars that, overall, met with a good
reception. Further product introductions are planned.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 0:57 par mihou
In 1985 we will intensify our efforts to keep per-pound cost
increases below the rate of inflation. Continued success in
these efforts, however, will require gains in same-store
poundage. Prices in 1985 should average 6% - 7% above those of
1984. Assuming no change in same-store volume, profits should
show a moderate gain.

Buffalo Evening News

Profits at the News in 1984 were considerably greater than
we expected. As at See’s, excellent progress was made in
controlling costs. Excluding hours worked in the newsroom, total
hours worked decreased by about 2.8%. With this productivity
improvement, overall costs increased only 4.9%. This performance
by Stan Lipsey and his management team was one of the best in the
industry.

However, we now face an acceleration in costs. In mid-1984
we entered into new multi-year union contracts that provided for
a large “catch-up” wage increase. This catch-up is entirely
appropriate: the cooperative spirit of our unions during the
unprofitable 1977-1982 period was an important factor in our
success in remaining cost competitive with The Courier-Express.
Had we not kept costs down, the outcome of that struggle might
well have been different.

Because our new union contracts took effect at varying
dates, little of the catch-up increase was reflected in our 1984
costs. But the increase will be almost totally effective in 1985
and, therefore, our unit labor costs will rise this year at a
rate considerably greater than that of the industry. We expect
to mitigate this increase by continued small gains in
productivity, but we cannot avoid significantly higher wage costs
this year. Newsprint price trends also are less favorable now
than they were in 1984. Primarily because of these two factors,
we expect at least a minor contraction in margins at the News.

Working in our favor at the News are two factors of major
economic importance:

(1) Our circulation is concentrated to an unusual degree
in the area of maximum utility to our advertisers.
“Regional” newspapers with wide-ranging circulation, on
the other hand, have a significant portion of their
circulation in areas that are of negligible utility to
most advertisers. A subscriber several hundred miles
away is not much of a prospect for the puppy you are
offering to sell via a classified ad - nor for the
grocer with stores only in the metropolitan area.
“Wasted” circulation - as the advertisers call it -
hurts profitability: expenses of a newspaper are
determined largely by gross circulation while
advertising revenues (usually 70% - 80% of total
revenues) are responsive only to useful circulation;

(2) Our penetration of the Buffalo retail market is
exceptional; advertisers can reach almost all of their
potential customers using only the News.

Last year I told you about this unusual reader acceptance:
among the 100 largest newspapers in the country, we were then
number one, daily, and number three, Sunday, in penetration. The
most recent figures show us number one in penetration on weekdays
and number two on Sunday. (Even so, the number of households in
Buffalo has declined, so our current weekday circulation is down
slightly; on Sundays it is unchanged.)

I told you also that one of the major reasons for this
unusual acceptance by readers was the unusual quantity of news
that we delivered to them: a greater percentage of our paper is
devoted to news than is the case at any other dominant paper in
our size range. In 1984 our “news hole” ratio was 50.9%, (versus
50.4% in 1983), a level far above the typical 35% - 40%. We will
continue to maintain this ratio in the 50% area. Also, though we
last year reduced total hours worked in other departments, we
maintained the level of employment in the newsroom and, again,
will continue to do so. Newsroom costs advanced 9.1% in 1984, a
rise far exceeding our overall cost increase of 4.9%.

Our news hole policy costs us significant extra money for
newsprint. As a result, our news costs (newsprint for the news
hole plus payroll and expenses of the newsroom) as a percentage
of revenue run higher than those of most dominant papers of our
size. There is adequate room, however, for our paper or any
other dominant paper to sustain these costs: the difference
between “high” and “low” news costs at papers of comparable size
runs perhaps three percentage points while pre-tax profit margins
are often ten times that amount.

The economics of a dominant newspaper are excellent, among
the very best in the business world. Owners, naturally, would
like to believe that their wonderful profitability is achieved
only because they unfailingly turn out a wonderful product. That
comfortable theory wilts before an uncomfortable fact. While
first-class newspapers make excellent profits, the profits of
third-rate papers are as good or better - as long as either class
of paper is dominant within its community. Of course, product
quality may have been crucial to the paper in achieving
dominance. We believe this was the case at the News, in very
large part because of people such as Alfred Kirchhofer who
preceded us.

Once dominant, the newspaper itself, not the marketplace,
determines just how good or how bad the paper will be. Good or
bad, it will prosper. That is not true of most businesses:
inferior quality generally produces inferior economics. But even
a poor newspaper is a bargain to most citizens simply because of
its “bulletin board” value. Other things being equal, a poor
product will not achieve quite the level of readership achieved
by a first-class product. A poor product, however, will still
remain essential to most citizens, and what commands their
attention will command the attention of advertisers.

Since high standards are not imposed by the marketplace,
management must impose its own. Our commitment to an above-
average expenditure for news represents an important quantitative
standard. We have confidence that Stan Lipsey and Murray Light
will continue to apply the far-more important qualitative
standards. Charlie and I believe that newspapers are very
special institutions in society. We are proud of the News, and
intend an even greater pride to be justified in the years ahead.

Insurance Operations

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table listing
two key figures for the insurance industry:

Yearly Change Combined Ratio
in Premiums after Policy-holder
Written (%) Dividends
------------- -------------------
1972 .............................. 10.2 96.2
1973 .............................. 8.0 99.2
1974 .............................. 6.2 105.4
1975 .............................. 11.0 107.9
1976 .............................. 21.9 102.4
1977 .............................. 19.8 97.2
1978 .............................. 12.8 97.5
1979 .............................. 10.3 100.6
1980 .............................. 6.0 103.1
1981 .............................. 3.9 106.0
1982 .............................. 4.4 109.7
1983 (Revised) .................... 4.5 111.9
1984 (Estimated) .................. 8.1 117.7
Source: Best’s Aggregates and Averages

Best’s data reflect the experience of practically the entire
industry, including stock, mutual, and reciprocal companies. The
combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred
plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums; a ratio below
100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates
a loss.

For a number of years, we have told you that an annual
increase by the industry of about 10% per year in premiums
written is necessary for the combined ratio to remain roughly
unchanged. We assumed in making that assertion that expenses as
a percentage of premium volume would stay relatively stable and
that losses would grow at about 10% annually because of the
combined influence of unit volume increases, inflation, and
judicial rulings that expand what is covered by the insurance
policy.

Our opinion is proving dismayingly accurate: a premium
increase of 10% per year since 1979 would have produced an
aggregate increase through 1984 of 61% and a combined ratio in
1984 almost identical to the 100.6 of 1979. Instead, the
industry had only a 30% increase in premiums and a 1984 combined
ratio of 117.7. Today, we continue to believe that the key index
to the trend of underwriting profitability is the year-to-year
percentage change in industry premium volume.

It now appears that premium volume in 1985 will grow well
over 10%. Therefore, assuming that catastrophes are at a
“normal” level, we would expect the combined ratio to begin
easing downward toward the end of the year. However, under our
industrywide loss assumptions (i.e., increases of 10% annually),
five years of 15%-per-year increases in premiums would be
required to get the combined ratio back to 100. This would mean
a doubling of industry volume by 1989, an outcome that seems
highly unlikely to us. Instead, we expect several years of
premium gains somewhat above the 10% level, followed by highly-
competitive pricing that generally will produce combined ratios
in the 108-113 range.

Our own combined ratio in 1984 was a humbling 134. (Here, as
throughout this report, we exclude structured settlements and the
assumption of loss reserves in reporting this ratio. Much
additional detail, including the effect of discontinued
operations on the ratio, appears on pages 42-43). This is the
third year in a row that our underwriting performance has been
far poorer than that of the industry. We expect an improvement
in the combined ratio in 1985, and also expect our improvement to
be substantially greater than that of the industry. Mike
Goldberg has corrected many of the mistakes I made before he took
over insurance operations. Moreover, our business is
concentrated in lines that have experienced poorer-than-average
results during the past several years, and that circumstance has
begun to subdue many of our competitors and even eliminate some.
With the competition shaken, we were able during the last half of
1984 to raise prices significantly in certain important lines
with little loss of business.

For some years I have told you that there could be a day
coming when our premier financial strength would make a real
difference in the competitive position of our insurance
operation. That day may have arrived. We are almost without
question the strongest property/casualty insurance operation in
the country, with a capital position far superior to that of
well-known companies of much greater size.

Equally important, our corporate policy is to retain that
superiority. The buyer of insurance receives only a promise in
exchange for his cash. The value of that promise should be
appraised against the possibility of adversity, not prosperity.
At a minimum, the promise should appear able to withstand a
prolonged combination of depressed financial markets and
exceptionally unfavorable underwriting results. Our insurance
subsidiaries are both willing and able to keep their promises in
any such environment - and not too many other companies clearly
are.

Our financial strength is a particular asset in the business
of structured settlements and loss reserve assumptions that we
reported on last year. The claimant in a structured settlement
and the insurance company that has reinsured loss reserves need
to be completely confident that payments will be forthcoming for
decades to come. Very few companies in the property/casualty
field can meet this test of unquestioned long-term strength. (In
fact, only a handful of companies exists with which we will
reinsure our own liabilities.)

We have grown in these new lines of business: funds that we
hold to offset assumed liabilities grew from $16.2 million to
$30.6 million during the year. We expect growth to continue and
perhaps to greatly accelerate. To support this projected growth
we have added substantially to the capital of Columbia Insurance
Company, our reinsurance unit specializing in structured
settlements and loss reserve assumptions. While these businesses
are very competitive, returns should be satisfactory.

At GEICO the news, as usual, is mostly good. That company
achieved excellent unit growth in its primary insurance business
during 1984, and the performance of its investment portfolio
continued to be extraordinary. Though underwriting results
deteriorated late in the year, they still remain far better than
those of the industry. Our ownership in GEICO at yearend
amounted to 36% and thus our interest in their direct
property/casualty volume of $885 million amounted to $320
million, or well over double our own premium volume.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 0:58 par mihou
I have reported to you in the past few years that the
performance of GEICO’s stock has considerably exceeded that
company’s business performance, brilliant as the latter has been.
In those years, the carrying value of our GEICO investment on our
balance sheet grew at a rate greater than the growth in GEICO’s
intrinsic business value. I warned you that over performance by
the stock relative to the performance of the business obviously
could not occur every year, and that in some years the stock must
under perform the business. In 1984 that occurred and the
carrying value of our interest in GEICO changed hardly at all,
while the intrinsic business value of that interest increased
substantially. Since 27% of Berkshire’s net worth at the
beginning of 1984 was represented by GEICO, its static market
value had a significant impact upon our rate of gain for the
year. We are not at all unhappy with such a result: we would far
rather have the business value of GEICO increase by X during the
year, while market value decreases, than have the intrinsic value
increase by only 1/2 X with market value soaring. In GEICO’s
case, as in all of our investments, we look to business
performance, not market performance. If we are correct in
expectations regarding the business, the market eventually will
follow along.

You, as shareholders of Berkshire, have benefited in
enormous measure from the talents of GEICO’s Jack Byrne, Bill
Snyder, and Lou Simpson. In its core business - low-cost auto
and homeowners insurance - GEICO has a major, sustainable
competitive advantage. That is a rare asset in business
generally, and it’s almost non-existent in the field of financial
services. (GEICO, itself, illustrates this point: despite the
company’s excellent management, superior profitability has eluded
GEICO in all endeavors other than its core business.) In a large
industry, a competitive advantage such as GEICO’s provides the
potential for unusual economic rewards, and Jack and Bill
continue to exhibit great skill in realizing that potential.

Most of the funds generated by GEICO’s core insurance
operation are made available to Lou for investment. Lou has the
rare combination of temperamental and intellectual
characteristics that produce outstanding long-term investment
performance. Operating with below-average risk, he has generated
returns that have been by far the best in the insurance industry.
I applaud and appreciate the efforts and talents of these three
outstanding managers.

Errors in Loss Reserving

Any shareholder in a company with important interests in the
property/casualty insurance business should have some
understanding of the weaknesses inherent in the reporting of
current earnings in that industry. Phil Graham, when publisher
of the Washington Post, described the daily newspaper as “a first
rough draft of history”. Unfortunately, the financial statements
of a property/casualty insurer provide, at best, only a first
rough draft of earnings and financial condition.

The determination of costs is the main problem. Most of an
insurer’s costs result from losses on claims, and many of the
losses that should be charged against the current year’s revenue
are exceptionally difficult to estimate. Sometimes the extent of
these losses, or even their existence, is not known for decades.

The loss expense charged in a property/casualty company’s
current income statement represents: (1) losses that occurred and
were paid during the year; (2) estimates for losses that occurred
and were reported to the insurer during the year, but which have
yet to be settled; (3) estimates of ultimate dollar costs for
losses that occurred during the year but of which the insurer is
unaware (termed “IBNR”: incurred but not reported); and (4) the
net effect of revisions this year of similar estimates for (2)
and (3) made in past years.
Such revisions may be long delayed, but eventually any
estimate of losses that causes the income for year X to be
misstated must be corrected, whether it is in year X + 1, or
X + 10. This, perforce, means that earnings in the year of
correction also are misstated. For example, assume a claimant
was injured by one of our insureds in 1979 and we thought a
settlement was likely to be made for $10,000. That year we would
have charged $10,000 to our earnings statement for the estimated
cost of the loss and, correspondingly, set up a liability reserve
on the balance sheet for that amount. If we settled the claim in
1984 for $100,000, we would charge earnings with a loss cost of
$90,000 in 1984, although that cost was truly an expense of 1979.
And if that piece of business was our only activity in 1979, we
would have badly misled ourselves as to costs, and you as to
earnings.

The necessarily-extensive use of estimates in assembling the
figures that appear in such deceptively precise form in the
income statement of property/casualty companies means that some
error must seep in, no matter how proper the intentions of
management. In an attempt to minimize error, most insurers use
various statistical techniques to adjust the thousands of
individual loss evaluations (called case reserves) that comprise
the raw data for estimation of aggregate liabilities. The extra
reserves created by these adjustments are variously labeled
“bulk”, “development”, or “supplemental” reserves. The goal of
the adjustments should be a loss-reserve total that has a 50-50
chance of being proved either slightly too high or slightly too
low when all losses that occurred prior to the date of the
financial statement are ultimately paid.

At Berkshire, we have added what we thought were appropriate
supplemental reserves but in recent years they have not been
adequate. It is important that you understand the magnitude of
the errors that have been involved in our reserving. You can
thus see for yourselves just how imprecise the process is, and
also judge whether we may have some systemic bias that should
make you wary of our current and future figures.

The following table shows the results from insurance
underwriting as we have reported them to you in recent years, and
also gives you calculations a year later on an “if-we-knew-then-
what-we think-we-know-now” basis. I say “what we think we know
now” because the adjusted figures still include a great many
estimates for losses that occurred in the earlier years.
However, many claims from the earlier years have been settled so
that our one-year-later estimate contains less guess work than
our earlier estimate:

Underwriting Results Corrected Figures
as Reported After One Year’s
Year to You Experience
---- -------------------- -----------------
1980 $ 6,738,000 $ 14,887,000
1981 1,478,000 (1,118,000)
1982 (21,462,000) (25,066,000)
1983 (33,192,000) (50,974,000)
1984 (45,413,000) ?

Our structured settlement and loss-reserve assumption
businesses are not included in this table. Important
additional information on loss reserve experience appears
on pages 43-45.

To help you understand this table, here is an explanation of
the most recent figures: 1984’s reported pre-tax underwriting
loss of $45.4 million consists of $27.6 million we estimate that
we lost on 1984’s business, plus the increased loss of $17.8
million reflected in the corrected figure for 1983.

As you can see from reviewing the table, my errors in
reporting to you have been substantial and recently have always
presented a better underwriting picture than was truly the case.
This is a source of particular chagrin to me because: (1) I like
for you to be able to count on what I say; (2) our insurance
managers and I undoubtedly acted with less urgency than we would
have had we understood the full extent of our losses; and (3) we
paid income taxes calculated on overstated earnings and thereby
gave the government money that we didn’t need to. (These
overpayments eventually correct themselves, but the delay is long
and we don’t receive interest on the amounts we overpaid.)

Because our business is weighted toward casualty and
reinsurance lines, we have more problems in estimating loss costs
than companies that specialize in property insurance. (When a
building that you have insured burns down, you get a much faster
fix on your costs than you do when an employer you have insured
finds out that one of his retirees has contracted a disease
attributable to work he did decades earlier.) But I still find
our errors embarrassing. In our direct business, we have far
underestimated the mushrooming tendency of juries and courts to
make the “deep pocket” pay, regardless of the factual situation
and the past precedents for establishment of liability. We also
have underestimated the contagious effect that publicity
regarding giant awards has on juries. In the reinsurance area,
where we have had our worst experience in under reserving, our
customer insurance companies have made the same mistakes. Since
we set reserves based on information they supply us, their
mistakes have become our mistakes.

I heard a story recently that is applicable to our insurance
accounting problems: a man was traveling abroad when he received
a call from his sister informing him that their father had died
unexpectedly. It was physically impossible for the brother to
get back home for the funeral, but he told his sister to take
care of the funeral arrangements and to send the bill to him.
After returning home he received a bill for several thousand
dollars, which he promptly paid. The following month another
bill came along for $15, and he paid that too. Another month
followed, with a similar bill. When, in the next month, a third
bill for $15 was presented, he called his sister to ask what was
going on. “Oh”, she said. “I forgot to tell you. We buried Dad
in a rented suit.”

If you’ve been in the insurance business in recent years -
particularly the reinsurance business - this story hurts. We
have tried to include all of our “rented suit” liabilities in our
current financial statement, but our record of past error should
make us humble, and you suspicious. I will continue to report to
you the errors, plus or minus, that surface each year.

Not all reserving errors in the industry have been of the
innocent-but-dumb variety. With underwriting results as bad as
they have been in recent years - and with managements having as
much discretion as they do in the presentation of financial
statements - some unattractive aspects of human nature have
manifested themselves. Companies that would be out of business
if they realistically appraised their loss costs have, in some
cases, simply preferred to take an extraordinarily optimistic
view about these yet-to-be-paid sums. Others have engaged in
various transactions to hide true current loss costs.

Both of these approaches can “work” for a considerable time:
external auditors cannot effectively police the financial
statements of property/casualty insurers. If liabilities of an
insurer, correctly stated, would exceed assets, it falls to the
insurer to volunteer this morbid information. In other words,
the corpse is supposed to file the death certificate. Under this
“honor system” of mortality, the corpse sometimes gives itself
the benefit of the doubt.

In most businesses, of course, insolvent companies run out
of cash. Insurance is different: you can be broke but flush.
Since cash comes in at the inception of an insurance policy and
losses are paid much later, insolvent insurers don’t run out of
cash until long after they have run out of net worth. In fact,
these “walking dead” often redouble their efforts to write
business, accepting almost any price or risk, simply to keep the
cash flowing in. With an attitude like that of an embezzler who
has gambled away his purloined funds, these companies hope that
somehow they can get lucky on the next batch of business and
thereby cover up earlier shortfalls. Even if they don’t get
lucky, the penalty to managers is usually no greater for a $100
million shortfall than one of $10 million; in the meantime, while
the losses mount, the managers keep their jobs and perquisites.

The loss-reserving errors of other property/casualty
companies are of more than academic interest to Berkshire. Not
only does Berkshire suffer from sell-at-any-price competition by
the “walking dead”, but we also suffer when their insolvency is
finally acknowledged. Through various state guarantee funds that
levy assessments, Berkshire ends up paying a portion of the
insolvent insurers’ asset deficiencies, swollen as they usually
are by the delayed detection that results from wrong reporting.
There is even some potential for cascading trouble. The
insolvency of a few large insurers and the assessments by state
guarantee funds that would follow could imperil weak-but-
previously-solvent insurers. Such dangers can be mitigated if
state regulators become better at prompt identification and
termination of insolvent insurers, but progress on that front has
been slow.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 0:59 par mihou
Washington Public Power Supply System

From October, 1983 through June, 1984 Berkshire’s insurance
subsidiaries continuously purchased large quantities of bonds of
Projects 1, 2, and 3 of Washington Public Power Supply System
(“WPPSS”). This is the same entity that, on July 1, 1983,
defaulted on $2.2 billion of bonds issued to finance partial
construction of the now-abandoned Projects 4 and 5. While there
are material differences in the obligors, promises, and
properties underlying the two categories of bonds, the problems
of Projects 4 and 5 have cast a major cloud over Projects 1, 2,
and 3, and might possibly cause serious problems for the latter
issues. In addition, there have been a multitude of problems
related directly to Projects 1, 2, and 3 that could weaken or
destroy an otherwise strong credit position arising from
guarantees by Bonneville Power Administration.

Despite these important negatives, Charlie and I judged the
risks at the time we purchased the bonds and at the prices
Berkshire paid (much lower than present prices) to be
considerably more than compensated for by prospects of profit.

As you know, we buy marketable stocks for our insurance
companies based upon the criteria we would apply in the purchase
of an entire business. This business-valuation approach is not
widespread among professional money managers and is scorned by
many academics. Nevertheless, it has served its followers well
(to which the academics seem to say, “Well, it may be all right
in practice, but it will never work in theory.”) Simply put, we
feel that if we can buy small pieces of businesses with
satisfactory underlying economics at a fraction of the per-share
value of the entire business, something good is likely to happen
to us - particularly if we own a group of such securities.

We extend this business-valuation approach even to bond
purchases such as WPPSS. We compare the $139 million cost of our
yearend investment in WPPSS to a similar $139 million investment
in an operating business. In the case of WPPSS, the “business”
contractually earns $22.7 million after tax (via the interest
paid on the bonds), and those earnings are available to us
currently in cash. We are unable to buy operating businesses
with economics close to these. Only a relatively few businesses
earn the 16.3% after tax on unleveraged capital that our WPPSS
investment does and those businesses, when available for
purchase, sell at large premiums to that capital. In the average
negotiated business transaction, unleveraged corporate earnings
of $22.7 million after-tax (equivalent to about $45 million pre-
tax) might command a price of $250 - $300 million (or sometimes
far more). For a business we understand well and strongly like,
we will gladly pay that much. But it is double the price we paid
to realize the same earnings from WPPSS bonds.

However, in the case of WPPSS, there is what we view to be a
very slight risk that the “business” could be worth nothing
within a year or two. There also is the risk that interest
payments might be interrupted for a considerable period of time.
Furthermore, the most that the “business” could be worth is about
the $205 million face value of the bonds that we own, an amount
only 48% higher than the price we paid.

This ceiling on upside potential is an important minus. It
should be realized, however, that the great majority of operating
businesses have a limited upside potential also unless more
capital is continuously invested in them. That is so because
most businesses are unable to significantly improve their average
returns on equity - even under inflationary conditions, though
these were once thought to automatically raise returns.

(Let’s push our bond-as-a-business example one notch
further: if you elect to “retain” the annual earnings of a 12%
bond by using the proceeds from coupons to buy more bonds,
earnings of that bond “business” will grow at a rate comparable
to that of most operating businesses that similarly reinvest all
earnings. In the first instance, a 30-year, zero-coupon, 12%
bond purchased today for $10 million will be worth $300 million
in 2015. In the second, a $10 million business that regularly
earns 12% on equity and retains all earnings to grow, will also
end up with $300 million of capital in 2015. Both the business
and the bond will earn over $32 million in the final year.)

Our approach to bond investment - treating it as an unusual
sort of “business” with special advantages and disadvantages -
may strike you as a bit quirky. However, we believe that many
staggering errors by investors could have been avoided if they
had viewed bond investment with a businessman’s perspective. For
example, in 1946, 20-year AAA tax-exempt bonds traded at slightly
below a 1% yield. In effect, the buyer of those bonds at that
time bought a “business” that earned about 1% on “book value”
(and that, moreover, could never earn a dime more than 1% on
book), and paid 100 cents on the dollar for that abominable
business.

If an investor had been business-minded enough to think in
those terms - and that was the precise reality of the bargain
struck - he would have laughed at the proposition and walked
away. For, at the same time, businesses with excellent future
prospects could have been bought at, or close to, book value
while earning 10%, 12%, or 15% after tax on book. Probably no
business in America changed hands in 1946 at book value that the
buyer believed lacked the ability to earn more than 1% on book.
But investors with bond-buying habits eagerly made economic
commitments throughout the year on just that basis. Similar,
although less extreme, conditions prevailed for the next two
decades as bond investors happily signed up for twenty or thirty
years on terms outrageously inadequate by business standards.
(In what I think is by far the best book on investing ever
written - “The Intelligent Investor”, by Ben Graham - the last
section of the last chapter begins with, “Investment is most
intelligent when it is most businesslike.” This section is called
“A Final Word”, and it is appropriately titled.)

We will emphasize again that there is unquestionably some
risk in the WPPSS commitment. It is also the sort of risk that
is difficult to evaluate. Were Charlie and I to deal with 50
similar evaluations over a lifetime, we would expect our judgment
to prove reasonably satisfactory. But we do not get the chance
to make 50 or even 5 such decisions in a single year. Even
though our long-term results may turn out fine, in any given year
we run a risk that we will look extraordinarily foolish. (That’s
why all of these sentences say “Charlie and I”, or “we”.)

Most managers have very little incentive to make the
intelligent-but-with-some-chance-of-looking-like-an-idiot
decision. Their personal gain/loss ratio is all too obvious: if
an unconventional decision works out well, they get a pat on the
back and, if it works out poorly, they get a pink slip. (Failing
conventionally is the route to go; as a group, lemmings may have
a rotten image, but no individual lemming has ever received bad
press.)

Our equation is different. With 47% of Berkshire’s stock,
Charlie and I don’t worry about being fired, and we receive our
rewards as owners, not managers. Thus we behave with Berkshire’s
money as we would with our own. That frequently leads us to
unconventional behavior both in investments and general business
management.

We remain unconventional in the degree to which we
concentrate the investments of our insurance companies, including
those in WPPSS bonds. This concentration makes sense only
because our insurance business is conducted from a position of
exceptional financial strength. For almost all other insurers, a
comparable degree of concentration (or anything close to it)
would be totally inappropriate. Their capital positions are not
strong enough to withstand a big error, no matter how attractive
an investment opportunity might appear when analyzed on the basis
of probabilities.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:00 par mihou
With our financial strength we can own large blocks of a few
securities that we have thought hard about and bought at
attractive prices. (Billy Rose described the problem of over-
diversification: “If you have a harem of forty women, you never
get to know any of them very well.”) Over time our policy of
concentration should produce superior results, though these will
be tempered by our large size. When this policy produces a
really bad year, as it must, at least you will know that our
money was committed on the same basis as yours.

We made the major part of our WPPSS investment at different
prices and under somewhat different factual circumstances than
exist at present. If we decide to change our position, we will
not inform shareholders until long after the change has been
completed. (We may be buying or selling as you read this.) The
buying and selling of securities is a competitive business, and
even a modest amount of added competition on either side can cost
us a great deal of money. Our WPPSS purchases illustrate this
principle. From October, 1983 through June, 1984, we attempted
to buy almost all the bonds that we could of Projects 1, 2, and
3. Yet we purchased less than 3% of the bonds outstanding. Had
we faced even a few additional well-heeled investors, stimulated
to buy because they knew we were, we could have ended up with a
materially smaller amount of bonds, purchased at a materially
higher price. (A couple of coat-tail riders easily could have
cost us $5 million.) For this reason, we will not comment about
our activities in securities - neither to the press, nor
shareholders, nor to anyone else - unless legally required to do
so.
One final observation regarding our WPPSS purchases: we
dislike the purchase of most long-term bonds under most
circumstances and have bought very few in recent years. That’s
because bonds are as sound as a dollar - and we view the long-
term outlook for dollars as dismal. We believe substantial
inflation lies ahead, although we have no idea what the average
rate will turn out to be. Furthermore, we think there is a
small, but not insignificant, chance of runaway inflation.

Such a possibility may seem absurd, considering the rate to
which inflation has dropped. But we believe that present fiscal
policy - featuring a huge deficit - is both extremely dangerous
and difficult to reverse. (So far, most politicians in both
parties have followed Charlie Brown’s advice: “No problem is so
big that it can’t be run away from.”) Without a reversal, high
rates of inflation may be delayed (perhaps for a long time), but
will not be avoided. If high rates materialize, they bring with
them the potential for a runaway upward spiral.

While there is not much to choose between bonds and stocks
(as a class) when annual inflation is in the 5%-10% range,
runaway inflation is a different story. In that circumstance, a
diversified stock portfolio would almost surely suffer an
enormous loss in real value. But bonds already outstanding would
suffer far more. Thus, we think an all-bond portfolio carries a
small but unacceptable “wipe out” risk, and we require any
purchase of long-term bonds to clear a special hurdle. Only when
bond purchases appear decidedly superior to other business
opportunities will we engage in them. Those occasions are likely
to be few and far between.

Dividend Policy

Dividend policy is often reported to shareholders, but
seldom explained. A company will say something like, “Our goal
is to pay out 40% to 50% of earnings and to increase dividends at
a rate at least equal to the rise in the CPI”. And that’s it -
no analysis will be supplied as to why that particular policy is
best for the owners of the business. Yet, allocation of capital
is crucial to business and investment management. Because it is,
we believe managers and owners should think hard about the
circumstances under which earnings should be retained and under
which they should be distributed.

The first point to understand is that all earnings are not
created equal. In many businesses particularly those that have
high asset/profit ratios - inflation causes some or all of the
reported earnings to become ersatz. The ersatz portion - let’s
call these earnings “restricted” - cannot, if the business is to
retain its economic position, be distributed as dividends. Were
these earnings to be paid out, the business would lose ground in
one or more of the following areas: its ability to maintain its
unit volume of sales, its long-term competitive position, its
financial strength. No matter how conservative its payout ratio,
a company that consistently distributes restricted earnings is
destined for oblivion unless equity capital is otherwise infused.

Restricted earnings are seldom valueless to owners, but they
often must be discounted heavily. In effect, they are
conscripted by the business, no matter how poor its economic
potential. (This retention-no-matter-how-unattractive-the-return
situation was communicated unwittingly in a marvelously ironic
way by Consolidated Edison a decade ago. At the time, a punitive
regulatory policy was a major factor causing the company’s stock
to sell as low as one-fourth of book value; i.e., every time a
dollar of earnings was retained for reinvestment in the business,
that dollar was transformed into only 25 cents of market value.
But, despite this gold-into-lead process, most earnings were
reinvested in the business rather than paid to owners.
Meanwhile, at construction and maintenance sites throughout New
York, signs proudly proclaimed the corporate slogan, “Dig We
Must”.)

Restricted earnings need not concern us further in this
dividend discussion. Let’s turn to the much-more-valued
unrestricted variety. These earnings may, with equal
feasibility, be retained or distributed. In our opinion,
management should choose whichever course makes greater sense for
the owners of the business.

This principle is not universally accepted. For a number of
reasons managers like to withhold unrestricted, readily
distributable earnings from shareholders - to expand the
corporate empire over which the managers rule, to operate from a
position of exceptional financial comfort, etc. But we believe
there is only one valid reason for retention. Unrestricted
earnings should be retained only when there is a reasonable
prospect - backed preferably by historical evidence or, when
appropriate, by a thoughtful analysis of the future - that for
every dollar retained by the corporation, at least one dollar of
market value will be created for owners. This will happen only
if the capital retained produces incremental earnings equal to,
or above, those generally available to investors.

To illustrate, let’s assume that an investor owns a risk-
free 10% perpetual bond with one very unusual feature. Each year
the investor can elect either to take his 10% coupon in cash, or
to reinvest the coupon in more 10% bonds with identical terms;
i.e., a perpetual life and coupons offering the same cash-or-
reinvest option. If, in any given year, the prevailing interest
rate on long-term, risk-free bonds is 5%, it would be foolish for
the investor to take his coupon in cash since the 10% bonds he
could instead choose would be worth considerably more than 100
cents on the dollar. Under these circumstances, the investor
wanting to get his hands on cash should take his coupon in
additional bonds and then immediately sell them. By doing that,
he would realize more cash than if he had taken his coupon
directly in cash. Assuming all bonds were held by rational
investors, no one would opt for cash in an era of 5% interest
rates, not even those bondholders needing cash for living
purposes.

If, however, interest rates were 15%, no rational investor
would want his money invested for him at 10%. Instead, the
investor would choose to take his coupon in cash, even if his
personal cash needs were nil. The opposite course - reinvestment
of the coupon - would give an investor additional bonds with
market value far less than the cash he could have elected. If he
should want 10% bonds, he can simply take the cash received
and buy them in the market, where they will be available at a
large discount.

An analysis similar to that made by our hypothetical
bondholder is appropriate for owners in thinking about whether a
company’s unrestricted earnings should be retained or paid out.
Of course, the analysis is much more difficult and subject to
error because the rate earned on reinvested earnings is not a
contractual figure, as in our bond case, but rather a fluctuating
figure. Owners must guess as to what the rate will average over
the intermediate future. However, once an informed guess is
made, the rest of the analysis is simple: you should wish your
earnings to be reinvested if they can be expected to earn high
returns, and you should wish them paid to you if low returns are
the likely outcome of reinvestment.

Many corporate managers reason very much along these lines
in determining whether subsidiaries should distribute earnings to
their parent company. At that level,. the managers have no
trouble thinking like intelligent owners. But payout decisions
at the parent company level often are a different story. Here
managers frequently have trouble putting themselves in the shoes
of their shareholder-owners.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:00 par mihou
With this schizoid approach, the CEO of a multi-divisional
company will instruct Subsidiary A, whose earnings on incremental
capital may be expected to average 5%, to distribute all
available earnings in order that they may be invested in
Subsidiary B, whose earnings on incremental capital are expected
to be 15%. The CEO’s business school oath will allow no lesser
behavior. But if his own long-term record with incremental
capital is 5% - and market rates are 10% - he is likely to impose
a dividend policy on shareholders of the parent company that
merely follows some historical or industry-wide payout pattern.
Furthermore, he will expect managers of subsidiaries to give him
a full account as to why it makes sense for earnings to be
retained in their operations rather than distributed to the
parent-owner. But seldom will he supply his owners with a
similar analysis pertaining to the whole company.

In judging whether managers should retain earnings,
shareholders should not simply compare total incremental earnings
in recent years to total incremental capital because that
relationship may be distorted by what is going on in a core
business. During an inflationary period, companies with a core
business characterized by extraordinary economics can use small
amounts of incremental capital in that business at very high
rates of return (as was discussed in last year’s section on
Goodwill). But, unless they are experiencing tremendous unit
growth, outstanding businesses by definition generate large
amounts of excess cash. If a company sinks most of this money in
other businesses that earn low returns, the company’s overall
return on retained capital may nevertheless appear excellent
because of the extraordinary returns being earned by the portion
of earnings incrementally invested in the core business. The
situation is analogous to a Pro-Am golf event: even if all of the
amateurs are hopeless duffers, the team’s best-ball score will be
respectable because of the dominating skills of the professional.

Many corporations that consistently show good returns both
on equity and on overall incremental capital have, indeed,
employed a large portion of their retained earnings on an
economically unattractive, even disastrous, basis. Their
marvelous core businesses, however, whose earnings grow year
after year, camouflage repeated failures in capital allocation
elsewhere (usually involving high-priced acquisitions of
businesses that have inherently mediocre economics). The
managers at fault periodically report on the lessons they have
learned from the latest disappointment. They then usually seek
out future lessons. (Failure seems to go to their heads.)

In such cases, shareholders would be far better off if
earnings were retained only to expand the high-return business,
with the balance paid in dividends or used to repurchase stock
(an action that increases the owners’ interest in the exceptional
business while sparing them participation in subpar businesses).
Managers of high-return businesses who consistently employ much
of the cash thrown off by those businesses in other ventures with
low returns should be held to account for those allocation
decisions, regardless of how profitable the overall enterprise
is.

Nothing in this discussion is intended to argue for
dividends that bounce around from quarter to quarter with each
wiggle in earnings or in investment opportunities. Shareholders
of public corporations understandably prefer that dividends be
consistent and predictable. Payments, therefore, should reflect
long-term expectations for both earnings and returns on
incremental capital. Since the long-term corporate outlook
changes only infrequently, dividend patterns should change no
more often. But over time distributable earnings that have been
withheld by managers should earn their keep. If earnings have
been unwisely retained, it is likely that managers, too, have
been unwisely retained.

Let’s now turn to Berkshire Hathaway and examine how these
dividend principles apply to it. Historically, Berkshire has
earned well over market rates on retained earnings, thereby
creating over one dollar of market value for every dollar
retained. Under such circumstances, any distribution would have
been contrary to the financial interest of shareholders, large or
small.

In fact, significant distributions in the early years might
have been disastrous, as a review of our starting position will
show you. Charlie and I then controlled and managed three
companies, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Diversified Retailing
Company, Inc., and Blue Chip Stamps (all now merged into our
present operation). Blue Chip paid only a small dividend,
Berkshire and DRC paid nothing. If, instead, the companies had
paid out their entire earnings, we almost certainly would have no
earnings at all now - and perhaps no capital as well. The three
companies each originally made their money from a single
business: (1) textiles at Berkshire; (2) department stores at
Diversified; and (3) trading stamps at Blue Chip. These
cornerstone businesses (carefully chosen, it should be noted, by
your Chairman and Vice Chairman) have, respectively, (1) survived
but earned almost nothing, (2) shriveled in size while incurring
large losses, and (3) shrunk in sales volume to about 5% its size
at the time of our entry. (Who says “you can’t lose ‘em all”?)
Only by committing available funds to much better businesses were
we able to overcome these origins. (It’s been like overcoming a
misspent youth.) Clearly, diversification has served us well.
We expect to continue to diversify while also supporting the
growth of current operations though, as we’ve pointed out, our
returns from these efforts will surely be below our historical
returns. But as long as prospective returns are above the rate
required to produce a dollar of market value per dollar retained,
we will continue to retain all earnings. Should our estimate of
future returns fall below that point, we will distribute all
unrestricted earnings that we believe can not be effectively
used. In making that judgment, we will look at both our
historical record and our prospects. Because our year-to-year
results are inherently volatile, we believe a five-year rolling
average to be appropriate for judging the historical record.
Our present plan is to use our retained earnings to further
build the capital of our insurance companies. Most of our
competitors are in weakened financial condition and reluctant to
expand substantially. Yet large premium-volume gains for the
industry are imminent, amounting probably to well over $15
billion in 1985 versus less than $5 billion in 1983. These
circumstances could produce major amounts of profitable business
for us. Of course, this result is no sure thing, but prospects
for it are far better than they have been for many years.

Miscellaneous

This is the spot where each year I run my small “business
wanted” ad. In 1984 John Loomis, one of our particularly
knowledgeable and alert shareholders, came up with a company that
met all of our tests. We immediately pursued this idea, and only
a chance complication prevented a deal. Since our ad is pulling,
we will repeat it in precisely last year’s form:

We prefer:
(1) large purchases (at least $5 million of after-tax
earnings),
(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future
projections are of little interest to us, nor are
“turn-around” situations),
(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while
employing little or no debt,
(4) management in place (we can’t supply it),
(5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we
won’t understand it),
(6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or
that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily,
about a transaction when price is unknown).

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise
complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily
within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer
to buy for cash, but will consider issuance of stock when we
receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. We
invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people
with whom we have done business in the past. For the right
business - and the right people - we can provide a good home.

* * *

A record 97.2% of all eligible shares participated in
Berkshire’s 1984 shareholder-designated contributions program.
Total contributions made through this program were $3,179,000,
and 1,519 charities were recipients. Our proxy material for the
annual meeting will allow you to cast an advisory vote expressing
your views about this program - whether you think we should
continue it and, if so, at what per-share level. (You may be
interested to learn that we were unable to find a precedent for
an advisory vote in which management seeks the opinions of
shareholders about owner-related corporate policies. Managers
who put their trust in capitalism seem in no hurry to put their
trust in capitalists.)

We urge new shareholders to read the description of our
shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on
pages 60 and 61. If you wish to participate in future programs,
we strongly urge that you immediately make sure that your shares
are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in “street”
name or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 30,
1985 will be ineligible for the 1985 program.

* * *

Our annual meeting will be on May 21, 1985 in Omaha, and I
hope that you attend. Many annual meetings are a waste of time,
both for shareholders and for management. Sometimes that is true
because management is reluctant to open up on matters of business
substance. More often a nonproductive session is the fault of
shareholder participants who are more concerned about their own
moment on stage than they are about the affairs of the
corporation. What should be a forum for business discussion
becomes a forum for theatrics, spleen-venting and advocacy of
issues. (The deal is irresistible: for the price of one share you
get to tell a captive audience your ideas as to how the world
should be run.) Under such circumstances, the quality of the
meeting often deteriorates from year to year as the antics of
those interested in themselves discourage attendance by those
interested in the business.

Berkshire’s meetings are a different story. The number of
shareholders attending grows a bit each year and we have yet to
experience a silly question or an ego-inspired commentary.
Instead, we get a wide variety of thoughtful questions about the
business. Because the annual meeting is the time and place for
these, Charlie and I are happy to answer them all, no matter how
long it takes. (We cannot, however, respond to written or phoned
questions at other times of the year; one-person-at-a time
reporting is a poor use of management time in a company with 3000
shareholders.) The only business matters that are off limits at
the annual meeting are those about which candor might cost our
company real money. Our activities in securities would be the
main example.

We always have bragged a bit on these pages about the
quality of our shareholder-partners. Come to the annual meeting
and you will see why. Out-of-towners should schedule a stop at
Nebraska Furniture Mart. If you make some purchases, you’ll save
far more than enough to pay for your trip, and you’ll enjoy the
experience.

Warren E. Buffett
February 25, 1985 Chairman of the Board

Subsequent Event: On March 18, a week after copy for this
report went to the typographer but shortly before production, we
agreed to purchase three million shares of Capital Cities
Communications, Inc. at $172.50 per share. Our purchase is
contingent upon the acquisition of American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc. by Capital Cities, and will close when that
transaction closes. At the earliest, that will be very late in
1985. Our admiration for the management of Capital Cities, led
by Tom Murphy and Dan Burke, has been expressed several times in
previous annual reports. Quite simply, they are tops in both
ability and integrity. We will have more to say about this
investment in next year’s report.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:02 par mihou
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

You may remember the wildly upbeat message of last year’s
report: nothing much was in the works but our experience had been
that something big popped up occasionally. This carefully-
crafted corporate strategy paid off in 1985. Later sections of
this report discuss (a) our purchase of a major position in
Capital Cities/ABC, (b) our acquisition of Scott & Fetzer, (c)
our entry into a large, extended term participation in the
insurance business of Fireman’s Fund, and (d) our sale of our
stock in General Foods.

Our gain in net worth during the year was $613.6 million, or
48.2%. It is fitting that the visit of Halley’s Comet coincided
with this percentage gain: neither will be seen again in my
lifetime. Our gain in per-share book value over the last twenty-
one years (that is, since present management took over) has been
from $19.46 to $1643.71, or 23.2% compounded annually, another
percentage that will not be repeated.

Two factors make anything approaching this rate of gain
unachievable in the future. One factor probably transitory - is
a stock market that offers very little opportunity compared to
the markets that prevailed throughout much of the 1964-1984
period. Today we cannot find significantly-undervalued equities
to purchase for our insurance company portfolios. The current
situation is 180 degrees removed from that existing about a
decade ago, when the only question was which bargain to choose.

This change in the market also has negative implications for
our present portfolio. In our 1974 annual report I could say:
“We consider several of our major holdings to have great
potential for significantly increased values in future years.” I
can’t say that now. It’s true that our insurance companies
currently hold major positions in companies with exceptional
underlying economics and outstanding managements, just as they
did in 1974. But current market prices generously appraise these
attributes, whereas they were ignored in 1974. Today’s
valuations mean that our insurance companies have no chance for
future portfolio gains on the scale of those achieved in the
past.

The second negative factor, far more telling, is our size.
Our equity capital is more than twenty times what it was only ten
years ago. And an iron law of business is that growth eventually
dampens exceptional economics. just look at the records of high-
return companies once they have amassed even $1 billion of equity
capital. None that I know of has managed subsequently, over a
ten-year period, to keep on earning 20% or more on equity while
reinvesting all or substantially all of its earnings. Instead,
to sustain their high returns, such companies have needed to shed
a lot of capital by way of either dividends or repurchases of
stock. Their shareholders would have been far better off if all
earnings could have been reinvested at the fat returns earned by
these exceptional businesses. But the companies simply couldn’t
turn up enough high-return opportunities to make that possible.

Their problem is our problem. Last year I told you that we
needed profits of $3.9 billion over the ten years then coming up
to earn 15% annually. The comparable figure for the ten years
now ahead is $5.7 billion, a 48% increase that corresponds - as
it must mathematically - to the growth in our capital base during
1985. (Here’s a little perspective: leaving aside oil companies,
only about 15 U.S. businesses have managed to earn over $5.7
billion during the past ten years.)

Charlie Munger, my partner in managing Berkshire, and I are
reasonably optimistic about Berkshire’s ability to earn returns
superior to those earned by corporate America generally, and you
will benefit from the company’s retention of all earnings as long
as those returns are forthcoming. We have several things going
for us: (1) we don’t have to worry about quarterly or annual
figures but, instead, can focus on whatever actions will maximize
long-term value; (2) we can expand the business into any areas
that make sense - our scope is not circumscribed by history,
structure, or concept; and (3) we love our work. All of these
help. Even so, we will also need a full measure of good fortune
to average our hoped-for 15% - far more good fortune than was
required for our past 23.2%.

We need to mention one further item in the investment
equation that could affect recent purchasers of our stock.
Historically, Berkshire shares have sold modestly below intrinsic
business value. With the price there, purchasers could be
certain (as long as they did not experience a widening of this
discount) that their personal investment experience would at
least equal the financial experience of the business. But
recently the discount has disappeared, and occasionally a modest
premium has prevailed.

The elimination of the discount means that Berkshire’s
market value increased even faster than business value (which,
itself, grew at a pleasing pace). That was good news for any
owner holding while that move took place, but it is bad news for
the new or prospective owner. If the financial experience of new
owners of Berkshire is merely to match the future financial
experience of the company, any premium of market value over
intrinsic business value that they pay must be maintained.

Management cannot determine market prices, although it can,
by its disclosures and policies, encourage rational behavior by
market participants. My own preference, as perhaps you’d guess,
is for a market price that consistently approximates business
value. Given that relationship, all owners prosper precisely as
the business prospers during their period of ownership. Wild
swings in market prices far above and below business value do not
change the final gains for owners in aggregate; in the end,
investor gains must equal business gains. But long periods of
substantial undervaluation and/or overvaluation will cause the
gains of the business to be inequitably distributed among various
owners, with the investment result of any given owner largely
depending upon how lucky, shrewd, or foolish he happens to be.

Over the long term there has been a more consistent
relationship between Berkshire’s market value and business value
than has existed for any other publicly-traded equity with which
I am familiar. This is a tribute to you. Because you have been
rational, interested, and investment-oriented, the market price
for Berkshire stock has almost always been sensible. This
unusual result has been achieved by a shareholder group with
unusual demographics: virtually all of our shareholders are
individuals, not institutions. No other public company our size
can claim the same.

You might think that institutions, with their large staffs
of highly-paid and experienced investment professionals, would be
a force for stability and reason in financial markets. They are
not: stocks heavily owned and constantly monitored by
institutions have often been among the most inappropriately
valued.

Ben Graham told a story 40 years ago that illustrates why
investment professionals behave as they do: An oil prospector,
moving to his heavenly reward, was met by St. Peter with bad
news. “You’re qualified for residence”, said St. Peter, “but, as
you can see, the compound reserved for oil men is packed.
There’s no way to squeeze you in.” After thinking a moment, the
prospector asked if he might say just four words to the present
occupants. That seemed harmless to St. Peter, so the prospector
cupped his hands and yelled, “Oil discovered in hell.”
Immediately the gate to the compound opened and all of the oil
men marched out to head for the nether regions. Impressed, St.
Peter invited the prospector to move in and make himself
comfortable. The prospector paused. “No,” he said, “I think
I’ll go along with the rest of the boys. There might be some
truth to that rumor after all.”

Sources of Reported Earnings

The table on the next page shows the major sources of
Berkshire’s reported earnings. These numbers, along with far
more detailed sub-segment numbers, are the ones that Charlie and
I focus upon. We do not find consolidated figures an aid in
either managing or evaluating Berkshire and, in fact, never
prepare them for internal use.

Segment information is equally essential for investors
wanting to know what is going on in a multi-line business.
Corporate managers always have insisted upon such information
before making acquisition decisions but, until a few years ago,
seldom made it available to investors faced with acquisition and
disposition decisions of their own. Instead, when owners wishing
to understand the economic realities of their business asked for
data, managers usually gave them a we-can’t-tell-you-what-is-
going-on-because-it-would-hurt-the-company answer. Ultimately
the SEC ordered disclosure of segment data and management began
supplying real answers. The change in their behavior recalls an
insight of Al Capone: “You can get much further with a kind word
and a gun than you can with a kind word alone.”

In the table, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against the
specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix to
my letter in the 1983 annual report, is aggregated as a separate
item. (A compendium of the 1977-1984 letters is available upon
request.) In the Business Segment Data and Management’s
Discussion sections on pages 39-41 and 49-55, much additional
information regarding our businesses is provided, including
Goodwill and Goodwill Amortization figures for each of the
segments. I urge you to read those sections as well as Charlie
Munger’s letter to Wesco shareholders, which starts on page 56.

(000s omitted)
-----------------------------------------
Berkshire's Share
of Net Earnings
(after taxes and
Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)
------------------- -------------------
1985 1984 1985 1984
-------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ................ $(44,230) $(48,060) $(23,569) $(25,955)
Net Investment Income ....... 95,217 68,903 79,716 62,059
Associated Retail Stores ...... 270 (1,072) 134 (579)
Blue Chip Stamps .............. 5,763 (1,843) 2,813 (899)
Buffalo News .................. 29,921 27,328 14,580 13,317
Mutual Savings and Loan ....... 2,622 1,456 4,016 3,151
Nebraska Furniture Mart ....... 12,686 14,511 5,181 5,917
Precision Steel ............... 3,896 4,092 1,477 1,696
See’s Candies ................. 28,989 26,644 14,558 13,380
Textiles ...................... (2,395) 418 (1,324) 226
Wesco Financial ............... 9,500 9,777 4,191 4,828
Amortization of Goodwill ...... (1,475) (1,434) (1,475) (1,434)
Interest on Debt .............. (14,415) (14,734) (7,288) (7,452)
Shareholder-Designated
Contributions .............. (4,006) (3,179) (2,164) (1,716)
Other ......................... 3,106 4,932 2,102 3,475
-------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings .............. 125,449 87,739 92,948 70,014
Special General Foods Distribution 4,127 8,111 3,779 7,294
Special Washington Post
Distribution ................. 14,877 --- 13,851 ---
Sales of Securities ............. 468,903 104,699 325,237 71,587
-------- -------- -------- --------
Total Earnings - all entities ... $613,356 $200,549 $435,815 $148,895
======== ======== ======== ========

Our 1985 results include unusually large earnings from the
sale of securities. This fact, in itself, does not mean that we
had a particularly good year (though, of course, we did).
Security profits in a given year bear similarities to a college
graduation ceremony in which the knowledge gained over four years
is recognized on a day when nothing further is learned. We may
hold a stock for a decade or more, and during that period it may
grow quite consistently in both business and market value. In
the year in which we finally sell it there may be no increase in
value, or there may even be a decrease. But all growth in value
since purchase will be reflected in the accounting earnings of
the year of sale. (If the stock owned is in our insurance
subsidiaries, however, any gain or loss in market value will be
reflected in net worth annually.) Thus, reported capital gains or
losses in any given year are meaningless as a measure of how well
we have done in the current year.

A large portion of the realized gain in 1985 ($338 million
pre-tax out of a total of $488 million) came about through the
sale of our General Foods shares. We held most of these shares
since 1980, when we had purchased them at a price far below what
we felt was their per/share business value. Year by year, the
managerial efforts of Jim Ferguson and Phil Smith substantially
increased General Foods’ business value and, last fall, Philip
Morris made an offer for the company that reflected the increase.
We thus benefited from four factors: a bargain purchase price, a
business with fine underlying economics, an able management
concentrating on the interests of shareholders, and a buyer
willing to pay full business value. While that last factor is
the only one that produces reported earnings, we consider
identification of the first three to be the key to building value
for Berkshire shareholders. In selecting common stocks, we
devote our attention to attractive purchases, not to the
possibility of attractive sales.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:03 par mihou
We have again reported substantial income from special
distributions, this year from Washington Post and General Foods.
(The General Foods transactions obviously took place well before
the Philip Morris offer.) Distributions of this kind occur when
we sell a portion of our shares in a company back to it
simultaneously with its purchase of shares from other
shareholders. The number of shares we sell is contractually set
so as to leave our percentage ownership in the company precisely
the same after the sale as before. Such a transaction is quite
properly regarded by the IRS as substantially equivalent to a
dividend since we, as a shareholder, receive cash while
maintaining an unchanged ownership interest. This tax treatment
benefits us because corporate taxpayers, unlike individual
taxpayers, incur much lower taxes on dividend income than on
income from long-term capital gains. (This difference will be
widened further if the House-passed tax bill becomes law: under
its provisions, capital gains realized by corporations will be
taxed at the same rate as ordinary income.) However, accounting
rules are unclear as to proper treatment for shareholder
reporting. To conform with last year’s treatment, we have shown
these transactions as capital gains.
Though we have not sought out such transactions, we have
agreed to them on several occasions when managements initiated
the idea. In each case we have felt that non-selling
shareholders (all of whom had an opportunity to sell at the same
price we received) benefited because the companies made their
repurchases at prices below intrinsic business value. The tax
advantages we receive and our wish to cooperate with managements
that are increasing values for all shareholders have sometimes
led us to sell - but only to the extent that our proportional
share of the business was undiminished.

At this point we usually turn to a discussion of some of our
major business units. Before doing so, however, we should first
look at a failure at one of our smaller businesses. Our Vice
Chairman, Charlie Munger, has always emphasized the study of
mistakes rather than successes, both in business and other
aspects of life. He does so in the spirit of the man who said:
“All I want to know is where I’m going to die so I’ll never go
there.” You’ll immediately see why we make a good team: Charlie
likes to study errors and I have generated ample material for
him, particularly in our textile and insurance businesses.
Shutdown of Textile Business

In July we decided to close our textile operation, and by
yearend this unpleasant job was largely completed. The history
of this business is instructive.

When Buffett Partnership, Ltd., an investment partnership of
which I was general partner, bought control of Berkshire Hathaway
21 years ago, it had an accounting net worth of $22 million, all
devoted to the textile business. The company’s intrinsic
business value, however, was considerably less because the
textile assets were unable to earn returns commensurate with
their accounting value. Indeed, during the previous nine years
(the period in which Berkshire and Hathaway operated as a merged
company) aggregate sales of $530 million had produced an
aggregate loss of $10 million. Profits had been reported from
time to time but the net effect was always one step forward, two
steps back.

At the time we made our purchase, southern textile plants -
largely non-union - were believed to have an important
competitive advantage. Most northern textile operations had
closed and many people thought we would liquidate our business as
well.

We felt, however, that the business would be run much better
by a long-time employee whom. we immediately selected to be
president, Ken Chace. In this respect we were 100% correct: Ken
and his recent successor, Garry Morrison, have been excellent
managers, every bit the equal of managers at our more profitable
businesses.

In early 1967 cash generated by the textile operation was
used to fund our entry into insurance via the purchase of
National Indemnity Company. Some of the money came from earnings
and some from reduced investment in textile inventories,
receivables, and fixed assets. This pullback proved wise:
although much improved by Ken’s management, the textile business
never became a good earner, not even in cyclical upturns.

Further diversification for Berkshire followed, and
gradually the textile operation’s depressing effect on our
overall return diminished as the business became a progressively
smaller portion of the corporation. We remained in the business
for reasons that I stated in the 1978 annual report (and
summarized at other times also): “(1) our textile businesses are
very important employers in their communities, (2) management has
been straightforward in reporting on problems and energetic in
attacking them, (3) labor has been cooperative and understanding
in facing our common problems, and (4) the business should
average modest cash returns relative to investment.” I further
said, “As long as these conditions prevail - and we expect that
they will - we intend to continue to support our textile business
despite more attractive alternative uses for capital.”

It turned out that I was very wrong about (4). Though 1979
was moderately profitable, the business thereafter consumed major
amounts of cash. By mid-1985 it became clear, even to me, that
this condition was almost sure to continue. Could we have found
a buyer who would continue operations, I would have certainly
preferred to sell the business rather than liquidate it, even if
that meant somewhat lower proceeds for us. But the economics
that were finally obvious to me were also obvious to others, and
interest was nil.

I won’t close down businesses of sub-normal profitability
merely to add a fraction of a point to our corporate rate of
return. However, I also feel it inappropriate for even an
exceptionally profitable company to fund an operation once it
appears to have unending losses in prospect. Adam Smith would
disagree with my first proposition, and Karl Marx would disagree
with my second; the middle ground is the only position that
leaves me comfortable.

I should reemphasize that Ken and Garry have been
resourceful, energetic and imaginative in attempting to make our
textile operation a success. Trying to achieve sustainable
profitability, they reworked product lines, machinery
configurations and distribution arrangements. We also made a
major acquisition, Waumbec Mills, with the expectation of
important synergy (a term widely used in business to explain an
acquisition that otherwise makes no sense). But in the end
nothing worked and I should be faulted for not quitting sooner.
A recent Business Week article stated that 250 textile mills have
closed since 1980. Their owners were not privy to any
information that was unknown to me; they simply processed it more
objectively. I ignored Comte’s advice - “the intellect should be
the servant of the heart, but not its slave” - and believed what
I preferred to believe.

The domestic textile industry operates in a commodity
business, competing in a world market in which substantial excess
capacity exists. Much of the trouble we experienced was
attributable, both directly and indirectly, to competition from
foreign countries whose workers are paid a small fraction of the
U.S. minimum wage. But that in no way means that our labor force
deserves any blame for our closing. In fact, in comparison with
employees of American industry generally, our workers were poorly
paid, as has been the case throughout the textile business. In
contract negotiations, union leaders and members were sensitive
to our disadvantageous cost position and did not push for
unrealistic wage increases or unproductive work practices. To
the contrary, they tried just as hard as we did to keep us
competitive. Even during our liquidation period they performed
superbly. (Ironically, we would have been better off financially
if our union had behaved unreasonably some years ago; we then
would have recognized the impossible future that we faced,
promptly closed down, and avoided significant future losses.)

Over the years, we had the option of making large capital
expenditures in the textile operation that would have allowed us
to somewhat reduce variable costs. Each proposal to do so looked
like an immediate winner. Measured by standard return-on-
investment tests, in fact, these proposals usually promised
greater economic benefits than would have resulted from
comparable expenditures in our highly-profitable candy and
newspaper businesses.

But the promised benefits from these textile investments
were illusory. Many of our competitors, both domestic and
foreign, were stepping up to the same kind of expenditures and,
once enough companies did so, their reduced costs became the
baseline for reduced prices industrywide. Viewed individually,
each company’s capital investment decision appeared cost-
effective and rational; viewed collectively, the decisions
neutralized each other and were irrational (just as happens when
each person watching a parade decides he can see a little better
if he stands on tiptoes). After each round of investment, all
the players had more money in the game and returns remained
anemic.

Thus, we faced a miserable choice: huge capital investment
would have helped to keep our textile business alive, but would
have left us with terrible returns on ever-growing amounts of
capital. After the investment, moreover, the foreign competition
would still have retained a major, continuing advantage in labor
costs. A refusal to invest, however, would make us increasingly
non-competitive, even measured against domestic textile
manufacturers. I always thought myself in the position described
by Woody Allen in one of his movies: “More than any other time in
history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair
and utter hopelessness, the other to total extinction. Let us
pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly.”

For an understanding of how the to-invest-or-not-to-invest
dilemma plays out in a commodity business, it is instructive to
look at Burlington Industries, by far the largest U.S. textile
company both 21 years ago and now. In 1964 Burlington had sales
of $1.2 billion against our $50 million. It had strengths in
both distribution and production that we could never hope to
match and also, of course, had an earnings record far superior to
ours. Its stock sold at 60 at the end of 1964; ours was 13.

Burlington made a decision to stick to the textile business,
and in 1985 had sales of about $2.8 billion. During the 1964-85
period, the company made capital expenditures of about $3
billion, far more than any other U.S. textile company and more
than $200-per-share on that $60 stock. A very large part of the
expenditures, I am sure, was devoted to cost improvement and
expansion. Given Burlington’s basic commitment to stay in
textiles, I would also surmise that the company’s capital
decisions were quite rational.

Nevertheless, Burlington has lost sales volume in real
dollars and has far lower returns on sales and equity now than 20
years ago. Split 2-for-1 in 1965, the stock now sells at 34 --
on an adjusted basis, just a little over its $60 price in 1964.
Meanwhile, the CPI has more than tripled. Therefore, each share
commands about one-third the purchasing power it did at the end
of 1964. Regular dividends have been paid but they, too, have
shrunk significantly in purchasing power.

This devastating outcome for the shareholders indicates what
can happen when much brain power and energy are applied to a
faulty premise. The situation is suggestive of Samuel Johnson’s
horse: “A horse that can count to ten is a remarkable horse - not
a remarkable mathematician.” Likewise, a textile company that
allocates capital brilliantly within its industry is a remarkable
textile company - but not a remarkable business.

My conclusion from my own experiences and from much
observation of other businesses is that a good managerial record
(measured by economic returns) is far more a function of what
business boat you get into than it is of how effectively you row
(though intelligence and effort help considerably, of course, in
any business, good or bad). Some years ago I wrote: “When a
management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business
with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the
reputation of the business that remains intact.” Nothing has
since changed my point of view on that matter. Should you find
yourself in a chronically-leaking boat, energy devoted to
changing vessels is likely to be more productive than energy
devoted to patching leaks.

* * *
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:05 par mihou
There is an investment postscript in our textile saga. Some
investors weight book value heavily in their stock-buying
decisions (as I, in my early years, did myself). And some
economists and academicians believe replacement values are of
considerable importance in calculating an appropriate price level
for the stock market as a whole. Those of both persuasions would
have received an education at the auction we held in early 1986
to dispose of our textile machinery.

The equipment sold (including some disposed of in the few
months prior to the auction) took up about 750,000 square feet of
factory space in New Bedford and was eminently usable. It
originally cost us about $13 million, including $2 million spent
in 1980-84, and had a current book value of $866,000 (after
accelerated depreciation). Though no sane management would have
made the investment, the equipment could have been replaced new
for perhaps $30-$50 million.

Gross proceeds from our sale of this equipment came to
$163,122. Allowing for necessary pre- and post-sale costs, our
net was less than zero. Relatively modern looms that we bought
for $5,000 apiece in 1981 found no takers at $50. We finally
sold them for scrap at $26 each, a sum less than removal costs.

Ponder this: the economic goodwill attributable to two paper
routes in Buffalo - or a single See’s candy store - considerably
exceeds the proceeds we received from this massive collection of
tangible assets that not too many years ago, under different
competitive conditions, was able to employ over 1,000 people.

Three Very Good Businesses (and a Few Thoughts About Incentive
Compensation)

When I was 12, I lived with my grandfather for about four
months. A grocer by trade, he was also working on a book and
each night he dictated a few pages to me. The title - brace
yourself - was “How to Run a Grocery Store and a Few Things I
Have Learned About Fishing”. My grandfather was sure that
interest in these two subjects was universal and that the world
awaited his views. You may conclude from this section’s title
and contents that I was overexposed to Grandpa’s literary style
(and personality).

I am merging the discussion of Nebraska Furniture Mart,
See’s Candy Shops, and Buffalo Evening News here because the
economic strengths, weaknesses, and prospects of these businesses
have changed little since I reported to you a year ago. The
shortness of this discussion, however, is in no way meant to
minimize the importance of these businesses to us: in 1985 they
earned an aggregate of $72 million pre-tax. Fifteen years ago,
before we had acquired any of them, their aggregate earnings were
about $8 million pre-tax.

While an increase in earnings from $8 million to $72 million
sounds terrific - and usually is - you should not automatically
assume that to be the case. You must first make sure that
earnings were not severely depressed in the base year. If they
were instead substantial in relation to capital employed, an even
more important point must be examined: how much additional
capital was required to produce the additional earnings?

In both respects, our group of three scores well. First,
earnings 15 years ago were excellent compared to capital then
employed in the businesses. Second, although annual earnings are
now $64 million greater, the businesses require only about $40
million more in invested capital to operate than was the case
then.

The dramatic growth in earning power of these three
businesses, accompanied by their need for only minor amounts of
capital, illustrates very well the power of economic goodwill
during an inflationary period (a phenomenon explained in detail
in the 1983 annual report). The financial characteristics of
these businesses have allowed us to use a very large portion of
the earnings they generate elsewhere. Corporate America,
however, has had a different experience: in order to increase
earnings significantly, most companies have needed to increase
capital significantly also. The average American business has
required about $5 of additional capital to generate an additional
$1 of annual pre-tax earnings. That business, therefore, would
have required over $300 million in additional capital from its
owners in order to achieve an earnings performance equal to our
group of three.

When returns on capital are ordinary, an earn-more-by-
putting-up-more record is no great managerial achievement. You
can get the same result personally while operating from your
rocking chair. just quadruple the capital you commit to a savings
account and you will quadruple your earnings. You would hardly
expect hosannas for that particular accomplishment. Yet,
retirement announcements regularly sing the praises of CEOs who
have, say, quadrupled earnings of their widget company during
their reign - with no one examining whether this gain was
attributable simply to many years of retained earnings and the
workings of compound interest.

If the widget company consistently earned a superior return
on capital throughout the period, or if capital employed only
doubled during the CEO’s reign, the praise for him may be well
deserved. But if return on capital was lackluster and capital
employed increased in pace with earnings, applause should be
withheld. A savings account in which interest was reinvested
would achieve the same year-by-year increase in earnings - and,
at only 8% interest, would quadruple its annual earnings in 18
years.

The power of this simple math is often ignored by companies
to the detriment of their shareholders. Many corporate
compensation plans reward managers handsomely for earnings
increases produced solely, or in large part, by retained earnings
- i.e., earnings withheld from owners. For example, ten-year,
fixed-price stock options are granted routinely, often by
companies whose dividends are only a small percentage of
earnings.

An example will illustrate the inequities possible under
such circumstances. Let’s suppose that you had a $100,000
savings account earning 8% interest and “managed” by a trustee
who could decide each year what portion of the interest you were
to be paid in cash. Interest not paid out would be “retained
earnings” added to the savings account to compound. And let’s
suppose that your trustee, in his superior wisdom, set the “pay-
out ratio” at one-quarter of the annual earnings.

Under these assumptions, your account would be worth
$179,084 at the end of ten years. Additionally, your annual
earnings would have increased about 70% from $8,000 to $13,515
under this inspired management. And, finally, your “dividends”
would have increased commensurately, rising regularly from $2,000
in the first year to $3,378 in the tenth year. Each year, when
your manager’s public relations firm prepared his annual report
to you, all of the charts would have had lines marching skyward.

Now, just for fun, let’s push our scenario one notch further
and give your trustee-manager a ten-year fixed-price option on
part of your “business” (i.e., your savings account) based on its
fair value in the first year. With such an option, your manager
would reap a substantial profit at your expense - just from
having held on to most of your earnings. If he were both
Machiavellian and a bit of a mathematician, your manager might
also have cut the pay-out ratio once he was firmly entrenched.

This scenario is not as farfetched as you might think. Many
stock options in the corporate world have worked in exactly that
fashion: they have gained in value simply because management
retained earnings, not because it did well with the capital in
its hands.

Managers actually apply a double standard to options.
Leaving aside warrants (which deliver the issuing corporation
immediate and substantial compensation), I believe it is fair to
say that nowhere in the business world are ten-year fixed-price
options on all or a portion of a business granted to outsiders.
Ten months, in fact, would be regarded as extreme. It would be
particularly unthinkable for managers to grant a long-term option
on a business that was regularly adding to its capital. Any
outsider wanting to secure such an option would be required to
pay fully for capital added during the option period.

The unwillingness of managers to do-unto-outsiders, however,
is not matched by an unwillingness to do-unto-themselves.
(Negotiating with one’s self seldom produces a barroom brawl.)
Managers regularly engineer ten-year, fixed-price options for
themselves and associates that, first, totally ignore the fact
that retained earnings automatically build value and, second,
ignore the carrying cost of capital. As a result, these managers
end up profiting much as they would have had they had an option
on that savings account that was automatically building up in
value.

Of course, stock options often go to talented, value-adding
managers and sometimes deliver them rewards that are perfectly
appropriate. (Indeed, managers who are really exceptional almost
always get far less than they should.) But when the result is
equitable, it is accidental. Once granted, the option is blind
to individual performance. Because it is irrevocable and
unconditional (so long as a manager stays in the company), the
sluggard receives rewards from his options precisely as does the
star. A managerial Rip Van Winkle, ready to doze for ten years,
could not wish for a better “incentive” system.

(I can’t resist commenting on one long-term option given an
“outsider”: that granted the U.S. Government on Chrysler shares
as partial consideration for the government’s guarantee of some
lifesaving loans. When these options worked out well for the
government, Chrysler sought to modify the payoff, arguing that
the rewards to the government were both far greater than intended
and outsize in relation to its contribution to Chrysler’s
recovery. The company’s anguish over what it saw as an imbalance
between payoff and performance made national news. That anguish
may well be unique: to my knowledge, no managers - anywhere -
have been similarly offended by unwarranted payoffs arising from
options granted to themselves or their colleagues.)

Ironically, the rhetoric about options frequently describes
them as desirable because they put managers and owners in the
same financial boat. In reality, the boats are far different.
No owner has ever escaped the burden of capital costs, whereas a
holder of a fixed-price option bears no capital costs at all. An
owner must weigh upside potential against downside risk; an
option holder has no downside. In fact, the business project in
which you would wish to have an option frequently is a project in
which you would reject ownership. (I’ll be happy to accept a
lottery ticket as a gift - but I’ll never buy one.)

In dividend policy also, the option holders’ interests are
best served by a policy that may ill serve the owner. Think back
to the savings account example. The trustee, holding his option,
would benefit from a no-dividend policy. Conversely, the owner
of the account should lean to a total payout so that he can
prevent the option-holding manager from sharing in the account’s
retained earnings.

Despite their shortcomings, options can be appropriate under
some circumstances. My criticism relates to their indiscriminate
use and, in that connection, I would like to emphasize three
points:

First, stock options are inevitably tied to the overall
performance of a corporation. Logically, therefore, they should
be awarded only to those managers with overall responsibility.
Managers with limited areas of responsibility should have
incentives that pay off in relation to results under their
control. The .350 hitter expects, and also deserves, a big
payoff for his performance - even if he plays for a cellar-
dwelling team. And the .150 hitter should get no reward - even
if he plays for a pennant winner. Only those with overall
responsibility for the team should have their rewards tied to its
results.

Second, options should be structured carefully. Absent
special factors, they should have built into them a retained-
earnings or carrying-cost factor. Equally important, they should
be priced realistically. When managers are faced with offers for
their companies, they unfailingly point out how unrealistic
market prices can be as an index of real value. But why, then,
should these same depressed prices be the valuations at which
managers sell portions of their businesses to themselves? (They
may go further: officers and directors sometimes consult the Tax
Code to determine the lowest prices at which they can, in effect,
sell part of the business to insiders. While they’re at it, they
often elect plans that produce the worst tax result for the
company.) Except in highly unusual cases, owners are not well
served by the sale of part of their business at a bargain price -
whether the sale is to outsiders or to insiders. The obvious
conclusion: options should be priced at true business value.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:06 par mihou
Third, I want to emphasize that some managers whom I admire
enormously - and whose operating records are far better than mine
- disagree with me regarding fixed-price options. They have
built corporate cultures that work, and fixed-price options have
been a tool that helped them. By their leadership and example,
and by the use of options as incentives, these managers have
taught their colleagues to think like owners. Such a Culture is
rare and when it exists should perhaps be left intact - despite
inefficiencies and inequities that may infest the option program.
“If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” is preferable to “purity at any
price”.

At Berkshire, however, we use an incentive@compensation
system that rewards key managers for meeting targets in their own
bailiwicks. If See’s does well, that does not produce incentive
compensation at the News - nor vice versa. Neither do we look at
the price of Berkshire stock when we write bonus checks. We
believe good unit performance should be rewarded whether
Berkshire stock rises, falls, or stays even. Similarly, we think
average performance should earn no special rewards even if our
stock should soar. “Performance”, furthermore, is defined in
different ways depending upon the underlying economics of the
business: in some our managers enjoy tailwinds not of their own
making, in others they fight unavoidable headwinds.

The rewards that go with this system can be large. At our
various business units, top managers sometimes receive incentive
bonuses of five times their base salary, or more, and it would
appear possible that one manager’s bonus could top $2 million in
1986. (I hope so.) We do not put a cap on bonuses, and the
potential for rewards is not hierarchical. The manager of a
relatively small unit can earn far more than the manager of a
larger unit if results indicate he should. We believe, further,
that such factors as seniority and age should not affect
incentive compensation (though they sometimes influence basic
compensation). A 20-year-old who can hit .300 is as valuable to
us as a 40-year-old performing as well.

Obviously, all Berkshire managers can use their bonus money
(or other funds, including borrowed money) to buy our stock in
the market. Many have done just that - and some now have large
holdings. By accepting both the risks and the carrying costs
that go with outright purchases, these managers truly walk in the
shoes of owners.

Now let’s get back - at long last - to our three businesses:

At Nebraska Furniture Mart our basic strength is an
exceptionally low-cost operation that allows the business to
regularly offer customers the best values available in home
furnishings. NFM is the largest store of its kind in the
country. Although the already-depressed farm economy worsened
considerably in 1985, the store easily set a new sales record. I
also am happy to report that NFM’s Chairman, Rose Blumkin (the
legendary “Mrs. B”), continues at age 92 to set a pace at the
store that none of us can keep up with. She’s there wheeling and
dealing seven days a week, and I hope that any of you who visit
Omaha will go out to the Mart and see her in action. It will
inspire you, as it does me.

At See’s we continue to get store volumes that are far
beyond those achieved by any competitor we know of. Despite the
unmatched consumer acceptance we enjoy, industry trends are not
good, and we continue to experience slippage in poundage sales on
a same-store basis. This puts pressure on per-pound costs. We
now are willing to increase prices only modestly and, unless we
can stabilize per-shop poundage, profit margins will narrow.

At the News volume gains are also difficult to achieve.
Though linage increased during 1985, the gain was more than
accounted for by preprints. ROP linage (advertising printed on
our own pages) declined. Preprints are far less profitable than
ROP ads, and also more vulnerable to competition. In 1985, the
News again controlled costs well and our household penetration
continues to be exceptional.
One problem these three operations do not have is
management. At See’s we have Chuck Huggins, the man we put in
charge the day we bought the business. Selecting him remains one
of our best business decisions. At the News we have Stan Lipsey,
a manager of equal caliber. Stan has been with us 17 years, and
his unusual business talents have become more evident with every
additional level of responsibility he has tackled. And, at the
Mart, we have the amazing Blumkins - Mrs. B, Louie, Ron, Irv, and
Steve - a three-generation miracle of management.

I consider myself extraordinarily lucky to be able to work
with managers such as these. I like them personally as much as I
admire them professionally.
Insurance Operations

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table,
listing two key figures for the insurance industry:

Yearly Change Combined Ratio
in Premiums after Policyholder
Written (%) Dividends
------------- ------------------
1972 ............... 10.2 96.2
1973 ............... 8.0 99.2
1974 ............... 6.2 105.4
1975 ............... 11.0 107.9
1976 ............... 21.9 102.4
1977 ............... 19.8 97.2
1978 ............... 12.8 97.5
1979 ............... 10.3 100.6
1980 ............... 6.0 103.1
1981 ............... 3.9 106.0
1982 ............... 4.4 109.7
1983 ............... 4.5 111.9
1984 (Revised) ..... 9.2 117.9
1985 (Estimated) ... 20.9 118.0

Source: Best’s Aggregates and Averages
The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses
incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: a
ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above
100 indicates a loss.

The industry’s 1985 results were highly unusual. The
revenue gain was exceptional, and had insured losses grown at
their normal rate of most recent years - that is, a few points
above the inflation rate - a significant drop in the combined
ratio would have occurred. But losses in 1985 didn’t cooperate,
as they did not in 1984. Though inflation slowed considerably in
these years, insured losses perversely accelerated, growing by
16% in 1984 and by an even more startling 17% in 1985. The
year’s growth in losses therefore exceeds the inflation rate by
over 13 percentage points, a modern record.

Catastrophes were not the culprit in this explosion of loss
cost. True, there were an unusual number of hurricanes in 1985,
but the aggregate damage caused by all catastrophes in 1984 and
1985 was about 2% of premium volume, a not unusual proportion.
Nor was there any burst in the number of insured autos, houses,
employers, or other kinds of “exposure units”.

A partial explanation for the surge in the loss figures is
all the additions to reserves that the industry made in 1985. As
results for the year were reported, the scene resembled a revival
meeting: shouting “I’ve sinned, I’ve sinned”, insurance managers
rushed forward to confess they had under reserved in earlier
years. Their corrections significantly affected 1985 loss
numbers.

A more disturbing ingredient in the loss surge is the
acceleration in “social” or “judicial” inflation. The insurer’s
ability to pay has assumed overwhelming importance with juries
and judges in the assessment of both liability and damages. More
and more, “the deep pocket” is being sought and found, no matter
what the policy wording, the facts, or the precedents.

This judicial inflation represents a wild card in the
industry’s future, and makes forecasting difficult.
Nevertheless, the short-term outlook is good. Premium growth
improved as 1985 went along (quarterly gains were an estimated
15%, 19%, 24%, and 22%) and, barring a supercatastrophe, the
industry’s combined ratio should fall sharply in 1986.

The profit improvement, however, is likely to be of short
duration. Two economic principles will see to that. First,
commodity businesses achieve good levels of profitability only
when prices are fixed in some manner or when capacity is short.
Second, managers quickly add to capacity when prospects start to
improve and capital is available.

In my 1982 report to you, I discussed the commodity nature
of the insurance industry extensively. The typical policyholder
does not differentiate between products but concentrates instead
on price. For many decades a cartel-like procedure kept prices
up, but this arrangement has disappeared for good. The insurance
product now is priced as any other commodity for which a free
market exists: when capacity is tight, prices will be set
remuneratively; otherwise, they will not be.

Capacity currently is tight in many lines of insurance -
though in this industry, unlike most, capacity is an attitudinal
concept, not a physical fact. Insurance managers can write
whatever amount of business they feel comfortable writing,
subject only to pressures applied by regulators and Best’s, the
industry’s authoritative rating service. The comfort level of
both managers and regulators is tied to capital. More capital
means more comfort, which in turn means more capacity. In the
typical commodity business, furthermore, such as aluminum or
steel, a long gestation precedes the birth of additional
capacity. In the insurance industry, capital can be secured
instantly. Thus, any capacity shortage can be eliminated in
short order.

That’s exactly what’s going on right now. In 1985, about 15
insurers raised well over $3 billion, piling up capital so that
they can write all the business possible at the better prices now
available. The capital-raising trend has accelerated
dramatically so far in 1986.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:07 par mihou
If capacity additions continue at this rate, it won’t be
long before serious price-cutting appears and next a fall in
profitability. When the fall comes, it will be the fault of the
capital-raisers of 1985 and 1986, not the price-cutters of 198X.
(Critics should be understanding, however: as was the case in our
textile example, the dynamics of capitalism cause each insurer to
make decisions that for itself appear sensible, but that
collectively slash profitability.)

In past reports, I have told you that Berkshire’s strong
capital position - the best in the industry - should one day
allow us to claim a distinct competitive advantage in the
insurance market. With the tightening of the market, that day
arrived. Our premium volume more than tripled last year,
following a long period of stagnation. Berkshire’s financial
strength (and our record of maintaining unusual strength through
thick and thin) is now a major asset for us in securing good
business.

We correctly foresaw a flight to quality by many large
buyers of insurance and reinsurance who belatedly recognized that
a policy is only an IOU - and who, in 1985, could not collect on
many of their IOUs. These buyers today are attracted to
Berkshire because of its strong capital position. But, in a
development we did not foresee, we also are finding buyers drawn
to us because our ability to insure substantial risks sets us
apart from the crowd.

To understand this point, you need a few background facts
about large risks. Traditionally, many insurers have wanted to
write this kind of business. However, their willingness to do so
has been almost always based upon reinsurance arrangements that
allow the insurer to keep just a small portion of the risk itself
while passing on (“laying off”) most of the risk to its
reinsurers. Imagine, for example, a directors and officers
(“D & O”) liability policy providing $25 million of coverage.
By various “excess-of-loss” reinsurance contracts, the company
issuing that policy might keep the liability for only the first
$1 million of any loss that occurs. The liability for any loss
above that amount up to $24 million would be borne by the
reinsurers of the issuing insurer. In trade parlance, a company
that issues large policies but retains relatively little of the
risk for its own account writes a large gross line but a small
net line.

In any reinsurance arrangement, a key question is how the
premiums paid for the policy should be divided among the various
“layers” of risk. In our D & O policy, for example. what part of
the premium received should be kept by the issuing company to
compensate it fairly for taking the first $1 million of risk and
how much should be passed on to the reinsurers to compensate them
fairly for taking the risk between $1 million and $25 million?

One way to solve this problem might be deemed the Patrick
Henry approach: “I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided,
and that is the lamp of experience.” In other words, how much of
the total premium would reinsurers have needed in the past to
compensate them fairly for the losses they actually had to bear?

Unfortunately, the lamp of experience has always provided
imperfect illumination for reinsurers because so much of their
business is “long-tail”, meaning it takes many years before they
know what their losses are. Lately, however, the light has not
only been dim but also grossly misleading in the images it has
revealed. That is, the courts’ tendency to grant awards that are
both huge and lacking in precedent makes reinsurers’ usual
extrapolations or inferences from past data a formula for
disaster. Out with Patrick Henry and in with Pogo: “The future
ain’t what it used to be.”

The burgeoning uncertainties of the business, coupled with
the entry into reinsurance of many unsophisticated participants,
worked in recent years in favor of issuing companies writing a
small net line: they were able to keep a far greater percentage
of the premiums than the risk. By doing so, the issuing
companies sometimes made money on business that was distinctly
unprofitable for the issuing and reinsuring companies combined.
(This result was not necessarily by intent: issuing companies
generally knew no more than reinsurers did about the ultimate
costs that would be experienced at higher layers of risk.)
Inequities of this sort have been particularly pronounced in
lines of insurance in which much change was occurring and losses
were soaring; e.g., professional malpractice, D & 0, products
liability, etc. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising
that issuing companies remained enthusiastic about writing
business long after premiums became woefully inadequate on a
gross basis.
An example of just how disparate results have been for
issuing companies versus their reinsurers is provided by the 1984
financials of one of the leaders in large and unusual risks. In
that year the company wrote about $6 billion of business and kept
around $2 1/2 billion of the premiums, or about 40%. It gave the
remaining $3 1/2 billion to reinsurers. On the part of the
business kept, the company’s underwriting loss was less than $200
million - an excellent result in that year. Meanwhile, the part
laid off produced a loss of over $1.5 billion for the reinsurers.
Thus, the issuing company wrote at a combined ratio of well under
110 while its reinsurers, participating in precisely the same
policies, came in considerably over 140. This result was not
attributable to natural catastrophes; it came from run-of-the-
mill insurance losses (occurring, however, in surprising
frequency and size). The issuing company’s 1985 report is not
yet available, but I would predict it will show that dramatically
unbalanced results continued.

A few years such as this, and even slow-witted reinsurers
can lose interest, particularly in explosive lines where the
proper split in premium between issuer and reinsurer remains
impossible to even roughly estimate. The behavior of reinsurers
finally becomes like that of Mark Twain’s cat: having once sat on
a hot stove, it never did so again - but it never again sat on a
cold stove, either. Reinsurers have had so many unpleasant
surprises in long-tail casualty lines that many have decided
(probably correctly) to give up the game entirely, regardless of
price inducements. Consequently, there has been a dramatic pull-
back of reinsurance capacity in certain important lines.

This development has left many issuing companies under
pressure. They can no longer commit their reinsurers, time after
time, for tens of millions per policy as they so easily could do
only a year or two ago, and they do not have the capital and/or
appetite to take on large risks for their own account. For many
issuing companies, gross capacity has shrunk much closer to net
capacity - and that is often small, indeed.

At Berkshire we have never played the lay-it-off-at-a-profit
game and, until recently, that put us at a severe disadvantage in
certain lines. Now the tables are turned: we have the
underwriting capability whereas others do not. If we believe the
price to be right, we are willing to write a net line larger than
that of any but the largest insurers. For instance, we are
perfectly willing to risk losing $10 million of our own money on
a single event, as long as we believe that the price is right and
that the risk of loss is not significantly correlated with other
risks we are insuring. Very few insurers are willing to risk
half that much on single events - although, just a short while
ago, many were willing to lose five or ten times that amount as
long as virtually all of the loss was for the account of their
reinsurers.

In mid-1985 our largest insurance company, National
Indemnity Company, broadcast its willingness to underwrite large
risks by running an ad in three issues of an insurance weekly.
The ad solicited policies of only large size: those with a
minimum premium of $1 million. This ad drew a remarkable 600
replies and ultimately produced premiums totaling about $50
million. (Hold the applause: it’s all long-tail business and it
will be at least five years before we know whether this marketing
success was also an underwriting success.) Today, our insurance
subsidiaries continue to be sought out by brokers searching for
large net capacity.

As I have said, this period of tightness will pass; insurers
and reinsurers will return to underpricing. But for a year or
two we should do well in several segments of our insurance
business. Mike Goldberg has made many important improvements in
the operation (prior mismanagement by your Chairman having
provided him ample opportunity to do so). He has been
particularly successful recently in hiring young managers with
excellent potential. They will have a chance to show their stuff
in 1986.

Our combined ratio has improved - from 134 in 1984 to 111 in
1985 - but continues to reflect past misdeeds. Last year I told
you of the major mistakes I had made in loss-reserving, and
promised I would update you annually on loss-development figures.
Naturally, I made this promise thinking my future record would be
much improved. So far this has not been the case. Details on
last year’s loss development are on pages 50-52. They reveal
significant underreserving at the end of 1984, as they did in the
several years preceding.

The only bright spot in this picture is that virtually all
of the underreserving revealed in 1984 occurred in the
reinsurance area - and there, in very large part, in a few
contracts that were discontinued several years ago. This
explanation, however, recalls all too well a story told me many
years ago by the then Chairman of General Reinsurance Company.
He said that every year his managers told him that “except for
the Florida hurricane” or “except for Midwestern tornadoes”, they
would have had a terrific year. Finally he called the group
together and suggested that they form a new operation - the
Except-For Insurance Company - in which they would henceforth
place all of the business that they later wouldn’t want to count.

In any business, insurance or otherwise, “except for” should
be excised from the lexicon. If you are going to play the game,
you must count the runs scored against you in all nine innings.
Any manager who consistently says “except for” and then reports
on the lessons he has learned from his mistakes may be missing
the only important lesson - namely, that the real mistake is not
the act, but the actor.

Inevitably, of course, business errors will occur and the
wise manager will try to find the proper lessons in them. But
the trick is to learn most lessons from the experiences of
others. Managers who have learned much from personal experience
in the past usually are destined to learn much from personal
experience in the future.

GEICO, 38%-owned by Berkshire, reported an excellent year in
1985 in premium growth and investment results, but a poor year -
by its lofty standards - in underwriting. Private passenger auto
and homeowners insurance were the only important lines in the
industry whose results deteriorated significantly during the
year. GEICO did not escape the trend, although its record was
far better than that of virtually all its major competitors.

Jack Byrne left GEICO at mid-year to head Fireman’s Fund,
leaving behind Bill Snyder as Chairman and Lou Simpson as Vice
Chairman. Jack’s performance in reviving GEICO from near-
bankruptcy was truly extraordinary, and his work resulted in
enormous gains for Berkshire. We owe him a great deal for that.

We are equally indebted to Jack for an achievement that
eludes most outstanding leaders: he found managers to succeed him
who have talents as valuable as his own. By his skill in
identifying, attracting and developing Bill and Lou, Jack
extended the benefits of his managerial stewardship well beyond
his tenure.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:08 par mihou
Fireman’s Fund Quota-Share Contract

Never one to let go of a meal ticket, we have followed Jack
Byrne to Fireman’s Fund (“FFIC”) where he is Chairman and CEO of
the holding company.

On September 1, 1985 we became a 7% participant in all of
the business in force of the FFIC group, with the exception of
reinsurance they write for unaffiliated companies. Our contract
runs for four years, and provides that our losses and costs will
be proportionate to theirs throughout the contract period. If
there is no extension, we will thereafter have no participation
in any ongoing business. However, for a great many years in the
future, we will be reimbursing FFIC for our 7% of the losses that
occurred in the September 1, 1985 - August 31, 1989 period.

Under the contract FFIC remits premiums to us promptly and
we reimburse FFIC promptly for expenses and losses it has paid.
Thus, funds generated by our share of the business are held by us
for investment. As part of the deal, I’m available to FFIC for
consultation about general investment strategy. I’m not
involved, however, in specific investment decisions of FFIC, nor
is Berkshire involved in any aspect of the company’s underwriting
activities.
Currently FFIC is doing about $3 billion of business, and it
will probably do more as rates rise. The company’s September 1,
1985 unearned premium reserve was $1.324 billion, and it
therefore transferred 7% of this, or $92.7 million, to us at
initiation of the contract. We concurrently paid them $29.4
million representing the underwriting expenses that they had
incurred on the transferred premium. All of the FFIC business is
written by National Indemnity Company, but two-sevenths of it is
passed along to Wesco-Financial Insurance Company (“Wes-FIC”), a
new company organized by our 80%-owned subsidiary, Wesco
Financial Corporation. Charlie Munger has some interesting
comments about Wes-FIC and the reinsurance business on pages 60-
62.

To the Insurance Segment tables on page 41, we have added a
new line, labeled Major Quota Share Contracts. The 1985 results
of the FFIC contract are reported there, though the newness of
the arrangement makes these results only very rough
approximations.

After the end of the year, we secured another quota-share
contract, whose 1986 volume should be over $50 million. We hope
to develop more of this business, and industry conditions suggest
that we could: a significant number of companies are generating
more business than they themselves can prudently handle. Our
financial strength makes us an attractive partner for such
companies.

Marketable Securities

We show below our 1985 yearend net holdings in marketable
equities. All positions with a market value over $25 million are
listed, and the interests attributable to minority shareholders
of Wesco and Nebraska Furniture Mart are excluded.

No. of Shares Cost Market
------------- ---------- ----------
(000s omitted)
1,036,461 Affiliated Publications, Inc. ....... $ 3,516 $ 55,710
900,800 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. 54,435 108,997
2,350,922 Beatrice Companies, Inc. ............ 106,811 108,142
6,850,000 GEICO Corporation ................... 45,713 595,950
2,379,200 Handy & Harman ...................... 27,318 43,718
847,788 Time, Inc. .......................... 20,385 52,669
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company ......... 9,731 205,172
---------- ----------
267,909 1,170,358
All Other Common Stockholdings ...... 7,201 27,963
---------- ----------
Total Common Stocks $275,110 $1,198,321
========== ==========
We mentioned earlier that in the past decade the investment
environment has changed from one in which great businesses were
totally unappreciated to one in which they are appropriately
recognized. The Washington Post Company (“WPC”) provides an
excellent example.
We bought all of our WPC holdings in mid-1973 at a price of
not more than one-fourth of the then per-share business value of
the enterprise. Calculating the price/value ratio required no
unusual insights. Most security analysts, media brokers, and
media executives would have estimated WPC’s intrinsic business
value at $400 to $500 million just as we did. And its $100
million stock market valuation was published daily for all to
see. Our advantage, rather, was attitude: we had learned from
Ben Graham that the key to successful investing was the purchase
of shares in good businesses when market prices were at a large
discount from underlying business values.

Most institutional investors in the early 1970s, on the
other hand, regarded business value as of only minor relevance
when they were deciding the prices at which they would buy or
sell. This now seems hard to believe. However, these
institutions were then under the spell of academics at
prestigious business schools who were preaching a newly-fashioned
theory: the stock market was totally efficient, and therefore
calculations of business value - and even thought, itself - were
of no importance in investment activities. (We are enormously
indebted to those academics: what could be more advantageous in
an intellectual contest - whether it be bridge, chess, or stock
selection than to have opponents who have been taught that
thinking is a waste of energy?)

Through 1973 and 1974, WPC continued to do fine as a
business, and intrinsic value grew. Nevertheless, by yearend
1974 our WPC holding showed a loss of about 25%, with market
value at $8 million against our cost of $10.6 million. What we
had thought ridiculously cheap a year earlier had become a good
bit cheaper as the market, in its infinite wisdom, marked WPC
stock down to well below 20 cents on the dollar of intrinsic
value.

You know the happy outcome. Kay Graham, CEO of WPC, had the
brains and courage to repurchase large quantities of stock for
the company at those bargain prices, as well as the managerial
skills necessary to dramatically increase business values.
Meanwhile, investors began to recognize the exceptional economics
of the business and the stock price moved closer to underlying
value. Thus, we experienced a triple dip: the company’s business
value soared upward, per-share business value increased
considerably faster because of stock repurchases and, with a
narrowing of the discount, the stock price outpaced the gain in
per-share business value.

We hold all of the WPC shares we bought in 1973, except for
those sold back to the company in 1985’s proportionate
redemption. Proceeds from the redemption plus yearend market
value of our holdings total $221 million.

If we had invested our $10.6 million in any of a half-dozen
media companies that were investment favorites in mid-1973, the
value of our holdings at yearend would have been in the area of
$40 - $60 million. Our gain would have far exceeded the gain in
the general market, an outcome reflecting the exceptional
economics of the media business. The extra $160 million or so we
gained through ownership of WPC came, in very large part, from
the superior nature of the managerial decisions made by Kay as
compared to those made by managers of most media companies. Her
stunning business success has in large part gone unreported but
among Berkshire shareholders it should not go unappreciated.

Our Capital Cities purchase, described in the next section,
required me to leave the WPC Board early in 1986. But we intend
to hold indefinitely whatever WPC stock FCC rules allow us to.
We expect WPC’s business values to grow at a reasonable rate, and
we know that management is both able and shareholder-oriented.
However, the market now values the company at over $1.8 billion,
and there is no way that the value can progress from that level
at a rate anywhere close to the rate possible when the company’s
valuation was only $100 million. Because market prices have also
been bid up for our other holdings, we face the same vastly-
reduced potential throughout our portfolio.

You will notice that we had a significant holding in
Beatrice Companies at yearend. This is a short-term arbitrage
holding - in effect, a parking place for money (though not a
totally safe one, since deals sometimes fall through and create
substantial losses). We sometimes enter the arbitrage field when
we have more money than ideas, but only to participate in
announced mergers and sales. We would be a lot happier if the
funds currently employed on this short-term basis found a long-
term home. At the moment, however, prospects are bleak.

At yearend our insurance subsidiaries had about $400 million
in tax-exempt bonds, of which $194 million at amortized cost were
issues of Washington Public Power Supply System (“WPPSS”)
Projects 1, 2, and 3. 1 discussed this position fully last year,
and explained why we would not disclose further purchases or
sales until well after the fact (adhering to the policy we follow
on stocks). Our unrealized gain on the WPPSS bonds at yearend
was $62 million, perhaps one-third arising from the upward
movement of bonds generally, and the remainder from a more
positive investor view toward WPPSS 1, 2, and 3s. Annual tax-
exempt income from our WPPSS issues is about $30 million.

Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.

Right after yearend, Berkshire purchased 3 million shares of
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (“Cap Cities”) at $172.50 per share, the
market price of such shares at the time the commitment was made
early in March, 1985. I’ve been on record for many years about
the management of Cap Cities: I think it is the best of any
publicly-owned company in the country. And Tom Murphy and Dan
Burke are not only great managers, they are precisely the sort of
fellows that you would want your daughter to marry. It is a
privilege to be associated with them - and also a lot of fun, as
any of you who know them will understand.

Our purchase of stock helped Cap Cities finance the $3.5
billion acquisition of American Broadcasting Companies. For Cap
Cities, ABC is a major undertaking whose economics are likely to
be unexciting over the next few years. This bothers us not an
iota; we can be very patient. (No matter how great the talent or
effort, some things just take time: you can’t produce a baby in
one month by getting nine women pregnant.)

As evidence of our confidence, we have executed an unusual
agreement: for an extended period Tom, as CEO (or Dan, should he
be CEO) votes our stock. This arrangement was initiated by
Charlie and me, not by Tom. We also have restricted ourselves in
various ways regarding sale of our shares. The object of these
restrictions is to make sure that our block does not get sold to
anyone who is a large holder (or intends to become a large
holder) without the approval of management, an arrangement
similar to ones we initiated some years ago at GEICO and
Washington Post.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:08 par mihou
Since large blocks frequently command premium prices, some
might think we have injured Berkshire financially by creating
such restrictions. Our view is just the opposite. We feel the
long-term economic prospects for these businesses - and, thus,
for ourselves as owners - are enhanced by the arrangements. With
them in place, the first-class managers with whom we have aligned
ourselves can focus their efforts entirely upon running the
businesses and maximizing long-term values for owners. Certainly
this is much better than having those managers distracted by
“revolving-door capitalists” hoping to put the company “in play”.
(Of course, some managers place their own interests above those
of the company and its owners and deserve to be shaken up - but,
in making investments, we try to steer clear of this type.)

Today, corporate instability is an inevitable consequence of
widely-diffused ownership of voting stock. At any time a major
holder can surface, usually mouthing reassuring rhetoric but
frequently harboring uncivil intentions. By circumscribing our
blocks of stock as we often do, we intend to promote stability
where it otherwise might be lacking. That kind of certainty,
combined with a good manager and a good business, provides
excellent soil for a rich financial harvest. That’s the economic
case for our arrangements.

The human side is just as important. We don’t want managers
we like and admire - and who have welcomed a major financial
commitment by us - to ever lose any sleep wondering whether
surprises might occur because of our large ownership. I have
told them there will be no surprises, and these agreements put
Berkshire’s signature where my mouth is. That signature also
means the managers have a corporate commitment and therefore need
not worry if my personal participation in Berkshire’s affairs
ends prematurely (a term I define as any age short of three
digits).

Our Cap Cities purchase was made at a full price, reflecting
the very considerable enthusiasm for both media stocks and media
properties that has developed in recent years (and that, in the
case of some property purchases, has approached a mania). it’s no
field for bargains. However, our Cap Cities investment allies us
with an exceptional combination of properties and people - and we
like the opportunity to participate in size.

Of course, some of you probably wonder why we are now buying
Cap Cities at $172.50 per share given that your Chairman, in a
characteristic burst of brilliance, sold Berkshire’s holdings in
the same company at $43 per share in 1978-80. Anticipating your
question, I spent much of 1985 working on a snappy answer that
would reconcile these acts.

A little more time, please.

Acquisition of Scott & Fetzer

Right after yearend we acquired The Scott & Fetzer Company
(“Scott Fetzer”) of Cleveland for about $320 million. (In
addition, about $90 million of pre-existing Scott Fetzer debt
remains in place.) In the next section of this report I describe
the sort of businesses that we wish to buy for Berkshire. Scott
Fetzer is a prototype - understandable, large, well-managed, a
good earner.

The company has sales of about $700 million derived from 17
businesses, many leaders in their fields. Return on invested
capital is good to excellent for most of these businesses. Some
well-known products are Kirby home-care systems, Campbell
Hausfeld air compressors, and Wayne burners and water pumps.

World Book, Inc. - accounting for about 40% of Scott
Fetzer’s sales and a bit more of its income - is by far the
company’s largest operation. It also is by far the leader in its
industry, selling more than twice as many encyclopedia sets
annually as its nearest competitor. In fact, it sells more sets
in the U.S. than its four biggest competitors combined.

Charlie and I have a particular interest in the World Book
operation because we regard its encyclopedia as something
special. I’ve been a fan (and user) for 25 years, and now have
grandchildren consulting the sets just as my children did. World
Book is regularly rated the most useful encyclopedia by teachers,
librarians and consumer buying guides. Yet it sells for less
than any of its major competitors. Childcraft, another World
Book, Inc. product, offers similar value. This combination of
exceptional products and modest prices at World Book, Inc. helped
make us willing to pay the price demanded for Scott Fetzer,
despite declining results for many companies in the direct-
selling industry.

An equal attraction at Scott Fetzer is Ralph Schey, its CEO
for nine years. When Ralph took charge, the company had 31
businesses, the result of an acquisition spree in the 1960s. He
disposed of many that did not fit or had limited profit
potential, but his focus on rationalizing the original potpourri
was not so intense that he passed by World Book when it became
available for purchase in 1978. Ralph’s operating and capital-
allocation record is superb, and we are delighted to be
associated with him.

The history of the Scott Fetzer acquisition is interesting,
marked by some zigs and zags before we became involved. The
company had been an announced candidate for purchase since early
1984. A major investment banking firm spent many months
canvassing scores of prospects, evoking interest from several.
Finally, in mid-1985 a plan of sale, featuring heavy
participation by an ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plan), was
approved by shareholders. However, as difficulty in closing
followed, the plan was scuttled.

I had followed this corporate odyssey through the
newspapers. On October 10, well after the ESOP deal had fallen
through, I wrote a short letter to Ralph, whom I did not know. I
said we admired the company’s record and asked if he might like
to talk. Charlie and I met Ralph for dinner in Chicago on
October 22 and signed an acquisition contract the following week.

The Scott Fetzer acquisition, plus major growth in our
insurance business, should push revenues above $2 billion in
1986, more than double those of 1985.

Miscellaneous

The Scott Fetzer purchase illustrates our somewhat haphazard
approach to acquisitions. We have no master strategy, no
corporate planners delivering us insights about socioeconomic
trends, and no staff to investigate a multitude of ideas
presented by promoters and intermediaries. Instead, we simply
hope that something sensible comes along - and, when it does, we
act.

To give fate a helping hand, we again repeat our regular
“business wanted” ad. The only change from last year’s copy is
in (1): because we continue to want any acquisition we make to
have a measurable impact on Berkshire’s financial results, we
have raised our minimum profit requirement.

Here’s what we’re looking for:
(1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax
earnings),
(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future
projections are of little interest to us, nor are
“turn-around” situations),
(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while
employing little or no debt,
(4) management in place (we can’t supply it),
(5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we
won’t understand it),
(6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time
or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily,
about a transaction when price is unknown).

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise
complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily
within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer
to buy for cash, but will consider issuance of stock when we
receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. Indeed,
following recent advances in the price of Berkshire stock,
transactions involving stock issuance may be quite feasible. We
invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people
with whom we have done business in the past. For the right
business - and the right people - we can provide a good home.

On the other hand, we frequently get approached about
acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: new
ventures, turnarounds, auction-like sales, and the ever-popular
(among brokers) “I’m-sure-something-will-work-out-if-you-people-
get-to-know-each-other”. None of these attracts us in the least.

* * *

Besides being interested in the purchases of entire
businesses as described above, we are also interested in the
negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of
stock, as in our Cap Cities purchase. Such purchases appeal to
us only when we are very comfortable with both the economics of
the business and the ability and integrity of the people running
the operation. We prefer large transactions: in the unusual case
we might do something as small as $50 million (or even smaller),
but our preference is for commitments many times that size.

* * *

About 96.8% of all eligible shares participated in
Berkshire’s 1985 shareholder-designated contributions program.
Total contributions made through the program were $4 million, and
1,724 charities were recipients. We conducted a plebiscite last
year in order to get your views about this program, as well as
about our dividend policy. (Recognizing that it’s possible to
influence the answers to a question by the framing of it, we
attempted to make the wording of ours as neutral as possible.) We
present the ballot and the results in the Appendix on page 69. I
think it’s fair to summarize your response as highly supportive
of present policies and your group preference - allowing for the
tendency of people to vote for the status quo - to be for
increasing the annual charitable commitment as our asset values
build.

We urge new shareholders to read the description of our
shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on
pages 66 and 67. If you wish to participate in future programs,
we strongly urge that you immediately make sure that your shares
are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in “street”
name or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 30,
1986 will be ineligible for the 1986 program.

* * *

Five years ago we were required by the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1969 to dispose of our holdings in The Illinois National
Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois. Our method of
doing so was unusual: we announced an exchange ratio between
stock of Rockford Bancorp Inc. (the Illinois National’s holding
company) and stock of Berkshire, and then let each of our
shareholders - except me - make the decision as to whether to
exchange all, part, or none of his Berkshire shares for Rockford
shares. I took the Rockford stock that was left over and thus my
own holding in Rockford was determined by your decisions. At the
time I said, “This technique embodies the world’s oldest and most
elementary system of fairly dividing an object. Just as when you
were a child and one person cut the cake and the other got first
choice, I have tried to cut the company fairly, but you get first
choice as to which piece you want.”

Last fall Illinois National was sold. When Rockford’s
liquidation is completed, its shareholders will have received
per-share proceeds about equal to Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic
value at the time of the bank’s sale. I’m pleased that this
five-year result indicates that the division of the cake was
reasonably equitable.

Last year I put in a plug for our annual meeting, and you
took me up on the invitation. Over 250 of our more than 3,000
registered shareholders showed up. Those attending behaved just
as those present in previous years, asking the sort of questions
you would expect from intelligent and interested owners. You can
attend a great many annual meetings without running into a crowd
like ours. (Lester Maddox, when Governor of Georgia, was
criticized regarding the state’s abysmal prison system. “The
solution”, he said, “is simple. All we need is a better class of
prisoners.” Upgrading annual meetings works the same way.)

I hope you come to this year’s meeting, which will be held
on May 20 in Omaha. There will be only one change: after 48
years of allegiance to another soft drink, your Chairman, in an
unprecedented display of behavioral flexibility, has converted to
the new Cherry Coke. Henceforth, it will be the Official Drink
of the Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting.

And bring money: Mrs. B promises to have bargains galore if
you will pay her a visit at The Nebraska Furniture Mart after the
meeting.


Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

March 4, 1986
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:17 par mihou
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 1986 was $492.5 million, or
26.1%. Over the last 22 years (that is, since present management
took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to
$2,073.06, or 23.3% compounded annually. Both the numerator and
denominator are important in the per-share book value
calculation: during the 22-year period our corporate net worth
has increased 10,600% while shares outstanding have increased
less than 1%.

In past reports I have noted that book value at most
companies differs widely from intrinsic business value - the
number that really counts for owners. In our own case, however,
book value has served for more than a decade as a reasonable if
somewhat conservative proxy for business value. That is, our
business value has moderately exceeded our book value, with the
ratio between the two remaining fairly steady.

The good news is that in 1986 our percentage gain in
business value probably exceeded the book value gain. I say
"probably" because business value is a soft number: in our own
case, two equally well-informed observers might make judgments
more than 10% apart.

A large measure of our improvement in business value
relative to book value reflects the outstanding performance of
key managers at our major operating businesses. These managers -
the Blumkins, Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan
Lipsey, and Ralph Schey - have over the years improved the
earnings of their businesses dramatically while, except in the
case of insurance, utilizing little additional capital. This
accomplishment builds economic value, or "Goodwill," that does
not show up in the net worth figure on our balance sheet, nor in
our per-share book value. In 1986 this unrecorded gain was
substantial.

So much for the good news. The bad news is that my
performance did not match that of our managers. While they were
doing a superb job in running our businesses, I was unable to
skillfully deploy much of the capital they generated.

Charlie Munger, our Vice Chairman, and I really have only
two jobs. One is to attract and keep outstanding managers to run
our various operations. This hasn’t been all that difficult.
Usually the managers came with the companies we bought, having
demonstrated their talents throughout careers that spanned a wide
variety of business circumstances. They were managerial stars
long before they knew us, and our main contribution has been to
not get in their way. This approach seems elementary: if my job
were to manage a golf team - and if Jack Nicklaus or Arnold
Palmer were willing to play for me - neither would get a lot of
directives from me about how to swing.

Some of our key managers are independently wealthy (we hope
they all become so), but that poses no threat to their continued
interest: they work because they love what they do and relish the
thrill of outstanding performance. They unfailingly think like
owners (the highest compliment we can pay a manager) and find all
aspects of their business absorbing.

(Our prototype for occupational fervor is the Catholic
tailor who used his small savings of many years to finance a
pilgrimage to the Vatican. When he returned, his parish held a
special meeting to get his first-hand account of the Pope. "Tell
us," said the eager faithful, "just what sort of fellow is he?"
Our hero wasted no words: "He’s a forty-four, medium.")

Charlie and I know that the right players will make almost
any team manager look good. We subscribe to the philosophy of
Ogilvy & Mather’s founding genius, David Ogilvy: "If each of us
hires people who are smaller than we are, we shall become a
company of dwarfs. But, if each of us hires people who are
bigger than we are, we shall become a company of giants."

A by-product of our managerial style is the ability it gives
us to easily expand Berkshire’s activities. We’ve read
management treatises that specify exactly how many people should
report to any one executive, but they make little sense to us.
When you have able managers of high character running businesses
about which they are passionate, you can have a dozen or more
reporting to you and still have time for an afternoon nap.
Conversely, if you have even one person reporting to you who is
deceitful, inept or uninterested, you will find yourself with
more than you can handle. Charlie and I could work with double
the number of managers we now have, so long as they had the rare
qualities of the present ones.

We intend to continue our practice of working only with
people whom we like and admire. This policy not only maximizes
our chances for good results, it also ensures us an
extraordinarily good time. On the other hand, working with
people who cause your stomach to churn seems much like marrying
for money - probably a bad idea under any circumstances, but
absolute madness if you are already rich.

The second job Charlie and I must handle is the allocation
of capital, which at Berkshire is a considerably more important
challenge than at most companies. Three factors make that so: we
earn more money than average; we retain all that we earn; and, we
are fortunate to have operations that, for the most part, require
little incremental capital to remain competitive and to grow.
Obviously, the future results of a business earning 23% annually
and retaining it all are far more affected by today’s capital
allocations than are the results of a business earning 10% and
distributing half of that to shareholders. If our retained
earnings - and those of our major investees, GEICO and Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc. - are employed in an unproductive manner, the
economics of Berkshire will deteriorate very quickly. In a
company adding only, say, 5% to net worth annually, capital-
allocation decisions, though still important, will change the
company’s economics far more slowly.

Capital allocation at Berkshire was tough work in 1986. We
did make one business acquisition - The Fechheimer Bros.
Company, which we will discuss in a later section. Fechheimer is
a company with excellent economics, run by exactly the kind of
people with whom we enjoy being associated. But it is relatively
small, utilizing only about 2% of Berkshire’s net worth.

Meanwhile, we had no new ideas in the marketable equities
field, an area in which once, only a few years ago, we could
readily employ large sums in outstanding businesses at very
reasonable prices. So our main capital allocation moves in 1986
were to pay off debt and stockpile funds. Neither is a fate
worse than death, but they do not inspire us to do handsprings
either. If Charlie and I were to draw blanks for a few years in
our capital-allocation endeavors, Berkshire’s rate of growth
would slow significantly.

We will continue to look for operating businesses that meet
our tests and, with luck, will acquire such a business every
couple of years. But an acquisition will have to be large if it
is to help our performance materially. Under current stock
market conditions, we have little hope of finding equities to buy
for our insurance companies. Markets will change significantly -
you can be sure of that and some day we will again get our turn
at bat. However, we haven’t the faintest idea when that might
happen.

It can’t be said too often (although I’m sure you feel I’ve
tried) that, even under favorable conditions, our returns are
certain to drop substantially because of our enlarged size. We
have told you that we hope to average a return of 15% on equity
and we maintain that hope, despite some negative tax law changes
described in a later section of this report. If we are to
achieve this rate of return, our net worth must increase $7.2
billion in the next ten years. A gain of that magnitude will be
possible only if, before too long, we come up with a few very big
(and good) ideas. Charlie and I can’t promise results, but we do
promise you that we will keep our efforts focused on our goals.

Sources of Reported Earnings

The table on the next page shows the major sources of
Berkshire’s reported earnings. This table differs in several
ways from the one presented last year. We have added four new
lines of business because of the Scott Fetzer and Fechheimer
acquisitions. In the case of Scott Fetzer, the two major units
acquired were World Book and Kirby, and each is presented
separately. Fourteen other businesses of Scott Fetzer are
aggregated in Scott Fetzer - Diversified Manufacturing. SF
Financial Group, a credit company holding both World Book and
Kirby receivables, is included in "Other." This year, because
Berkshire is so much larger, we also have eliminated separate
reporting for several of our smaller businesses.

In the table, amortization of Goodwill is not charged
against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the
Appendix to my letter in the 1983 Annual Report, is aggregated as
a separate item. (A Compendium of earlier letters, including the
Goodwill discussion, is available upon request.) Both the Scott
Fetzer and Fechheimer acquisitions created accounting Goodwill,
which is why the amortization charge for Goodwill increased in
1986.

Additionally, the Scott Fetzer acquisition required other
major purchase-price accounting adjustments, as prescribed by
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The GAAP
figures, of course, are the ones used in our consolidated
financial statements. But, in our view, the GAAP figures are not
necessarily the most useful ones for investors or managers.
Therefore, the figures shown for specific operating units are
earnings before purchase-price adjustments are taken into
account. In effect, these are the earnings that would have been
reported by the businesses if we had not purchased them.

A discussion of our reasons for preferring this form of
presentation is in the Appendix to this letter. This Appendix
will never substitute for a steamy novel and definitely is not
required reading. However, I know that among our 6,000
shareholders there are those who are thrilled by my essays on
accounting - and I hope that both of you enjoy the Appendix.

In the Business Segment Data on pages 41-43 and in the
Management’s Discussion section on pages 45-49, you will find
much additional information about our businesses. I urge you to
read those sections, as well as Charlie Munger’s letter to Wesco
shareholders, describing the various businesses of that
subsidiary, which starts on page 50.

(000s omitted)
------------------------------------------
Berkshire's Share
of Net Earnings
(after taxes and
Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)
------------------- -------------------
1986 1985 1986 1985
-------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ............... $(55,844) $(44,230) $(29,864) $(23,569)
Net Investment Income ...... 107,143 95,217 96,440 79,716
Buffalo News ................. 34,736 29,921 16,918 14,580
Fechheimer (Acquired 6/3/86) 8,400 --- 3,792 ---
Kirby ........................ 20,218 --- 10,508 ---
Nebraska Furniture Mart ...... 17,685 12,686 7,192 5,181
Scott Fetzer - Diversified Mfg. 25,358 --- 13,354 ---
See’s Candies ................ 30,347 28,989 15,176 14,558
Wesco - other than insurance 5,542 16,018 5,550 9,684
World Book ................... 21,978 --- 11,670 ---
Amortization of Goodwill (2,555) (1,475) (2,555) (1,475)
Other purchase-price
accounting charges ........ (10,033) --- (11,031) ---
Interest on Debt and
Pre-Payment penalty ....... (23,891) (14,415) (12,213) (7,288)
Shareholder-Designated
Contributions ............. (3,997) (4,006) (2,158) (2,164)
Other ........................ 20,770 6,744 8,685 3,725
-------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings ............. 195,857 125,449 131,464 92,948
Special General Foods
Distribution ................ --- 4,127 --- 3,779
Special Washington Post
Distribution ................ --- 14,877 --- 13,851
Sales of securities ............ 216,242 468,903 150,897 325,237
-------- -------- -------- --------
Total Earnings - all entities .. $412,099 $613,356 $282,361 $435,815
======== ======== ======== ========
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:22 par mihou
As you can see, operating earnings substantially improved
during 1986. Some of the improvement came from the insurance
operation, whose results I will discuss in a later section.
Fechheimer also will be discussed separately. Our other major
businesses performed as follows:

o Operating results at The Buffalo News continue to reflect a
truly superb managerial job by Stan Lipsey. For the third year
in a row, man-hours worked fell significantly and other costs
were closely controlled. Consequently, our operating margins
improved materially in 1986, even though our advertising rate
increases were well below those of most major newspapers.

Our cost-control efforts have in no way reduced our
commitment to news. We continue to deliver a 50% "news hole"
(the portion of the total space in the paper devoted to news), a
higher percentage, we believe, than exists at any dominant
newspaper in this country of our size or larger.

The average news hole at papers comparable to the News is
about 40%. The difference between 40% and 50% is more important
than it might first seem: a paper with 30 pages of ads and a 40%
news hole delivers 20 pages of news a day, whereas our paper
matches 30 pages of ads with 30 pages of news. Therefore, given
ad pages equal in number, we end up delivering our readers no
less than 50% more news.

We believe this heavy commitment to news is one of the
reasons The Buffalo News has the highest weekday penetration rate
(the percentage of households in the paper’s primary marketing
area purchasing it each day) among any of the top 50 papers in
the country. Our Sunday penetration, where we are also number
one, is even more impressive. Ten years ago, the only Sunday
paper serving Buffalo (the Courier-Express) had circulation of
271,000 and a penetration ratio of about 63%. The Courier-
Express had served the area for many decades and its penetration
ratio - which was similar to those existing in many metropolitan
markets - was thought to be a "natural" one, accurately
reflecting the local citizenry’s appetite for a Sunday product.

Our Sunday paper was started in late 1977. It now has a
penetration ratio of 83% and sells about 100,000 copies more each
Sunday than did the Courier-Express ten years ago - even though
population in our market area has declined during the decade. In
recent history, no other city that has long had a local Sunday
paper has experienced a penetration gain anywhere close to
Buffalo’s.

Despite our exceptional market acceptance, our operating
margins almost certainly have peaked. A major newsprint price
increase took effect at the end of 1986, and our advertising rate
increases in 1987 will again be moderate compared to those of the
industry. However, even if margins should materially shrink, we
would not reduce our news-hole ratio.

As I write this, it has been exactly ten years since we
purchased The News. The financial rewards it has brought us have
far exceeded our expectations and so, too, have the non-financial
rewards. Our respect for the News - high when we bought it - has
grown consistently ever since the purchase, as has our respect
and admiration for Murray Light, the editor who turns out the
product that receives such extraordinary community acceptance.
The efforts of Murray and Stan, which were crucial to the News
during its dark days of financial reversals and litigation, have
not in the least been lessened by prosperity. Charlie and I are
grateful to them.

o The amazing Blumkins continue to perform business miracles
at Nebraska Furniture Mart. Competitors come and go (mostly go),
but Mrs. B. and her progeny roll on. In 1986 net sales increased
10.2% to $132 million. Ten years ago sales were $44 million and,
even then, NFM appeared to be doing just about all of the
business available in the Greater Omaha Area. Given NFM’s
remarkable dominance, Omaha’s slow growth in population and the
modest inflation rates that have applied to the goods NFM sells,
how can this operation continue to rack up such large sales
gains? The only logical explanation is that the marketing
territory of NFM’s one-and-only store continues to widen because
of its ever-growing reputation for rock-bottom everyday prices
and the broadest of selections. In preparation for further
gains, NFM is expanding the capacity of its warehouse, located a
few hundred yards from the store, by about one-third.

Mrs. B, Chairman of Nebraska Furniture Mart, continues at
age 93 to outsell and out-hustle any manager I’ve ever seen.
She’s at the store seven days a week, from opening to close.
Competing with her represents a triumph of courage over judgment.

It’s easy to overlook what I consider to be the critical
lesson of the Mrs. B saga: at 93, Omaha based Board Chairmen have
yet to reach their peak. Please file this fact away to consult
before you mark your ballot at the 2024 annual meeting of
Berkshire.

o At See’s, sales trends improved somewhat from those of
recent years. Total pounds sold rose about 2%. (For you
chocaholics who like to fantasize, one statistic: we sell over
12,000 tons annually.) Same-store sales, measured in pounds, were
virtually unchanged. In the previous six years, same store
poundage fell, and we gained or maintained poundage volume only
by adding stores. But a particularly strong Christmas season in
1986 stemmed the decline. By stabilizing same-store volume and
making a major effort to control costs, See’s was able to
maintain its excellent profit margin in 1986 though it put
through only minimal price increases. We have Chuck Huggins, our
long-time manager at See’s, to thank for this significant
achievement.

See’s has a one-of-a-kind product "personality" produced by
a combination of its candy’s delicious taste and moderate price,
the company’s total control of the distribution process, and the
exceptional service provided by store employees. Chuck
rightfully measures his success by the satisfaction of our
customers, and his attitude permeates the organization. Few
major retailing companies have been able to sustain such a
customer-oriented spirit, and we owe Chuck a great deal for
keeping it alive and well at See’s.

See’s profits should stay at about their present level. We
will continue to increase prices very modestly, merely matching
prospective cost increases.

o World Book is the largest of 17 Scott Fetzer operations
that joined Berkshire at the beginning of 1986. Last year I
reported to you enthusiastically about the businesses of Scott
Fetzer and about Ralph Schey, its manager. A year’s experience
has added to my enthusiasm for both. Ralph is a superb
businessman and a straight shooter. He also brings exceptional
versatility and energy to his job: despite the wide array of
businesses that he manages, he is on top of the operations,
opportunities and problems of each. And, like our other
managers, Ralph is a real pleasure to work with. Our good
fortune continues.

World Book’s unit volume increased for the fourth
consecutive year, with encyclopedia sales up 7% over 1985 and 45%
over 1982. Childcraft’s unit sales also grew significantly.

World Book continues to dominate the U.S. direct-sales
encyclopedia market - and for good reasons. Extraordinarily
well-edited and priced at under 5 cents per page, these books are
a bargain for youngster and adult alike. You may find one
editing technique interesting: World Book ranks over 44,000 words
by difficulty. Longer entries in the encyclopedia include only
the most easily comprehended words in the opening sections, with
the difficulty of the material gradually escalating as the
exposition proceeds. As a result, youngsters can easily and
profitably read to the point at which subject matter gets too
difficult, instead of immediately having to deal with a
discussion that mixes up words requiring college-level
comprehension with others of fourth-grade level.

Selling World Book is a calling. Over one-half of our
active salespeople are teachers or former teachers, and another
5% have had experience as librarians. They correctly think of
themselves as educators, and they do a terrific job. If you
don’t have a World Book set in your house, I recommend one.

o Kirby likewise recorded its fourth straight year of unit
volume gains. Worldwide, unit sales grew 4% from 1985 and 33%
from 1982. While the Kirby product is more expensive than most
cleaners, it performs in a manner that leaves cheaper units far
behind ("in the dust," so to speak). Many 30- and 40-year-old
Kirby cleaners are still in active duty. If you want the best,
you buy a Kirby.

Some companies that historically have had great success in
direct sales have stumbled in recent years. Certainly the era of
the working woman has created new challenges for direct sales
organizations. So far, the record shows that both Kirby and
World Book have responded most successfully.

The businesses described above, along with the insurance
operation and Fechheimer, constitute our major business units.
The brevity of our descriptions is in no way meant to diminish
the importance of these businesses to us. All have been
discussed in past annual reports and, because of the tendency of
Berkshire owners to stay in the fold (about 98% of the stock at
the end of each year is owned by people who were owners at the
start of the year), we want to avoid undue repetition of basic
facts. You can be sure that we will immediately report to you in
detail if the underlying economics or competitive position of any
of these businesses should materially change. In general, the
businesses described in this section can be characterized as
having very strong market positions, very high returns on capital
employed, and the best of operating managements.

The Fechheimer Bros. Co.

Every year in Berkshire’s annual report I include a
description of the kind of business that we would like to buy.
This "ad" paid off in 1986.

On January 15th of last year I received a letter from Bob
Heldman of Cincinnati, a shareholder for many years and also
Chairman of Fechheimer Bros. Until I read the letter, however, I
did not know of either Bob or Fechheimer. Bob wrote that he ran
a company that met our tests and suggested that we get together,
which we did in Omaha after their results for 1985 were compiled.

He filled me in on a little history: Fechheimer, a uniform
manufacturing and distribution business, began operations in
1842. Warren Heldman, Bob’s father, became involved in the
business in 1941 and his sons, Bob and George (now President),
along with their sons, subsequently joined the company. Under
the Heldmans’ management, the business was highly successful.

In 1981 Fechheimer was sold to a group of venture
capitalists in a leveraged buy out (an LBO), with management
retaining an equity interest. The new company, as is the case
with all LBOS, started with an exceptionally high debt/equity
ratio. After the buy out, however, operations continued to be
very successful. So by the start of last year debt had been paid
down substantially and the value of the equity had increased
dramatically. For a variety of reasons, the venture capitalists
wished to sell and Bob, having dutifully read Berkshire’s annual
reports, thought of us.

Fechheimer is exactly the sort of business we like to buy.
Its economic record is superb; its managers are talented, high-
grade, and love what they do; and the Heldman family wanted to
continue its financial interest in partnership with us.
Therefore, we quickly purchased about 84% of the stock for a
price that was based upon a $55 million valuation for the entire
business.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:24 par mihou
The circumstances of this acquisition were similar to those
prevailing in our purchase of Nebraska Furniture Mart: most of
the shares were held by people who wished to employ funds
elsewhere; family members who enjoyed running their business
wanted to continue both as owners and managers; several
generations of the family were active in the business, providing
management for as far as the eye can see; and the managing family
wanted a purchaser who would not re-sell, regardless of price,
and who would let the business be run in the future as it had
been in the past. Both Fechheimer and NFM were right for us, and
we were right for them.

You may be amused to know that neither Charlie nor I have
been to Cincinnati, headquarters for Fechheimer, to see their
operation. (And, incidentally, it works both ways: Chuck Huggins,
who has been running See’s for 15 years, has never been to
Omaha.) If our success were to depend upon insights we developed
through plant inspections, Berkshire would be in big trouble.
Rather, in considering an acquisition, we attempt to evaluate the
economic characteristics of the business - its competitive
strengths and weaknesses - and the quality of the people we will
be joining. Fechheimer was a standout in both respects. In
addition to Bob and George Heldman, who are in their mid-60s -
spring chickens by our standards - there are three members of the
next generation, Gary, Roger and Fred, to insure continuity.

As a prototype for acquisitions, Fechheimer has only one
drawback: size. We hope our next acquisition is at least several
times as large but a carbon copy in all other respects. Our
threshold for minimum annual after-tax earnings of potential
acquisitions has been moved up to $10 million from the $5 million
level that prevailed when Bob wrote to me.

Flushed with success, we repeat our ad. If you have a
business that fits, call me or, preferably, write.

Here’s what we’re looking for:
(1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax
earnings),
(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future
projections are of little interest to us, nor are
"turn-around" situations),
(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while
employing little or no debt.
(4) management in place (we can’t supply it),
(5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we
won’t understand it),
(6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time
or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily,
about a transaction when price is unknown).

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise
complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily
within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer
to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive
as much in intrinsic business value as we give. Indeed,
following recent advances in the price of Berkshire stock,
transactions involving stock issuance may be quite feasible. We
invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people
with whom we have done business in the past. For the right
business - and the right people - we can provide a good home.

On the other hand, we frequently get approached about
acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: new
ventures, turnarounds, auction-like sales, and the ever-popular
(among brokers) "I’m-sure-something-will-work-out-if-you-people-
get-to-know-each-other." None of these attracts us in the least.

* * *

Besides being interested in the purchases of entire
businesses as described above, we are also interested in the
negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of
stock, as in our Cap Cities purchase. Such purchases appeal to
us only when we are very comfortable with both the economics of
the business and the ability and integrity of the people running
the operation. We prefer large transactions: in the unusual case
we might do something as small as $50 million (or even smaller),
but our preference is for commitments many times that size.
Insurance Operations

We present our usual table of industry figures, expanded
this year to include data about incurred losses and the GNP
inflation index. The contrast in 1986 between the growth in
premiums and growth in incurred losses will show you why
underwriting results for the year improved materially:

Statutory
Yearly Change Combined Ratio Yearly Change Inflation Rate
in Premiums After Policyholder in Incurred Measured by
Written (%) Dividends Losses (%) GNP Deflator (%)
------------- ------------------ ------------- ----------------
1981 ..... 3.8 106.0 6.5 9.7
1982 ..... 4.4 109.8 8.4 6.4
1983 ..... 4.6 112.0 6.8 3.9
1984 ..... 9.2 117.9 16.9 3.8
1985 ..... 22.1 116.5 16.1 3.3
1986 (Est.) 22.6 108.5 15.5 2.6

Source: Best’s Insurance Management Reports

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses
incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: a
ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above
100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer
earns from holding on to policyholders’ funds ("the float") is
taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-112 range
typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of
earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

The math of the insurance business, encapsulated by the
table, is not very complicated. In years when the industry’s
annual gain in revenues (premiums) pokes along at 4% or 5%,
underwriting losses are sure to mount. This is not because auto
accidents, fires, windstorms and the like are occurring more
frequently, nor has it lately been the fault of general
inflation. Today, social and judicial inflation are the major
culprits; the cost of entering a courtroom has simply ballooned.
Part of the jump in cost arises from skyrocketing verdicts, and
part from the tendency of judges and juries to expand the
coverage of insurance policies beyond that contemplated by the
insurer when the policies were written. Seeing no let-up in
either trend, we continue to believe that the industry’s revenues
must grow at close to 10% annually for it to just hold its own
in terms of profitability, even though general inflation may be
running only 2% - 4%.

In 1986, as noted, the industry’s premium volume soared even
faster than loss costs. Consequently, the underwriting loss of
the industry fell dramatically. In last year’s report we
predicted this sharp improvement but also predicted that
prosperity would be fleeting. Alas, this second prediction is
already proving accurate. The rate of gain in the industry’s
premium volume has slowed significantly (from an estimated 27.1%
in 1986’s first quarter, to 23.5% in the second, to 21.8% in the
third, to 18.7% in the fourth), and we expect further slowing in
1987. Indeed, the rate of gain may well fall below my 10%
"equilibrium" figure by the third quarter.

Nevertheless, underwriting results in 1987, assuming they
are not dragged down by a major natural catastrophe, will again
improve materially because price increases are recognized in
revenues on a lagged basis. In effect, the good news in earnings
follows the good news in prices by six to twelve months. But the
improving trend in earnings will probably end by late 1988 or
early 1989. Thereafter the industry is likely to head south in a
hurry.

Pricing behavior in the insurance industry continues to be
exactly what can be expected in a commodity-type business. Only
under shortage conditions are high profits achieved, and such
conditions don’t last long. When the profit sun begins to shine,
long-established insurers shower investors with new shares in
order to build capital. In addition, newly-formed insurers rush
to sell shares at the advantageous prices available in the new-
issue market (prices advantageous, that is, to the insiders
promoting the company but rarely to the new shareholders). These
moves guarantee future trouble: capacity soars, competitive
juices flow, and prices fade.
It’s interesting to observe insurance leaders beseech their
colleagues to behave in a more "statesmanlike" manner when
pricing policies. "Why," they ask, "can’t we learn from history,
even out the peaks and valleys, and consistently price to make
reasonable profits?" What they wish, of course, is pricing that
resembles, say, that of The Wall Street journal, whose prices are
ample to start with and rise consistently each year.

Such calls for improved behavior have all of the efficacy of
those made by a Nebraska corn grower asking his fellow growers,
worldwide, to market their corn with more statesmanship. What’s
needed is not more statesmen, but less corn. By raising large
amounts of capital in the last two years, the insurance industry
has, to continue our metaphor, vastly expanded its plantings of
corn. The resulting increase in "crop" - i.e., the proliferation
of insurance capacity - will have the same effect on prices and
profits that surplus crops have had since time immemorial.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:25 par mihou
Our own insurance operation did well in 1986 and is also
likely to do well in 1987. We have benefited significantly from
industry conditions. But much of our prosperity arises from the
efforts and ability of Mike Goldberg, manager of all insurance
operations.

Our combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding
structured settlements and financial reinsurance) fell from 111
in 1985 to 103 in 1986. In addition, our premium growth has been
exceptional: although final figures aren’t available, I believe
that over the past two years we were the fastest growing company
among the country’s top 100 insurers. Some of our growth, it is
true, came from our large quota-share contract with Fireman’s
Fund, described in last year’s report and updated in Charlie’s
letter on page 54. But even if the premiums from that contract
are excluded from the calculation, we probably still ranked first
in growth.

Interestingly, we were the slowest-growing large insurer in
the years immediately preceding 1985. In fact, we shrank - and
we will do so again from time to time in the future. Our large
swings in volume do not mean that we come and go from the
insurance marketplace. Indeed, we are its most steadfast
participant, always standing ready, at prices we believe
adequate, to write a wide variety of high-limit coverages. The
swings in our volume arise instead from the here-today, gone-
tomorrow behavior of other insurers. When most insurers are
"gone," because their capital is inadequate or they have been
frightened by losses, insureds rush to us and find us ready to
do business. But when hordes of insurers are "here," and are
slashing prices far below expectable costs, many customers
naturally leave us in order to take advantage of the bargains
temporarily being offered by our competition.

Our firmness on prices works no hardship on the consumer: he
is being bombarded by attractively priced insurance offers at
those times when we are doing little business. And it works no
hardship on our employees: we don’t engage in layoffs when we
experience a cyclical slowdown at one of our generally-profitable
insurance operations. This no-layoff practice is in our self-
interest. Employees who fear that large layoffs will accompany
sizable reductions in premium volume will understandably produce
scads of business through thick and thin (mostly thin).

The trends in National Indemnity’s traditional business -
the writing of commercial auto and general liability policies
through general agents - suggest how gun-shy other insurers
became for a while and how brave they are now getting. In the
last quarter of 1984, NICO’s monthly volume averaged $5 million,
about what it had been running for several years. By the first
quarter of 1986, monthly volume had climbed to about $35 million.
In recent months, a sharp decline has set in. Monthly volume is
currently about $20 million and will continue to fall as new
competitors surface and prices are cut. Ironically, the managers
of certain major new competitors are the very same managers that
just a few years ago bankrupted insurers that were our old
competitors. Through state-mandated guaranty funds, we must pay
some of the losses these managers left unpaid, and now we find
them writing the same sort of business under a new name. C’est
la guerre.

The business we call "large risks" expanded significantly
during 1986, and will be important to us in the future. In this
operation, we regularly write policies with annual premiums of $1
- $3 million, or even higher. This business will necessarily be
highly volatile - both in volume and profitability - but our
premier capital position and willingness to write large net lines
make us a very strong force in the market when prices are right.
On the other hand, our structured settlement business has become
near-dormant because present prices make no sense to us.

The 1986 loss reserve development of our insurance group is
chronicled on page 46. The figures show the amount of error in
our yearend 1985 liabilities that a year of settlements and
further evaluation has revealed. As you can see, what I told you
last year about our loss liabilities was far from true - and that
makes three years in a row of error. If the physiological rules
that applied to Pinocchio were to apply to me, my nose would now
draw crowds.

When insurance executives belatedly establish proper
reserves, they often speak of "reserve strengthening," a term
that has a rather noble ring to it. They almost make it sound as
if they are adding extra layers of strength to an already-solid
balance sheet. That’s not the case: instead the term is a
euphemism for what should more properly be called "correction of
previous untruths" (albeit non-intentional ones).

We made a special effort at the end of 1986 to reserve
accurately. However, we tried just as hard at the end of 1985.
Only time will tell whether we have finally succeeded in
correctly estimating our insurance liabilities.

Despite the difficulties we have had in reserving and the
commodity economics of the industry, we expect our insurance
business to both grow and make significant amounts of money - but
progress will be distinctly irregular and there will be major
unpleasant surprises from time to time. It’s a treacherous
business and a wary attitude is essential. We must heed Woody
Allen: "While the lamb may lie down with the lion, the lamb
shouldn’t count on getting a whole lot of sleep."

In our insurance operations we have an advantage in
attitude, we have an advantage in capital, and we are developing
an advantage in personnel. Additionally, I like to think we have
some long-term edge in investing the float developed from
policyholder funds. The nature of the business suggests that we
will need all of these advantages in order to prosper.

* * *

GEICO Corporation, 41% owned by Berkshire, had an
outstanding year in 1986. Industrywide, underwriting experience
in personal lines did not improve nearly as much as it did in
commercial lines. But GEICO, writing personal lines almost
exclusively, improved its combined ratio to 96.9 and recorded a
16% gain in premium volume. GEICO also continued to repurchase
its own shares and ended the year with 5.5% fewer shares
outstanding than it had at the start of the year. Our share of
GEICO’s premium volume is over $500 million, close to double that
of only three years ago. GEICO’s book of business is one of the
best in the world of insurance, far better indeed than
Berkshire’s own book.

The most important ingredient in GEICO’s success is rock-
bottom operating costs, which set the company apart from
literally hundreds of competitors that offer auto insurance. The
total of GEICO’s underwriting expense and loss adjustment expense
in 1986 was only 23.5% of premiums. Many major companies show
percentages 15 points higher than that. Even such huge direct
writers as Allstate and State Farm incur appreciably higher costs
than does GEICO.

The difference between GEICO’s costs and those of its
competitors is a kind of moat that protects a valuable and much-
sought-after business castle. No one understands this moat-
around-the-castle concept better than Bill Snyder, Chairman of
GEICO. He continually widens the moat by driving down costs
still more, thereby defending and strengthening the economic
franchise. Between 1985 and 1986, GEICO’s total expense ratio
dropped from 24.1% to the 23.5% mentioned earlier and, under
Bill’s leadership, the ratio is almost certain to drop further.
If it does - and if GEICO maintains its service and underwriting
standards - the company’s future will be brilliant indeed.
The second stage of the GEICO rocket is fueled by Lou
Simpson, Vice Chairman, who has run the company’s investments
since late 1979. Indeed, it’s a little embarrassing for me, the
fellow responsible for investments at Berkshire, to chronicle
Lou’s performance at GEICO. Only my ownership of a controlling
block of Berkshire stock makes me secure enough to give you the
following figures, comparing the overall return of the equity
portfolio at GEICO to that of the Standard & Poor’s 500:

Year GEICO’s Equities S&P 500
---- ---------------- -------
1980 .................. 23.7% 32.3%
1981 .................. 5.4 (5.0)
1982 .................. 45.8 21.4
1983 .................. 36.0 22.4
1984 .................. 21.8 6.2
1985 .................. 45.8 31.6
1986 .................. 38.7 18.6

These are not only terrific figures but, fully as important,
they have been achieved in the right way. Lou has consistently
invested in undervalued common stocks that, individually, were
unlikely to present him with a permanent loss and that,
collectively, were close to risk-free.

In sum, GEICO is an exceptional business run by exceptional
managers. We are fortunate to be associated with them.

Marketable Securities

During 1986, our insurance companies purchased about $700
million of tax-exempt bonds, most having a maturity of 8 to 12
years. You might think that this commitment indicates a
considerable enthusiasm for such bonds. Unfortunately, that’s
not so: at best, the bonds are mediocre investments. They simply
seemed the least objectionable alternative at the time we bought
them, and still seem so. (Currently liking neither stocks nor
bonds, I find myself the polar opposite of Mae West as she
declared: "I like only two kinds of men - foreign and domestic.")

We must, of necessity, hold marketable securities in our
insurance companies and, as money comes in, we have only five
directions to go: (1) long-term common stock investments; (2)
long-term fixed-income securities; (3) medium-term fixed-income
securities; (4) short-term cash equivalents; and (5) short-term
arbitrage commitments.

Common stocks, of course, are the most fun. When conditions
are right that is, when companies with good economics and good
management sell well below intrinsic business value - stocks
sometimes provide grand-slam home runs. But we currently find no
equities that come close to meeting our tests. This statement in
no way translates into a stock market prediction: we have no idea
- and never have had - whether the market is going to go up,
down, or sideways in the near- or intermediate term future.

What we do know, however, is that occasional outbreaks of
those two super-contagious diseases, fear and greed, will forever
occur in the investment community. The timing of these epidemics
will be unpredictable. And the market aberrations produced by
them will be equally unpredictable, both as to duration and
degree. Therefore, we never try to anticipate the arrival or
departure of either disease. Our goal is more modest: we simply
attempt to be fearful when others are greedy and to be greedy
only when others are fearful.

As this is written, little fear is visible in Wall Street.
Instead, euphoria prevails - and why not? What could be more
exhilarating than to participate in a bull market in which the
rewards to owners of businesses become gloriously uncoupled from
the plodding performances of the businesses themselves.
Unfortunately, however, stocks can’t outperform businesses
indefinitely.

Indeed, because of the heavy transaction and investment
management costs they bear, stockholders as a whole and over the
long term must inevitably underperform the companies they own.
If American business, in aggregate, earns about 12% on equity
annually, investors must end up earning significantly less. Bull
markets can obscure mathematical laws, but they cannot repeal
them.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:27 par mihou
The second category of investments open to our insurance
companies is long-term bonds. These are unlikely to be of
interest to us except in very special situations, such as the
Washington Public Power Supply System #1, #2 and #3 issues,
discussed in our 1984 report. (At yearend, we owned WPPSS issues
having an amortized cost of $218 million and a market value of
$310 million, paying us $31.7 million in annual tax-exempt
income.) Our aversion to long-term bonds relates to our fear that
we will see much higher rates of inflation within the next
decade. Over time, the behavior of our currency will be
determined by the behavior of our legislators. This relationship
poses a continuing threat to currency stability - and a
corresponding threat to the owners of long-term bonds.

We continue to periodically employ money in the arbitrage
field. However, unlike most arbitrageurs, who purchase dozens of
securities each year, we purchase only a few. We restrict
ourselves to large deals that have been announced publicly and do
not bet on the come. Therefore, our potential profits are apt to
be small; but, with luck, our disappointments will also be few.

Our yearend portfolio shown below includes one arbitrage
commitment, Lear-Siegler. Our balance sheet also includes a
receivable for $145 million, representing the money owed us (and
paid a few days later) by Unilever, then in the process of
purchasing Chesebrough-Ponds, another of our arbitrage holdings.
Arbitrage is an alternative to Treasury Bills as a short-term
parking place for money - a choice that combines potentially
higher returns with higher risks. To date, our returns from the
funds committed to arbitrage have been many times higher than
they would have been had we left those funds in Treasury Bills.
Nonetheless, one bad experience could change the scorecard
markedly.

We also, though it takes some straining, currently view
medium-term tax-exempt bonds as an alternative to short-term
Treasury holdings. Buying these bonds, we run a risk of
significant loss if, as seems probable, we sell many of them well
before maturity. However, we believe this risk is more than
counter-balanced first, by the much higher after-tax returns
currently realizable from these securities as compared to
Treasury Bills and second, by the possibility that sales will
produce an overall profit rather than a loss. Our expectation of
a higher total return, after allowing for the possibility of loss
and after taking into account all tax effects, is a relatively
close call and could well be wrong. Even if we sell our bonds at
a fairly large loss, however, we may end up reaping a higher
after-tax return than we would have realized by repeatedly
rolling over Treasury Bills.

In any event, you should know that our expectations for both
the stocks and bonds we now hold are exceptionally modest, given
current market levels. Probably the best thing that could happen
to us is a market in which we would choose to sell many of our
bond holdings at a significant loss in order to re-allocate funds
to the far-better equity values then very likely to exist. The
bond losses I am talking about would occur if high interest rates
came along; the same rates would probably depress common stocks
considerably more than medium-term bonds.

We show below our 1986 yearend net holdings in marketable
equities. All positions with a market value of over $25 million
are listed, and the interests attributable to minority
shareholdings of Wesco Financial Corp. and Nebraska Furniture
Mart are excluded.

No. of Shares Cost Market
------------- ---------- ----------
(000s omitted)
2,990,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ....... $515,775 $ 801,694
6,850,000 GEICO Corporation .............. 45,713 674,725
2,379,200 Handy & Harman ................. 27,318 46,989
489,300 Lear Siegler, Inc. ............. 44,064 44,587
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company .... 9,731 269,531
---------- ----------
642,601 1,837,526
All Other Common Stockholdings 12,763 36,507
---------- ----------
Total Common Stocks ............ $655,364 $1,874,033

We should note that we expect to keep permanently our three
primary holdings, Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation,
and The Washington Post. Even if these securities were to appear
significantly overpriced, we would not anticipate selling them,
just as we would not sell See’s or Buffalo Evening News if
someone were to offer us a price far above what we believe those
businesses are worth.

This attitude may seem old-fashioned in a corporate world in
which activity has become the order of the day. The modern
manager refers to his "portfolio" of businesses - meaning that
all of them are candidates for "restructuring" whenever such a
move is dictated by Wall Street preferences, operating conditions
or a new corporate "concept." (Restructuring is defined narrowly,
however: it extends only to dumping offending businesses, not to
dumping the officers and directors who bought the businesses in
the first place. "Hate the sin but love the sinner" is a
theology as popular with the Fortune 500 as it is with the
Salvation Army.)

Investment managers are even more hyperkinetic: their
behavior during trading hours makes whirling dervishes appear
sedated by comparison. Indeed, the term "institutional investor"
is becoming one of those self-contradictions called an oxymoron,
comparable to "jumbo shrimp," "lady mudwrestler" and "inexpensive
lawyer."

Despite the enthusiasm for activity that has swept business
and financial America, we will stick with our ‘til-death-do-us-
part policy. It’s the only one with which Charlie and I are
comfortable, it produces decent results, and it lets our managers
and those of our investees run their businesses free of
distractions.

NHP, Inc.

Last year we paid $23.7 million for about 50% of NHP, Inc.,
a developer, syndicator, owner and manager of multi-family rental
housing. Should all executive stock options that have been
authorized be granted and exercised, our equity interest will
decline to slightly over 45%.

NHP, Inc. has a most unusual genealogy. In 1967, President
Johnson appointed a commission of business and civic leaders, led
by Edgar Kaiser, to study ways to increase the supply of
multifamily housing for low- and moderate-income tenants.
Certain members of the commission subsequently formed and
promoted two business entities to foster this goal. Both are now
owned by NHP, Inc. and one operates under unusual ground rules:
three of its directors must be appointed by the President, with
the advice and consent of the Senate, and it is also required by
law to submit an annual report to the President.

Over 260 major corporations, motivated more by the idea of
public service than profit, invested $42 million in the two
original entities, which promptly began, through partnerships, to
develop government-subsidized rental property. The typical
partnership owned a single property and was largely financed by a
non-recourse mortgage. Most of the equity money for each
partnership was supplied by a group of limited partners who were
primarily attracted by the large tax deductions that went with
the investment. NHP acted as general partner and also purchased
a small portion of each partnership’s equity.

The Government’s housing policy has, of course, shifted and
NHP has necessarily broadened its activities to include non-
subsidized apartments commanding market-rate rents. In addition,
a subsidiary of NHP builds single-family homes in the Washington,
D.C. area, realizing revenues of about $50 million annually.

NHP now oversees about 500 partnership properties that are
located in 40 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico,
and that include about 80,000 housing units. The cost of these
properties was more than $2.5 billion and they have been well
maintained. NHP directly manages about 55,000 of the housing
units and supervises the management of the rest. The company’s
revenues from management are about $16 million annually, and
growing.

In addition to the equity interests it purchased upon the
formation of each partnership, NHP owns varying residual
interests that come into play when properties are disposed of and
distributions are made to the limited partners. The residuals on
many of NHP’s "deep subsidy" properties are unlikely to be of
much value. But residuals on certain other properties could
prove quite valuable, particularly if inflation should heat up.

The tax-oriented syndication of properties to individuals
has been halted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In the main, NHP
is currently trying to develop equity positions or significant
residual interests in non-subsidized rental properties of quality
and size (typically 200 to 500 units). In projects of this kind,
NHP usually works with one or more large institutional investors
or lenders. NHP will continue to seek ways to develop low- and
moderate-income apartment housing, but will not likely meet
success unless government policy changes.

Besides ourselves, the large shareholders in NHP are
Weyerhauser (whose interest is about 25%) and a management group
led by Rod Heller, chief executive of NHP. About 60 major
corporations also continue to hold small interests, none larger
than 2%.

Taxation

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 affects our various businesses in
important and divergent ways. Although we find much to praise in
the Act, the net financial effect for Berkshire is negative: our
rate of increase in business value is likely to be at least
moderately slower under the new law than under the old. The net
effect for our shareholders is even more negative: every dollar
of increase in per-share business value, assuming the increase is
accompanied by an equivalent dollar gain in the market value of
Berkshire stock, will produce 72 cents of after-tax gain for our
shareholders rather than the 80 cents produced under the old law.
This result, of course, reflects the rise in the maximum tax rate
on personal capital gains from 20% to 28%.

Here are the main tax changes that affect Berkshire:

o The tax rate on corporate ordinary income is scheduled to
decrease from 46% in 1986 to 34% in 1988. This change obviously
affects us positively - and it also has a significant positive
effect on two of our three major investees, Capital Cities/ABC
and The Washington Post Company.

I say this knowing that over the years there has been a lot
of fuzzy and often partisan commentary about who really pays
corporate taxes - businesses or their customers. The argument,
of course, has usually turned around tax increases, not
decreases. Those people resisting increases in corporate rates
frequently argue that corporations in reality pay none of the
taxes levied on them but, instead, act as a sort of economic
pipeline, passing all taxes through to consumers. According to
these advocates, any corporate-tax increase will simply lead to
higher prices that, for the corporation, offset the increase.
Having taken this position, proponents of the "pipeline" theory
must also conclude that a tax decrease for corporations will not
help profits but will instead flow through, leading to
correspondingly lower prices for consumers.

Conversely, others argue that corporations not only pay the
taxes levied upon them, but absorb them also. Consumers, this
school says, will be unaffected by changes in corporate rates.

What really happens? When the corporate rate is cut, do
Berkshire, The Washington Post, Cap Cities, etc., themselves soak
up the benefits, or do these companies pass the benefits along to
their customers in the form of lower prices? This is an
important question for investors and managers, as well as for
policymakers.

Our conclusion is that in some cases the benefits of lower
corporate taxes fall exclusively, or almost exclusively, upon the
corporation and its shareholders, and that in other cases the
benefits are entirely, or almost entirely, passed through to the
customer. What determines the outcome is the strength of the
corporation’s business franchise and whether the profitability of
that franchise is regulated.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:29 par mihou
For example, when the franchise is strong and after-tax
profits are regulated in a relatively precise manner, as is the
case with electric utilities, changes in corporate tax rates are
largely reflected in prices, not in profits. When taxes are cut,
prices will usually be reduced in short order. When taxes are
increased, prices will rise, though often not as promptly.

A similar result occurs in a second arena - in the price-
competitive industry, whose companies typically operate with very
weak business franchises. In such industries, the free market
"regulates" after-tax profits in a delayed and irregular, but
generally effective, manner. The marketplace, in effect,
performs much the same function in dealing with the price-
competitive industry as the Public Utilities Commission does in
dealing with electric utilities. In these industries, therefore,
tax changes eventually affect prices more than profits.

In the case of unregulated businesses blessed with strong
franchises, however, it’s a different story: the corporation
and its shareholders are then the major beneficiaries of tax
cuts. These companies benefit from a tax cut much as the
electric company would if it lacked a regulator to force down
prices.

Many of our businesses, both those we own in whole and in
part, possess such franchises. Consequently, reductions in their
taxes largely end up in our pockets rather than the pockets of
our customers. While this may be impolitic to state, it is
impossible to deny. If you are tempted to believe otherwise,
think for a moment of the most able brain surgeon or lawyer in
your area. Do you really expect the fees of this expert (the
local "franchise-holder" in his or her specialty) to be reduced
now that the top personal tax rate is being cut from 50% to 28%?

Your joy at our conclusion that lower rates benefit a number
of our operating businesses and investees should be severely
tempered, however, by another of our convictions: scheduled 1988
tax rates, both individual and corporate, seem totally
unrealistic to us. These rates will very likely bestow a fiscal
problem on Washington that will prove incompatible with price
stability. We believe, therefore, that ultimately - within, say,
five years - either higher tax rates or higher inflation rates
are almost certain to materialize. And it would not surprise us
to see both.

o Corporate capital gains tax rates have been increased from
28% to 34%, effective in 1987. This change will have an
important adverse effect on Berkshire because we expect much of
our gain in business value in the future, as in the past, to
arise from capital gains. For example, our three major
investment holdings - Cap Cities, GEICO, and Washington Post - at
yearend had a market value of over $1.7 billion, close to 75% of
the total net worth of Berkshire, and yet they deliver us only
about $9 million in annual income. Instead, all three retain a
very high percentage of their earnings, which we expect to
eventually deliver us capital gains.

The new law increases the rate for all gains realized in the
future, including the unrealized gains that existed before the
law was enacted. At yearend, we had $1.2 billion of such
unrealized gains in our equity investments. The effect of the new
law on our balance sheet will be delayed because a GAAP rule
stipulates that the deferred tax liability applicable to
unrealized gains should be stated at last year’s 28% tax rate
rather than the current 34% rate. This rule is expected to change
soon. The moment it does, about $73 million will disappear from
our GAAP net worth and be added to the deferred tax account.

o Dividend and interest income received by our insurance
companies will be taxed far more heavily under the new law.
First, all corporations will be taxed on 20% of the dividends
they receive from other domestic corporations, up from 15% under
the old law. Second, there is a change concerning the residual
80% that applies only to property/casualty companies: 15% of that
residual will be taxed if the stocks paying the dividends were
purchased after August 7, 1986. A third change, again applying
only to property/casualty companies, concerns tax-exempt bonds:
interest on bonds purchased by insurers after August 7, 1986 will
only be 85% tax-exempt.

The last two changes are very important. They mean that our
income from the investments we make in future years will be
significantly lower than would have been the case under the old
law. My best guess is that these changes alone will eventually
reduce the earning power of our insurance operation by at least
10% from what we could previously have expected.
o The new tax law also materially changes the timing of tax
payments by property/casualty insurance companies. One new rule
requires us to discount our loss reserves in our tax returns, a
change that will decrease deductions and increase taxable income.
Another rule, to be phased in over six years, requires us to
include 20% of our unearned premium reserve in taxable income.

Neither rule changes the amount of the annual tax accrual in
our reports to you, but each materially accelerates the schedule
of payments. That is, taxes formerly deferred will now be front-
ended, a change that will significantly cut the profitability of
our business. An analogy will suggest the toll: if, upon turning
21, you were required to immediately pay tax on all income you
were due to receive throughout your life, both your lifetime
wealth and your estate would be a small fraction of what they
would be if all taxes on your income were payable only when you
died.

Attentive readers may spot an inconsistency in what we say.
Earlier, discussing companies in price-competitive industries, we
suggested that tax increases or reductions affect these companies
relatively little, but instead are largely passed along to their
customers. But now we are saying that tax increases will affect
profits of Berkshire’s property/casualty companies even though
they operate in an intensely price-competitive industry.

The reason this industry is likely to be an exception to our
general rule is that not all major insurers will be working with
identical tax equations. Important differences will exist for
several reasons: a new alternative minimum tax will materially
affect some companies but not others; certain major insurers have
huge loss carry-forwards that will largely shield their income
from significant taxes for at least a few years; and the results
of some large insurers will be folded into the consolidated
returns of companies with non-insurance businesses. These
disparate conditions will produce widely varying marginal tax
rates in the property/casualty industry. That will not be the
case, however, in most other price-competitive industries, such
as aluminum, autos and department stores, in which the major
players will generally contend with similar tax equations.

The absence of a common tax calculus for property/casualty
companies means that the increased taxes falling on the industry
will probably not be passed along to customers to the degree that
they would in a typical price-competitive industry. Insurers, in
other words, will themselves bear much of the new tax burdens.

o A partial offset to these burdens is a "fresh start"
adjustment that occurred on January 1, 1987 when our December 31,
1986 loss reserve figures were converted for tax purposes to the
newly-required discounted basis. (In our reports to you, however,
reserves will remain on exactly the same basis as in the past -
undiscounted except in special cases such as structured
settlements.) The net effect of the "fresh start" is to give us a
double deduction: we will get a tax deduction in 1987 and future
years for a portion of our-incurred-but-unpaid insurance losses
that have already been fully deducted as costs in 1986 and
earlier years.

The increase in net worth that is produced by this change is
not yet reflected in our financial statements. Rather, under
present GAAP rules (which may be changed), the benefit will flow
into the earnings statement and, consequently, into net worth
over the next few years by way of reduced tax charges. We expect
the total benefit from the fresh-start adjustment to be in the
$30 - $40 million range. It should be noted, however, that this
is a one-time benefit, whereas the negative impact of the other
insurance-related tax changes is not only ongoing but, in
important respects, will become more severe as time passes.

o The General Utilities Doctrine was repealed by the new tax
law. This means that in 1987 and thereafter there will be a
double tax on corporate liquidations, one at the corporate level
and another at the shareholder level. In the past, the tax at
the corporate level could be avoided, If Berkshire, for example,
were to be liquidated - which it most certainly won’t be -
shareholders would, under the new law, receive far less from the
sales of our properties than they would have if the properties
had been sold in the past, assuming identical prices in each
sale. Though this outcome is theoretical in our case, the change
in the law will very materially affect many companies.
Therefore, it also affects our evaluations of prospective
investments. Take, for example, producing oil and gas
businesses, selected media companies, real estate companies, etc.
that might wish to sell out. The values that their shareholders
can realize are likely to be significantly reduced simply because
the General Utilities Doctrine has been repealed - though the
companies’ operating economics will not have changed adversely at
all. My impression is that this important change in the law has
not yet been fully comprehended by either investors or managers.

This section of our report has been longer and more
complicated than I would have liked. But the changes in the law
are many and important, particularly for property/casualty
insurers. As I have noted, the new law will hurt Berkshire’s
results, but the negative impact is impossible to quantify with
any precision.

Miscellaneous

We bought a corporate jet last year. What you have heard about such
planes is true: they are very expensive and a luxury in
situations like ours where little travel to out-of-the-way places
is required. And planes not only cost a lot to operate, they cost
a lot just to look at. Pre-tax, cost of capital plus depreciation
on a new $15 million plane probably runs $3 million annually. On
our own plane, bought for $850,000 used, such costs run close to
$200,000 annually.

Cognizant of such figures, your Chairman, unfortunately, has
in the past made a number of rather intemperate remarks about
corporate jets. Accordingly, prior to our purchase, I was forced
into my Galileo mode. I promptly experienced the necessary
"counter-revelation" and travel is now considerably easier - and
considerably costlier - than in the past. Whether Berkshire will
get its money’s worth from the plane is an open question, but I
will work at achieving some business triumph that I can (no
matter how dubiously) attribute to it. I’m afraid Ben Franklin
had my number. Said he: "So convenient a thing it is to be a
reasonable creature, since it enables one to find or make a
reason for everything one has a mind to do."

About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s
1986 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions
made through the program were $4 million, and 1,934 charities
were recipients.

We urge new shareholders to read the description of our
shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on
pages 58 and 59. If you wish to participate in future programs,
we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are
registered in the name of the actual owner, not in "street" name
or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 30, 1987
will be ineligible for the 1987 program.

* * *
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:32 par mihou
Last year almost 450 people attended our shareholders’
meeting, up from about 250 the year before (and from about a
dozen ten years ago). I hope you can join us on May 19th in
Omaha. Charlie and I like to answer owner-related questions
and I can promise you that our shareholders will pose many good
ones. Finishing up the questions may take quite a while - we
had about 65 last year so you should feel free to leave once
your own have been answered.

Last year, after the meeting, one shareholder from New
Jersey and another from New York went to the Furniture Mart,
where each purchased a $5,000 Oriental rug from Mrs. B. (To be
precise, they purchased rugs that might cost $10,000 elsewhere
for which they were charged about $5,000.) Mrs. B was pleased -
but not satisfied - and she will be looking for you at the store
after this year’s meeting. Unless our shareholders top last
year’s record, I’ll be in trouble. So do me (and yourself) a
favor, and go see her.



Warren E. Buffett
February 27, 1987 Chairman of the Board

Appendix

Purchase-Price Accounting Adjustments and the "Cash Flow" Fallacy



First a short quiz: below are abbreviated 1986 statements of earnings for two companies. Which business is the more valuable?





Company O




Company N




(000s Omitted)


Revenues……………………….








$677,240








$677,240




















Costs of Goods Sold:


















Historical costs, excluding depreciation…………………….




$341,170








$341,170






Special non-cash inventory costs…………………………….












4,979


(1)




Depreciation of plant and equipment ……………………...




8,301








13,355


(2)












349,471








359,504










$327,769








$317,736


Gross Profit …………………….


















Selling & Admin. Expense........




$260,286

$260,286

Amortization of Goodwill .........



____595


(3)

260,286

260,881


Operating Profit .....................…


$ 67,483

$ 56,855


Other Income, Net .................…


4,135








4,135


Pre-Tax Income ......................…








$ 71,618








$ 60,990


Applicable Income Tax:


















Historical deferred and current tax ……………………………….




$ 31,387








$ 31,387






Non-Cash Inter-period Allocation Adjustment .............




______








_____998


(4)












31,387








32,385


Net Income ............ $40,231 $28,605
======= =======

(Numbers (1) through (4) designate items discussed later in this section.)
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:32 par mihou
As you've probably guessed, Companies O and N are the same business - Scott Fetzer. In the "O" (for "old") column we have shown what the company's 1986 GAAP earnings would have been if we had not purchased it; in the "N" (for "new") column we have shown Scott Fetzer's GAAP earnings as actually reported by Berkshire.

It should be emphasized that the two columns depict identical economics - i.e., the same sales, wages, taxes, etc. And both "companies" generate the same amount of cash for owners. Only the accounting is different.

So, fellow philosophers, which column presents truth? Upon which set of numbers should managers and investors focus?

Before we tackle those questions, let's look at what produces the disparity between O and N. We will simplify our discussion in some respects, but the simplification should not produce any inaccuracies in analysis or conclusions.

The contrast between O and N comes about because we paid an amount for Scott Fetzer that was different from its stated net worth. Under GAAP, such differences - such premiums or discounts - must be accounted for by "purchase-price adjustments." In Scott Fetzer's case, we paid $315 million for net assets that were carried on its books at $172.4 million. So we paid a premium of $142.6 million.

The first step in accounting for any premium paid is to adjust the carrying value of current assets to current values. In practice, this requirement usually does not affect receivables, which are routinely carried at current value, but often affects inventories. Because of a $22.9 million LIFO reserve and other accounting intricacies, Scott Fetzer's inventory account was carried at a $37.3 million discount from current value. So, making our first accounting move, we used $37.3 million of our $142.6 million premium to increase the carrying value of the inventory.

Assuming any premium is left after current assets are adjusted, the next step is to adjust fixed assets to current value. In our case, this adjustment also required a few accounting acrobatics relating to deferred taxes. Since this has been billed as a simplified discussion, I will skip the details and give you the bottom line: $68.0 million was added to fixed assets and $13.0 million was eliminated from deferred tax liabilities. After making this $81.0 million adjustment, we were left with $24.3 million of premium to allocate.

Had our situation called for them two steps would next have been required: the adjustment of intangible assets other than Goodwill to current fair values, and the restatement of liabilities to current fair values, a requirement that typically affects only long-term debt and unfunded pension liabilities. In Scott Fetzer's case, however, neither of these steps was necessary.

The final accounting adjustment we needed to make, after recording fair market values for all assets and liabilities, was the assignment of the residual premium to Goodwill (technically known as "excess of cost over the fair value of net assets acquired"). This residual amounted to $24.3 million. Thus, the balance sheet of Scott Fetzer immediately before the acquisition, which is summarized below in column O, was transformed by the purchase into the balance sheet shown in column N. In real terms, both balance sheets depict the same assets and liabilities - but, as you can see, certain figures differ significantly.



Company O


Company N



(000s Omitted)

Assets




Cash and Cash Equivalents …………………………...


$ 3,593


$ 3,593

Receivables, net ………………………………………..


90,919


90,919

Inventories ……………………………………………


77,489


114,764

Other …………………………………………………….


5,954


5,954

Total Current Assets …………………………………..


177,955


215,230

Property, Plant, and Equipment, net ………………….


80,967


148,960

Investments in and Advances to Unconsolidated Subsidiaries and Joint Ventures ………………………


93,589


93,589

Other Assets, including Goodwill …………………….


9,836


34,210



$362,347


$491,989

Liabilities




Notes Payable and Current Portion of Long-term Debt ………………………………………………………


$ 4,650


$ 4,650

Accounts Payable ……………………………………...


39,003


39,003

Accrued Liabilities ……………………………………..


84,939


84,939

Total Current Liabilities ………………………………..


128,592


128,592

Long-term Debt and Capitalized Leases …………….


34,669


34,669

Deferred Income Taxes ………………………………..


17,052


4,075

Other Deferred Credits …………………………………


9,657


9,657

Total Liabilities …………………………………………


189,970


176,993

Shareholders' Equity …………………………………...


172,377


314,996

$362,347 $491,989
======== ========



The higher balance sheet figures shown in column N produce the lower income figures shown in column N of the earnings statement presented earlier. This is the result of the asset write-ups and of the fact that some of the written-up assets must be depreciated or amortized. The higher the asset figure, the higher the annual depreciation or amortization charge to earnings must be. The charges that flowed to the earnings statement because of the balance sheet write-ups were numbered in the statement of earnings shown earlier:

1. $4,979,000 for non-cash inventory costs resulting, primarily, from reductions that Scott Fetzer made in its inventories during 1986; charges of this kind are apt to be small or non-existent in future years.

2. $5,054,000 for extra depreciation attributable to the write-up of fixed assets; a charge approximating this amount will probably be made annually for 12 more years.

3. $595,000 for amortization of Goodwill; this charge will be made annually for 39 more years in a slightly larger amount because our purchase was made on January 6 and, therefore, the 1986 figure applies to only 98% of the year.

4. $998,000 for deferred-tax acrobatics that are beyond my ability to explain briefly (or perhaps even non-briefly); a charge approximating this amount will probably be made annually for 12 more years.

It is important to understand that none of these newly-created accounting costs, totaling $11.6 million, are deductible for income tax purposes. The "new" Scott Fetzer pays exactly the same tax as the "old" Scott Fetzer would have, even though the GAAP earnings of the two entities differ greatly. And, in respect to operating earnings, that would be true in the future also. However, in the unlikely event that Scott Fetzer sells one of its businesses, the tax consequences to the "old" and "new" company might differ widely.

By the end of 1986 the difference between the net worth of the "old" and "new" Scott Fetzer had been reduced from $142.6 million to $131.0 million by means of the extra $11.6 million that was charged to earnings of the new entity. As the years go by, similar charges to earnings will cause most of the premium to disappear, and the two balance sheets will converge. However, the higher land values and most of the higher inventory values that were established on the new balance sheet will remain unless land is disposed of or inventory levels are further reduced.

* * *

What does all this mean for owners? Did the shareholders of Berkshire buy a business that earned $40.2 million in 1986 or did they buy one earning $28.6 million? Were those $11.6 million of new charges a real economic cost to us? Should investors pay more for the stock of Company O than of Company N? And, if a business is worth some given multiple of earnings, was Scott Fetzer worth considerably more the day before we bought it than it was worth the following day?

If we think through these questions, we can gain some insights about what may be called "owner earnings." These represent (a) reported earnings plus (b) depreciation, depletion, amortization, and certain other non-cash charges such as Company N's items (1) and (4) less ( c) the average annual amount of capitalized expenditures for plant and equipment, etc. that the business requires to fully maintain its long-term competitive position and its unit volume. (If the business requires additional working capital to maintain its competitive position and unit volume, the increment also should be included in ( c) . However, businesses following the LIFO inventory method usually do not require additional working capital if unit volume does not change.)





Our owner-earnings equation does not yield the deceptively precise figures provided by GAAP, since( c) must be a guess - and one sometimes very difficult to make. Despite this problem, we consider the owner earnings figure, not the GAAP figure, to be the relevant item for valuation purposes - both for investors in buying stocks and for managers in buying entire businesses. We agree with Keynes's observation: "I would rather be vaguely right than precisely wrong."

The approach we have outlined produces "owner earnings" for Company O and Company N that are identical, which means valuations are also identical, just as common sense would tell you should be the case. This result is reached because the sum of (a) and (b) is the same in both columns O and N, and because( c) is necessarily the same in both cases.

And what do Charlie and I, as owners and managers, believe is the correct figure for the owner earnings of Scott Fetzer? Under current circumstances, we believe ( c) is very close to the "old" company's (b) number of $8.3 million and much below the "new" company's (b) number of $19.9 million. Therefore, we believe that owner earnings are far better depicted by the reported earnings in the O column than by those in the N column. In other words, we feel owner earnings of Scott Fetzer are considerably larger than the GAAP figures that we report.

That is obviously a happy state of affairs. But calculations of this sort usually do not provide such pleasant news. Most managers probably will acknowledge that they need to spend something more than (b) on their businesses over the longer term just to hold their ground in terms of both unit volume and competitive position. When this imperative exists - that is, when ( c) exceeds (b) - GAAP earnings overstate owner earnings. Frequently this overstatement is substantial. The oil industry has in recent years provided a conspicuous example of this phenomenon. Had most major oil companies spent only (b) each year, they would have guaranteed their shrinkage in real terms.

All of this points up the absurdity of the "cash flow" numbers that are often set forth in Wall Street reports. These numbers routinely include (a) plus (b) - but do not subtract ( c) . Most sales brochures of investment bankers also feature deceptive presentations of this kind. These imply that the business being offered is the commercial counterpart of the Pyramids - forever state-of-the-art, never needing to be replaced, improved or refurbished. Indeed, if all U.S. corporations were to be offered simultaneously for sale through our leading investment bankers - and if the sales brochures describing them were to be believed - governmental projections of national plant and equipment spending would have to be slashed by 90%.

"Cash Flow", true, may serve as a shorthand of some utility in descriptions of certain real estate businesses or other enterprises that make huge initial outlays and only tiny outlays thereafter. A company whose only holding is a bridge or an extremely long-lived gas field would be an example. But "cash flow" is meaningless in such businesses as manufacturing, retailing, extractive companies, and utilities because, for them, ( c) is always significant. To be sure, businesses of this kind may in a given year be able to defer capital spending. But over a five- or ten-year period, they must make the investment - or the business decays.

Why, then, are "cash flow" numbers so popular today? In answer, we confess our cynicism: we believe these numbers are frequently used by marketers of businesses and securities in attempts to justify the unjustifiable (and thereby to sell what should be the unsalable). When (a) - that is, GAAP earnings - looks by itself inadequate to service debt of a junk bond or justify a foolish stock price, how convenient it becomes for salesmen to focus on (a) + (b). But you shouldn't add (b) without subtracting ( c) : though dentists correctly claim that if you ignore your teeth they'll go away, the same is not true for ( c) . The company or investor believing that the debt-servicing ability or the equity valuation of an enterprise can be measured by totaling (a) and (b) while ignoring ( c) is headed for certain trouble.

* * *

To sum up: in the case of both Scott Fetzer and our other businesses, we feel that (b) on an historical-cost basis - i.e., with both amortization of intangibles and other purchase-price adjustments excluded - is quite close in amount to ( c) . (The two items are not identical, of course. For example, at See's we annually make capitalized expenditures that exceed depreciation by $500,000 to $1 million, simply to hold our ground competitively.) Our conviction about this point is the reason we show our amortization and other purchase-price adjustment items separately in the table on page 8 and is also our reason for viewing the earnings of the individual businesses as reported there as much more closely approximating owner earnings than the GAAP figures.

Questioning GAAP figures may seem impious to some. After all, what are we paying the accountants for if it is not to deliver us the "truth" about our business. But the accountants' job is to record, not to evaluate. The evaluation job falls to investors and managers.

Accounting numbers, of course, are the language of business and as such are of enormous help to anyone evaluating the worth of a business and tracking its progress. Charlie and I would be lost without these numbers: they invariably are the starting point for us in evaluating our own businesses and those of others. Managers and owners need to remember, however, that accounting is but an aid to business thinking, never a substitute for it.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:33 par mihou
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 1987 was $464 million, or
19.5%. Over the last 23 years (that is, since present management
took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to
$2,477.47, or at a rate of 23.1% compounded annually.

What counts, of course, is the rate of gain in per-share
business value, not book value. In many cases, a corporation's
book value and business value are almost totally unrelated. For
example, just before they went bankrupt, LTV and Baldwin-United
published yearend audits showing their book values to be $652
million and $397 million, respectively. Conversely, Belridge Oil
was sold to Shell in 1979 for $3.6 billion although its book
value was only $177 million.

At Berkshire, however, the two valuations have tracked
rather closely, with the growth rate in business value over the
last decade moderately outpacing the growth rate in book value.
This good news continued in 1987.

Our premium of business value to book value has widened for
two simple reasons: We own some remarkable businesses and they
are run by even more remarkable managers.

You have a right to question that second assertion. After
all, CEOs seldom tell their shareholders that they have assembled
a bunch of turkeys to run things. Their reluctance to do so
makes for some strange annual reports. Oftentimes, in his
shareholders' letter, a CEO will go on for pages detailing
corporate performance that is woefully inadequate. He will
nonetheless end with a warm paragraph describing his managerial
comrades as "our most precious asset." Such comments sometimes
make you wonder what the other assets can possibly be.

At Berkshire, however, my appraisal of our operating
managers is, if anything, understated. To understand why, first
take a look at page 7, where we show the earnings (on an
historical-cost accounting basis) of our seven largest non-
financial units: Buffalo News, Fechheimer, Kirby, Nebraska
Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See's Candies,
and World Book. In 1987, these seven business units had combined
operating earnings before interest and taxes of $180 million.

By itself, this figure says nothing about economic
performance. To evaluate that, we must know how much total
capital - debt and equity - was needed to produce these earnings.
Debt plays an insignificant role at our seven units: Their net
interest expense in 1987 was only $2 million. Thus, pre-tax
earnings on the equity capital employed by these businesses
amounted to $178 million. And this equity - again on an
historical-cost basis - was only $175 million.

If these seven business units had operated as a single
company, their 1987 after-tax earnings would have been
approximately $100 million - a return of about 57% on equity
capital. You'll seldom see such a percentage anywhere, let alone
at large, diversified companies with nominal leverage. Here's a
benchmark: In its 1988 Investor's Guide issue, Fortune reported
that among the 500 largest industrial companies and 500 largest
service companies, only six had averaged a return on equity of
over 30% during the previous decade. The best performer among
the 1000 was Commerce Clearing House at 40.2%.

Of course, the returns that Berkshire earns from these seven
units are not as high as their underlying returns because, in
aggregate, we bought the businesses at a substantial premium to
underlying equity capital. Overall, these operations are carried
on our books at about $222 million above the historical
accounting values of the underlying assets. However, the
managers of the units should be judged by the returns they
achieve on the underlying assets; what we pay for a business does
not affect the amount of capital its manager has to work with.
(If, to become a shareholder and part owner of Commerce Clearing
House, you pay, say, six times book value, that does not change
CCH's return on equity.)

Three important inferences can be drawn from the figures I
have cited. First, the current business value of these seven
units is far above their historical book value and also far above
the value at which they are carried on Berkshire's balance sheet.
Second, because so little capital is required to run these
businesses, they can grow while concurrently making almost all of
their earnings available for deployment in new opportunities.
Third, these businesses are run by truly extraordinary managers.
The Blumkins, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, and Ralph
Schey all meld unusual talent, energy and character to achieve
exceptional financial results.

For good reasons, we had very high expectations when we
joined with these managers. In every case, however, our
experience has greatly exceeded those expectations. We have
received far more than we deserve, but we are willing to accept
such inequities. (We subscribe to the view Jack Benny expressed
upon receiving an acting award: "I don't deserve this, but then,
I have arthritis and I don't deserve that either.")

Beyond the Sainted Seven, we have our other major unit,
insurance, which I believe also has a business value well above
the net assets employed in it. However, appraising the business
value of a property-casualty insurance company is a decidedly
imprecise process. The industry is volatile, reported earnings
oftentimes are seriously inaccurate, and recent changes in the
Tax Code will severely hurt future profitability. Despite these
problems, we like the business and it will almost certainly
remain our largest operation. Under Mike Goldberg's management,
the insurance business should treat us well over time.

With managers like ours, my partner, Charlie Munger, and I
have little to do with operations. in fact, it is probably fair
to say that if we did more, less would be accomplished. We have
no corporate meetings, no corporate budgets, and no performance
reviews (though our managers, of course, oftentimes find such
procedures useful at their operating units). After all, what can
we tell the Blumkins about home furnishings, or the Heldmans
about uniforms?

Our major contribution to the operations of our subsidiaries
is applause. But it is not the indiscriminate applause of a
Pollyanna. Rather it is informed applause based upon the two
long careers we have spent intensively observing business
performance and managerial behavior. Charlie and I have seen so
much of the ordinary in business that we can truly appreciate a
virtuoso performance. Only one response to the 1987 performance
of our operating managers is appropriate: sustained, deafening
applause.

Sources of Reported Earnings

The table on the following page shows the major sources of
Berkshire's reported earnings. In the table, amortization of
Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments
are not charged against the specific businesses to which they
apply but, instead, are aggregated and shown separately. In
effect, this procedure presents the earnings of our businesses as
they would have been reported had we not purchased them. In
appendixes to my letters in the 1983 and 1986 annual reports, I
explained why this form of presentation seems to us to be more
useful to investors and managers than the standard GAAP
presentation, which makes purchase-price adjustments on a
business-by business basis. The total net earnings we show in
the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP figures in our
audited financial statements.

In the Business Segment Data on pages 36-38 and in the
Management's Discussion section on pages 40-44 you will find much
additional information about our businesses. In these sections
you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis.
I urge you to read that material, as well as Charlie Munger's
letter to Wesco shareholders, describing the various businesses
of that subsidiary, which starts on page 45.

(000s omitted)
------------------------------------------
Berkshire's Share
of Net Earnings
(after taxes and
Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)
------------------- -------------------
1987 1986 1987 1986
-------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ............... $(55,429) $(55,844) $(20,696) $(29,864)
Net Investment Income ...... 152,483 107,143 136,658 96,440
Buffalo News ................. 39,410 34,736 21,304 16,918
Fechheimer (Acquired 6/3/86) 13,332 8,400 6,580 3,792
Kirby ........................ 22,408 20,218 12,891 10,508
Nebraska Furniture Mart ...... 16,837 17,685 7,554 7,192
Scott Fetzer Mfg. Group ...... 30,591 25,358 17,555 13,354
See's Candies ................ 31,693 30,347 17,363 15,176
Wesco - other than Insurance 6,209 5,542 4,978 5,550
World Book ................... 25,745 21,978 15,136 11,670
Amortization of Goodwill ..... (2,862) (2,555) (2,862) (2,555)
Other Purchase-Price
Accounting Adjustments .... (5,546) (10,033) (6,544) (11,031)
Interest on Debt and
Pre-Payment Penalty ....... (11,474) (23,891) (5,905) (12,213)
Shareholder-Designated
Contributions ............. (4,938) (3,997) (2,963) (2,158)
Other ........................ 22,460 20,770 13,696 8,685
-------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings ........... 280,919 195,857 214,745 131,464
Sales of Securities .......... 27,319 216,242 19,807 150,897
-------- -------- -------- --------
Total Earnings - All Entities .. $308,238 $412,099 $234,552 $282,361
======== ======== ======== ========

Gypsy Rose Lee announced on one of her later birthdays: "I
have everything I had last year; it's just that it's all two
inches lower." As the table shows, during 1987 almost all of our
businesses aged in a more upbeat way.

There's not a lot new to report about these businesses - and
that's good, not bad. Severe change and exceptional returns
usually don't mix. Most investors, of course, behave as if just
the opposite were true. That is, they usually confer the highest
price-earnings ratios on exotic-sounding businesses that hold out
the promise of feverish change. That prospect lets investors
fantasize about future profitability rather than face today's
business realities. For such investor-dreamers, any blind date
is preferable to one with the girl next door, no matter how
desirable she may be.

Experience, however, indicates that the best business
returns are usually achieved by companies that are doing
something quite similar today to what they were doing five or ten
years ago. That is no argument for managerial complacency.
Businesses always have opportunities to improve service, product
lines, manufacturing techniques, and the like, and obviously
these opportunities should be seized. But a business that
constantly encounters major change also encounters many chances
for major error. Furthermore, economic terrain that is forever
shifting violently is ground on which it is difficult to build a
fortress-like business franchise. Such a franchise is usually
the key to sustained high returns.

The Fortune study I mentioned earlier supports our view.
Only 25 of the 1,000 companies met two tests of economic
excellence - an average return on equity of over 20% in the ten
years, 1977 through 1986, and no year worse than 15%. These
business superstars were also stock market superstars: During the
decade, 24 of the 25 outperformed the S&P 500.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:36 par mihou
The Fortune champs may surprise you in two respects. First,
most use very little leverage compared to their interest-paying
capacity. Really good businesses usually don't need to borrow.
Second, except for one company that is "high-tech" and several
others that manufacture ethical drugs, the companies are in
businesses that, on balance, seem rather mundane. Most sell non-
sexy products or services in much the same manner as they did ten
years ago (though in larger quantities now, or at higher prices,
or both). The record of these 25 companies confirms that making
the most of an already strong business franchise, or
concentrating on a single winning business theme, is what usually
produces exceptional economics.

Berkshire's experience has been similar. Our managers have
produced extraordinary results by doing rather ordinary things -
but doing them exceptionally well. Our managers protect their
franchises, they control costs, they search for new products and
markets that build on their existing strengths and they don't get
diverted. They work exceptionally hard at the details of their
businesses, and it shows.

Here's an update:

o Agatha Christie, whose husband was an archaeologist, said
that was the perfect profession for one's spouse: "The older you
become, the more interested they are in you." It is students of
business management, not archaeologists, who should be interested
in Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin), the 94-year-old chairman of Nebraska
Furniture Mart.

Fifty years ago Mrs. B started the business with $500, and
today NFM is far and away the largest home furnishings store in
the country. Mrs. B continues to work seven days a week at the
job from the opening of each business day until the close. She
buys, she sells, she manages - and she runs rings around the
competition. It's clear to me that she's gathering speed and may
well reach her full potential in another five or ten years.
Therefore, I've persuaded the Board to scrap our mandatory
retirement-at-100 policy. (And it's about time: With every
passing year, this policy has seemed sillier to me.)

Net sales of NFM were $142.6 million in 1987, up 8% from
1986. There's nothing like this store in the country, and
there's nothing like the family Mrs. B has produced to carry on:
Her son Louie, and his three boys, Ron, Irv and Steve, possess
the business instincts, integrity and drive of Mrs. B. They work
as a team and, strong as each is individually, the whole is far
greater than the sum of the parts.

The superb job done by the Blumkins benefits us as owners,
but even more dramatically benefits NFM's customers. They saved
about $30 million in 1987 by buying from NFM. In other words,
the goods they bought would have cost that much more if purchased
elsewhere.

You'll enjoy an anonymous letter I received last August:
"Sorry to see Berkshire profits fall in the second quarter. One
way you may gain back part of your lost. (sic) Check the pricing
at The Furniture Mart. You will find that they are leaving 10%
to 20% on the table. This additional profit on $140 million of
sells (sic) is $28 million. Not small change in anyone's pocket!
Check out other furniture, carpet, appliance and T.V. dealers.
Your raising prices to a reasonable profit will help. Thank you.
/signed/ A Competitor."

NFM will continue to grow and prosper by following Mrs. B's
maxim: "Sell cheap and tell the truth."

o Among dominant papers of its size or larger, the Buffalo
News continues to be the national leader in two important ways:
(1) its weekday and Sunday penetration rate (the percentage of
households in the paper's primary market area that purchase it);
and (2) its "news-hole" percentage (the portion of the paper
devoted to news).

It may not be coincidence that one newspaper leads in both
categories: an exceptionally "newsrich" product makes for broad
audience appeal, which in turn leads to high penetration. Of
course, quantity must be matched by quality. This not only
means good reporting and good writing; it means freshness and
relevance. To be indispensable, a paper must promptly tell its
readers many things they want to know but won't otherwise learn
until much later, if ever.

At the News, we put out seven fresh editions every 24 hours,
each one extensively changed in content. Here's a small example
that may surprise you: We redo the obituary page in every edition
of the News, or seven times a day. Any obituary added runs
through the next six editions until the publishing cycle has been
completed.

It's vital, of course, for a newspaper to cover national and
international news well and in depth. But it is also vital for
it to do what only a local newspaper can: promptly and
extensively chronicle the personally-important, otherwise-
unreported details of community life. Doing this job well
requires a very broad range of news - and that means lots of
space, intelligently used.

Our news hole was about 50% in 1987, just as it has been
year after year. If we were to cut it to a more typical 40%, we
would save approximately $4 million annually in newsprint costs.
That interests us not at all - and it won't interest us even if,
for one reason or another, our profit margins should
significantly shrink.

Charlie and I do not believe in flexible operating budgets,
as in "Non-direct expenses can be X if revenues are Y, but must
be reduced if revenues are Y - 5%." Should we really cut our news
hole at the Buffalo News, or the quality of product and service
at See's, simply because profits are down during a given year or
quarter? Or, conversely, should we add a staff economist, a
corporate strategist, an institutional advertising campaign or
something else that does Berkshire no good simply because the
money currently is rolling in?

That makes no sense to us. We neither understand the adding
of unneeded people or activities because profits are booming, nor
the cutting of essential people or activities because
profitability is shrinking. That kind of yo-yo approach is
neither business-like nor humane. Our goal is to do what makes
sense for Berkshire's customers and employees at all times, and
never to add the unneeded. ("But what about the corporate jet?"
you rudely ask. Well, occasionally a man must rise above
principle.)

Although the News' revenues have grown only moderately since
1984, superb management by Stan Lipsey, its publisher, has
produced excellent profit growth. For several years, I have
incorrectly predicted that profit margins at the News would fall.
This year I will not let vou down: Margins will, without
question, shrink in 1988 and profit may fall as well.
Skyrocketing newsprint costs will be the major cause.

o Fechheimer Bros. Company is another of our family
businesses - and, like the Blumkins, what a family. Three
generations of Heldmans have for decades consistently, built the
sales and profits of this manufacturer and distributor of
uniforms. In the year that Berkshire acquired its controlling
interest in Fechheimer - 1986 - profits were a record. The
Heldmans didn't slow down after that. Last year earnings
increased substantially and the outlook is good for 1988.

There's nothing magic about the Uniform business; the only
magic is in the Heldmans. Bob, George, Gary, Roger and Fred know
the business inside and out, and they have fun running it. We
are fortunate to be in partnership with them.

o Chuck Huggins continues to set new records at See's, just as
he has ever since we put him in charge on the day of our purchase
some 16 years ago. In 1987, volume hit a new high at slightly
Under 25 million pounds. For the second year in a row, moreover,
same-store sales, measured in pounds, were virtually unchanged.
In case you are wondering, that represents improvement: In each
of the previous six years, same-store sales had fallen.

Although we had a particularly strong 1986 Christmas season,
we racked up better store-for-store comparisons in the 1987
Christmas season than at any other time of the year. Thus, the
seasonal factor at See's becomes even more extreme. In 1987,
about 85% of our profit was earned during December.

Candy stores are fun to visit, but most have not been fun
for their owners. From what we can learn, practically no one
besides See's has made significant profits in recent years from
the operation of candy shops. Clearly, Chuck's record at See's
is not due to a rising industry tide. Rather, it is a one-of-a-
kind performance.

His achievement requires an excellent product - which we
have - but it also requires genuine affection for the customer.
Chuck is 100% customer-oriented, and his attitude sets the tone
for the rest of the See's organization.

Here's an example of Chuck in action: At See's we regularly
add new pieces of candy to our mix and also cull a few to keep
our product line at about 100 varieties. Last spring we selected
14 items for elimination. Two, it turned out, were badly missed
by our customers, who wasted no time in letting us know what they
thought of our judgment: "A pox on all in See's who participated
in the abominable decision...;" "May your new truffles melt in
transit, may they sour in people's mouths, may your costs go up
and your profits go down...;" "We are investigating the
possibility of obtaining a mandatory injunction requiring you to
supply...;" You get the picture. In all, we received many hundreds of
letters.

Chuck not only reintroduced the pieces, he turned this
miscue into an opportunity. Each person who had written got a
complete and honest explanation in return. Said Chuck's letter:
"Fortunately, when I make poor decisions, good things often
happen as a result...;" And with the letter went a special gift
certificate.

See's increased prices only slightly in the last two years.
In 1988 we have raised prices somewhat more, though still
moderately. To date, sales have been weak and it may be
difficult for See's to improve its earnings this year.

o World Book, Kirby, and the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group
are all under the management of Ralph Schey. And what a lucky
thing for us that they are. I told you last year that Scott
Fetzer performance in 1986 had far exceeded the expectations that
Charlie and I had at the time of our purchase. Results in 1987
were even better. Pre-tax earnings rose 10% while average
capital employed declined significantly.

Ralph's mastery of the 19 businesses for which he is
responsible is truly amazing, and he has also attracted some
outstanding managers to run them. We would love to find a few
additional units that could be put under Ralph's wing.

The businesses of Scott Fetzer are too numerous to describe
in detail. Let's just update you on one of our favorites: At the
end of 1987, World Book introduced its most dramatically-revised
edition since 1962. The number of color photos was increased
from 14,000 to 24,000; over 6,000 articles were revised; 840 new
contributors were added. Charlie and I recommend this product to
you and your family, as we do World Book's products for younger
children, Childcraft and Early World of Learning.
In 1987, World Book unit sales in the United States
increased for the fifth consecutive year. International sales
and profits also grew substantially. The outlook is good for
Scott Fetzer operations in aggregate, and for World Book in
particular.
mihou
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
Message Mer 5 Juil - 1:37 par mihou
Insurance Operations

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table
presenting key figures for the insurance industry:

Statutory
Yearly Change Combined Ratio Yearly Change Inflation Rate
in Premiums After Policyholder in Incurred Measured by
Written (%) Dividends Losses (%) GNP Deflator (%)
------------- ------------------ ------------- ----------------
1981 ..... 3.8 106.0 6.5 9.6
1982 ..... 4.4 109.8 8.4 6.4
1983 ..... 4.6 112.0 6.8 3.8
1984 ..... 9.2 117.9 16.9 3.7
1985 ..... 22.1 116.3 16.1 3.2
1986 (Rev.) 22.2 108.0 13.5 2.6
1987 (Est.) 8.7 104.7 6.8 3.0

Source: Best's Insurance Management Reports


The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses
incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A
ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above
100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer
earns from holding on to policyholders' funds ("the float") is
taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range
typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of
earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

The math of the insurance business, encapsulated by the
table, is not very complicated. In years when the industry's
annual gain in revenues (premiums) pokes along at 4% or 5%,
underwriting losses are sure to mount. That is not because auto
accidents, fires, windstorms and the like are occurring more
frequently, nor has it lately been the fault of general
inflation. Today, social and judicial inflation are the major
culprits; the cost of entering a courtroom has simply ballooned.
Part of the jump in cost arises from skyrocketing verdicts, and
part from the tendency of judges and juries to expand the
coverage of insurance policies beyond that contemplated by the
insurer when the policies were written. Seeing no let-up in
either trend, we continue to believe that the industry's revenues
must grow at about 10% annually for it to just hold its own in
terms of profitability, even though general inflation may be
running at a considerably lower rate.

The strong revenue gains of 1985-87 almost guaranteed the
industry an excellent underwriting performance in 1987 and,
indeed, it was a banner year. But the news soured as the
quarters rolled by: Best's estimates that year-over-year volume
increases were 12.9%, 11.1%, 5.7%, and 5.6%. In 1988, the
revenue gain is certain to be far below our 10% "equilibrium"
figure. Clearly, the party is over.

However, earnings will not immediately sink. A lag factor
exists in this industry: Because most policies are written for a
one-year term, higher or lower insurance prices do not have their
full impact on earnings until many months after they go into
effect. Thus, to resume our metaphor, when the party ends and
the bar is closed, you are allowed to finish your drink. If
results are not hurt by a major natural catastrophe, we predict a
small climb for the industry's combined ratio in 1988, followed
by several years of larger increases.

The insurance industry is cursed with a set of dismal
economic characteristics that make for a poor long-term outlook:
hundreds of competitors, ease of entry, and a product that cannot
be differentiated in any meaningful way. In such a commodity-
like business, only a very low-cost operator or someone operating
in a protected, and usually small, niche can sustain high
profitability levels.

When shortages exist, however, even commodity businesses
flourish. The insurance industry enjoyed that kind of climate
for a while but it is now gone. One of the ironies of capitalism
is that most managers in commodity industries abhor shortage
conditions - even though those are the only circumstances
permitting them good returns. Whenever shortages appear, the
typical manager simply can't wait to expand capacity and thereby
plug the hole through which money is showering upon him. This is
precisely what insurance managers did in 1985-87, confirming
again Disraeli's observation: "What we learn from history is that
we do not learn from history."

At Berkshire, we work to escape the industry's commodity
economics in two ways. First, we differentiate our product by our
financial strength, which exceeds that of all others in the
industry. This strength, however, is limited in its usefulness.
It means nothing in the personal insurance field: The buyer of
an auto or homeowners policy is going to get his claim paid even
if his insurer fails (as many have). It often means nothing in
the commercial insurance arena: When times are good, many major
corporate purchasers of insurance and their brokers pay scant
attention to the insurer's ability to perform under the more
adverse conditions that may exist, say, five years later when a
complicated claim is finally resolved. (Out of sight, out of mind
- and, later on, maybe out-of-pocket.)

Periodically, however, buyers remember Ben Franklin's
observation that it is hard for an empty sack to stand upright
and recognize their need to buy promises only from insurers that
have enduring financial strength. It is then that we have a
major competitive advantage. When a buyer really focuses on
whether a $10 million claim can be easily paid by his insurer
five or ten years down the road, and when he takes into account
the possibility that poor underwriting conditions may then
coincide with depressed financial markets and defaults by
reinsurer, he will find only a few companies he can trust.
Among those, Berkshire will lead the pack.

Our second method of differentiating ourselves is the total
indifference to volume that we maintain. In 1989, we will be
perfectly willing to write five times as much business as we
write in 1988 - or only one-fifth as much. We hope, of course,
that conditions will allow us large volume. But we cannot
control market prices. If they are unsatisfactory, we will
simply do very little business. No other major insurer acts with
equal restraint.

Three conditions that prevail in insurance, but not in most
businesses, allow us our flexibility. First, market share is not
an important determinant of profitability: In this business, in
contrast to the newspaper or grocery businesses, the economic
rule is not survival of the fattest. Second, in many sectors of
insurance, including most of those in which we operate,
distribution channels are not proprietary and can be easily
entered: Small volume this year does not preclude huge volume
next year. Third, idle capacity - which in this industry largely
means people - does not result in intolerable costs. In a way
that industries such as printing or steel cannot, we can operate
at quarter-speed much of the time and still enjoy long-term
prosperity.

We follow a price-based-on-exposure, not-on-competition
policy because it makes sense for our shareholders. But we're
happy to report that it is also pro-social. This policy means
that we are always available, given prices that we believe are
adequate, to write huge volumes of almost any type of property-
casualty insurance. Many other insurers follow an in-and-out
approach. When they are "out" - because of mounting losses,
capital inadequacy, or whatever - we are available. Of course,
when others are panting to do business we are also available -
but at such times we often find ourselves priced above the
market. In effect, we supply insurance buyers and brokers with a
large reservoir of standby capacity.

One story from mid-1987 illustrates some consequences of our
pricing policy: One of the largest family-owned insurance
brokers in the country is headed by a fellow who has long been a
shareholder of Berkshire. This man handles a number of large
risks that are candidates for placement with our New York office.
Naturally, he does the best he can for his clients. And, just as
naturally, when the insurance market softened dramatically in
1987 he found prices at other insurers lower than we were willing
to offer. His reaction was, first, to place all of his business
elsewhere and, second, to buy more stock in Berkshire. Had we
been really competitive, he said, we would have gotten his
insurance business but he would not have bought our stock.

Berkshire's underwriting experience was excellent in 1987,
in part because of the lag factor discussed earlier. Our
combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding structured
settlements and financial reinsurance) was 105. Although the
ratio was somewhat less favorable than in 1986, when it was 103,
our profitability improved materially in 1987 because we had the
use of far more float. This trend will continue to run in our
favor: Our ratio of float to premium volume will increase very
significantly during the next few years. Thus, Berkshire's
insurance profits are quite likely to improve during 1988 and
1989, even though we expect our combined ratio to rise.
Re: Warren E. Buffett letters
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Warren E. Buffett letters

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